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WORLD POLITICS

VOL. XVII JANUARY 1965 No. 2

CONTENTS

A Developmental Approach to Political Systems — *Gabriel A. Almond* — 183

Neo-Destour Leadership and the "Confiscated Revolution" — *Douglas E. Ashford* — 215

An Alternative to the Grand Design — *Seyom Brown* — 232

Worker-Management Councils in Indonesia — *J. Panglaykim* — 243

RESEARCH NOTES

The Role of Social Science in China Scholarship — *Chalmers Johnson* — 256

Clausewitz: A Bibliographical Survey — *Peter Paret* — 272

REVIEW ARTICLES

The Policy Sciences of Development — *Harold D. Lasswell* — 286

Peace and War — *Robert W. Tucker* — 310

Old Realities and New Myths — *Morton A. Kaplan* — 334

The Contributors — ii

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A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL SYSTEMS

By GABRIEL A. ALMOND

DURING the past decade two tendencies have come to dominate the field of comparative politics. One of these is the concern for theoretical explication and methodological rigor, and the second is the emphasis on field studies of the "emerging," "new," and "non-Western" nations. The theoretical tendency has largely taken the form of applications of "systems" theory to the study of politics, and the chief criticism of this approach has been that it is a static theory, not suitable for the analysis and explanation of political change.

The great output of empirical studies of contemporary politics in the new and emerging nations and the relative decline in the volume of European political studies have similarly been criticized. Here the argument is that the relative neglect of Western political studies, and particularly of their historical dimension, handicaps us in our efforts to work out the developmental theories and approaches which we need for our research on the new and emerging nations.

Both of these criticisms have great cogency. Systems theory does have a static, "equilibrium" bias; and the stress on the politics of the new and emerging nations gives us an inadequate sampling of man's experience with social and political change. The only answer to this criticism is that this seems to be the way sciences develop—not by orderly, systematic progression, but in a dialectical process involving overemphases and neglects. If we are to come to grips more effectively with political change, we shall have to redress this imbalance, adapt systems theory in a developmental direction, and utilize historical knowledge of Western political development (but not only Western history) in elaborating theories of political systems and political change.

This article represents a move in this direction, an effort on the part of one political systems theorist to define what political development consists of and to take into account the variables which affect it.[1]

[1] Whatever merit this contribution to the theory of political change may have is due to a long series of polemics which began with my paper, "Comparative Political Systems" (*Journal of Politics*, XVII [August 1956], 391-409), and became somewhat more lively after the appearance of my introductory essay in Almond and Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960). An early and partial version of some of the ideas contained here appeared in Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VI (June 1963), 3-10. The polemics were in part with myself, in part with graduate students in seminars, in part

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I. System and Function

The term "system" has become increasingly common in the titles of texts and monographs in the field of comparative politics. Older texts tended to use such terms as "governments" or "foreign powers." Something more is involved here than mere style in nomenclature. The use of the concept of system reflects the penetration into political theory of the anthropological and sociological theory of functionalism. The chief social theorists whose names are associated with functionalism are the anthropologists Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown and the sociologists Parsons, Merton, and Marion Levy.[2] Though they differ substantially in their concepts of system and function, what these men have been saying is that our capacity for explanation and prediction in the social sciences is enhanced when we think of social structures and institutions as performing *functions* in *systems.*

The point being made here is both simple and important. A circulatory system in an organism makes little sense by itself. When we view it as serving a purpose or set of purposes for the functioning of the organism as a whole, we can begin to comprehend its significance. Similarly, political parties or administrative agencies mean little by themselves. Their significance becomes clear when we see them as interacting with other institutions to produce public policies and enforcements of public policies in the domestic or international environments.

Functional-system theory as formulated by such writers as Talcott Parsons and Marion Levy implies three conditions: functional requisites, interdependence, and equilibrium. A particular system, whether it be an organism, a machine, or a family, has to behave in particular ways, perform a set of tasks, in order to "be" the particular organism, machine, or family. Levy calls these requirements "functional requisites," and lists nine activities as essential to the existence of any society.

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with reviewers, and in most substantial part with my friends and colleagues of the Committee on Comparative Politics. These ideas were partly formulated during two summer workshops which the Committee held, one in 1962 and the second in 1963. Sidney Verba spent several weeks during both of these summers discussing "input-output" and "capabilities" theory with me. I am deeply in his debt for these formulations.

[2] Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science, and Religion* (Anchor Books: Garden City, N.Y., 1954); A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (Glencoe 1957); Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied* (Glencoe 1949); Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe 1951); Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951); R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe 1957); Marion Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton 1952).

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To illustrate, Levy includes among these requisites adaptation to the natural environment, differentiation of and recruitment to social roles, the maintenance of a common body of knowledge and beliefs, the socialization of the young, and the control of disruptive behavior.[3] Parsons speaks of four "imperatives of any system of action," including adaptation, goal gratification, integration, and latent pattern maintenance and tension management.[4] These and other writers also make the point that, for a system to continue in operation, these functions must be performed in certain ways. When a function is performed in such a way as to maintain the equilibrium of the system, the performance of the function by the agency or structure is referred to as "functional" (or *eufunctional*, in Marion Levy's formulation). When the performance upsets the equilibrium, then it is referred to as "dysfunctional." We shall come back to this concept of functionality-dysfunctionality at a later point.

We need to elaborate a little on the other two assumptions of systems theory—*interdependence* and *equilibrium*. By the interdependence of the parts of a system, we mean that when the properties of one component in a system change, all the others, and the system as a whole, are affected. Thus if the rings of an automobile erode, we speak of the car as "burning oil"; the functioning of other systems deteriorates; and the power of the car declines. Or, in the growth of organisms there are points, for example, when some change in the endocrine system affects the overall pattern of growth, the functioning of all the parts, and the general behavior of the organism. In political systems, the emergence of mass parties or mass media of communication changes the performance of all the other structures of the political system, and affects the general capabilities of the system in its domestic and foreign environments. In other words, when one variable in a system changes in magnitude or in quality, the others are subjected to strains and are transformed, and the system changes its pattern of performance; or the dysfunctional component is disciplined by regulatory mechanisms, and the equilibrium of the system is reestablished. Parsons and Shils argue that social systems tend toward equilibrium;[5] i.e., families, economies, churches, polities tend to preserve their character through time, or to change slowly. Hence the analytical scheme which they propose for generalized use in the social sciences is this concept of system, implying the interdependent interaction of struc-

[3] Levy, *Structure of Society*, 149ff.
[4] Talcott Parsons, *Economy and Society* (Glencoe 1956), 16ff.
[5] Parsons and Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action*, 107ff.

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tures performing functions in such a way as to maintain the social system in equilibrium.

Even in this starkly simple form, the generic system model has value for the study of politics. The concept of function pushes us into realism and away from normative or ideological definitions. To answer functional questions we have to observe what a particular social system actually is and does. The concepts of functionality and dysfunctionality sensitize us to the factors making for social stability and social change, and enable us to perceive them in an orderly and thorough way. The concept of interdependence forces us to examine the performance of any structure or institution systemically; i.e., in all of its ramifications and interdependences. We can no longer be contented with describing a single institution or looking at bilateral interactions. Our research must assume interdependence and interaction among all components.

II. Critique of Functional Theory

The introduction of functionalism into the social sciences has stirred up a good deal of controversy and polemic.[6] Among the critics of functional theory, the logician Hempel has raised questions about the scientific status of functionalism, arguing that its exponents fail to provide operational criteria of function and dysfunction, and of the kind of interaction among variables which maintain a system in equilibrium. Gouldner's principal criticism is that the concept of system and function has come from biology and mechanics, and that there has been a tendency to attribute the properties of organismic and mechanical systems to social systems. He points out that interdependence and equilibrium may be of a radically different character in social systems. The autonomy of the components of social systems—i.e., the extent to which they may vary without significantly affecting other variables and the system as a whole—may be far greater than in mechanical and organismic systems.

Gouldner also argues that there is a static tendency in systems theory, a tendency to stress the functionality of institutions and the equilibrium of social systems. The distinction as formulated in anthropological and sociological theory tends to be dichotomous; i.e., structures perform either functionally or dysfunctionally. He argues that they should be viewed as continua, since without specification and measurement it is

[6] See *inter alia* Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," and Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., *Symposium in Sociological Theory* (New York 1959), 241ff.

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impossible to say what kind and degree of performance by given structures and institutions produce what kind of social equilibrium. Here Gouldner and Hempel would agree that what we need is a model of interaction of components in which the relations among variables and their consequences for system performance are left open to empirical investigation.

A further valuable criticism is Gouldner's argument that there is a tendency to treat each component in a social system as having a value equal to each of the others. Actually the significance and autonomy of the various parts of social systems may be quite unequal. Thus one may argue that the bureaucracy in differentiated political systems is in some sense the central structure of these systems, and that all other structures are significant by virtue of the way in which they affect the performance of the bureaucracy. Here again we need system models more appropriate for social and political phenomena.

Finally Gouldner argues that such a social system theorist as Parsons does not give sufficient stress to the special character of the interaction of social systems with their environments. He may attribute too great an impermeability to the boundaries of social systems. Thus political systems are quite porous, so to speak. The exchanges and movements which take place between political systems and their societies or their international environments, particularly in the modern world, are quite massive. It is impossible to account for either equilibrium or change in political systems without observing the volume and kind of their interactions with their social and international environments.

The main burden of these criticisms is that social system theory is still too much under the influence of biological and mechanical analogies, and that it fails to specify operational indices for such concepts as functionality, interdependence, and equilibrium. The criticisms have merit, but they should not obscure the importance of the original insights of the social system theorists. What we are engaged in here is simply an elaboration and adaptation of their work.

Before we drop the generic system concept and turn to the special characteristics of political systems, we need to deal with one or two other terms. Intrinsic to the concept of system is the notion of boundary and of exchanges or actions across boundaries. A system starts somewhere and stops somewhere. In dealing with an organism or a machine, it is relatively easy to locate the boundary and specify the interactions between it and its environment. The gas goes into the tank; the motor converts it into revolutions of the crankshaft and the

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driving wheels; and the car moves on the highway. In dealing with social systems, of which political systems are a class, the problem of boundary is not that easy. We may speak of what separates a social system from its environment as a boundary, but what we mean by this is not at all clear. Social systems are not made up of individuals but of roles; i.e., a family consists of the roles of mother and father, husband and wife, sibling and sibling, and the like. The family is only one set of interacting roles for a group of individuals who also may have extra-familial roles, and hence be involved in other social systems. In the same sense, a political system consists of the roles of nationals, subjects, voters, interacting—as the case may be—with legislators, bureaucrats, judges, and the like. The same individuals who perform roles in the political system perform roles in other social systems, such as the economy, religious community, family, and voluntary associations. As individuals expose themselves to political communication, vote, demonstrate, they shift from non-political to political roles. One might say that on election day as citizens leave their farms, plants, and offices to go to the polling places, they are crossing the boundary from the economy to the polity. It is crossing the boundary in both an objective and a subjective sense. In the objective sense, a man leaves his assembly line, where he is performing a role in a manufacturing process, to enter the polling booth, where he is performing a role in a political process. In a psychological sense, some shift of norms, values, expectations, and cognitions takes place as well.

The concept of boundary as we apply it to social and political systems is, of course, an analogy. What we really mean by this analogy can be specified only if we examine empirically the actual exchanges which take place between one system and another. Thus, when we speak of the interaction of personalities and the political system, we are thinking of the impulses, attitudes, and values entering into the performance of political roles by the individuals who make up the political system. At some point in this interactive process, properties which we associate with personality, such as hostility and rigidity, get converted into attitudes toward or choices of particular foreign or defense policies or candidates for public office. In other words, there are boundaries here between general affective and value tendencies, and political attitudes and choices.

There is a boundary between the polity and the economy. For example, an inflation may reduce the real income of certain groups in the population. When these changes in the economic situations of particular groups get converted into demands for public policy or

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changes in political personnel, there is an interaction between the economy and the polity. What really happens in the empirical sense is that certain psychic states resulting from changes in the economic capabilities of groups are converted into demands on the political system, demands on trade union or other pressure group leaders that they lobby for particular actions by the legislative or executive agencies, and the like. Somewhere along the line here a boundary is passed from one system to another, from the economic system to the political system.

That we are using an analogy when we speak of the boundaries of political systems, and a misleadingly simple analogy at that, becomes clear when we consider the variety of phenomena we include under it. We use it in a simple physical sense, as when we speak of the boundaries of nations or of subnational political jurisdictions. We use it in a behavioral sense, as when we refer to the interactions of voters and candidates, governmental officials and citizens, as these are separated from the interactions of these same individuals in their roles as workers and employers, parishioners and clergy. We use it in a psychological sense, as when we refer to attitudes toward politics, politicians, public officials, and public policies, as these are differentiated from the other contents of the psyches of the members of a polity. Whenever we use the term we need to be clear just which one, or which combination, of these phenomena we have in mind.

Another way of thinking about the interaction of political systems with their environments is to divide the process into three phases, as is usually done in systems theory—input, conversion, output. The inputs and outputs which involve the political system with other social systems are transactions between the system and its environment; the conversion processes are internal to the political system. When we talk about the sources of inputs and how they enter the political system, and how outputs leave the political system and affect other social systems, we shall in effect be talking about the boundaries of the political system.

III. Three Types of Functions

One further thought before we leave this generic concept of system and turn to political systems, properly speaking. We have talked about the functions of systems and how they give the system its identity. Actually, we need to think of systems as functioning at different *levels*. One level of functioning involves the unit as a whole in its environment. An animal moves, while plants do not. Some machines process

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data; others produce power. An economy produces and distributes physical goods and services. Families produce children and socialize them into adult roles and disciplines. Religious systems regulate the relations of their members with authorities and norms to which supernatural qualities are attributed. What we focus on at this level is the behavior of the system as a unit in its relations with other social systems and the environment.

The second kind of functioning is internal to the system. Here we refer to "conversion processes," such as the digestion of food, the elimination of waste, the circulation of the blood, the transmission of impulses through the nervous system. The conversion processes or functions are the ways particular systems transform inputs into outputs. Obviously the two levels of behavior are related. In order for an animal to be able to move, hunt, dig, and the like, energy must be created in the organism and the use of the energy controlled and directed. The level and kind of performance of the system in its environment are tied up with a particular kind of structural-functional performance inside the system.

In talking about politics, we shall speak of the performance of the political system in its environment as the political system's "capabilities." What happens inside the political system we shall refer to as "conversion functions." To illustrate, we shall speak here of the "responsive capability" of political systems, meaning by the term the openness of the political system to demands coming from various groups in the society, or from the international political system. This capacity to respond is associated with the performance inside the political system of such functions as communication, interest articulation, aggregation, and rule-making.

Finally, we shall speak of "system-maintenance and adaptation functions." For an automobile to perform efficiently on the road, parts must be lubricated, repaired, replaced. New parts may perform stiffly; they must be "broken in." In a political system the incumbents of the various roles (diplomats, military officers, tax officials, and the like) must be recruited to these roles and learn how to perform them. New roles are created and new personnel "broken in." These functions (in machines, maintenance and replacement of parts; in politics, *recruitment* and *socialization*) do not directly enter into the conversion processes of the system; they affect the internal efficiency and operations of the system, and hence condition its performance.

When we compare classes of political systems with each other, or individual political systems with each other, we need to make these

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comparisons in terms of *capabilities, conversion functions*, and *system-maintenance and adaptation functions*, and the interrelations among these three kinds of functions. And when we talk about political development, it will also be in terms of the interrelations of these three kinds of political functions. A change in capability will be associated with changes in the performance of the conversion functions, and these changes in turn will be related to changes in political socialization and recruitment.

While the individual categories that we use may, on empirical test, turn out to be inappropriate, this threefold classification of functions is important for political analysis, and we believe it will hold up under testing and examination.[7] The theory of the political system will consist of the discovery of the relations among these different levels of functioning—capabilities, conversion functions, and system-maintenance and adaptation functions—and of the interrelations of the functions at each level. The theory of political change deals with those transactions between the political system and its environment that affect changes in general system performance, or capabilities that in turn are associated with changes in the performance of the system-adaptation functions and the conversion functions.

IV. The Political System: Inputs and Outputs

This discussion of the concept of system has been useful, but we shall be open to the criticism of being carried away by an analogy if we fail to bring these analytical tools into the world of politics. What is the political system? What gives it its special identity? Much has been written on this subject, and it is difficult to get agreement among political theorists on the precise language of their definitions. Common to most of these definitions is the association of the political system with the use of legitimate physical coercion in societies. Easton speaks of *authoritative allocation of values,* Lasswell and Kaplan of *severe deprivations*, Dahl of *power, rule, and authority*.[8] Common to all of

[7] This approach to functional requisites analysis is related to earlier work but differs in its explicit differentiation of these three classes of function. For other applications of functional theory to the study of political systems, see in particular David Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton 1955), 325ff.; Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (November 1958), 221-37; and Apter's contribution to Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics* (New York 1963), 723ff.; also William C. Mitchell, *The American Polity* (New York 1962), 7ff.

[8] David Easton, *The Political System* (New York 1953), 130ff.; Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950), 176; Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), 5ff.

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these definitions is their association of politics with legitimate heavy sanctions.[9] We have suggested elsewhere that "Legitimate force is the thread that runs through the inputs and outputs of the political system, giving it its special quality and salience and its coherence as a system. The inputs into the political system are all in some way related to claims for the employment of legitimate physical compulsion, whether these are demands for war or for recreational facilities. The outputs of the political system are also all in some way related to legitimate physical compulsion, however remote the relationship may be. Thus public recreational facilities are usually supported by taxation, and any violation of the regulations governing their use is a legal offense. . . ."[10] When we speak of the political system, we include all of the interactions—inputs as well as outputs—which affect the use or threat of use of physical coercion. "We mean to include not just the structures based on law, like parliaments, executives, bureaucracies, and courts, or just the associational or formally organized units, like parties, interest groups, and media of communication, but *all of the structures in their political aspects*, including undifferentiated structures like kinship and lineage, status and caste groups, as well as anomic phenomena like riots, street demonstrations, and the like."[11]

This is not the same thing as saying that the political system is solely concerned with force, violence, or compulsion, but only that its relation to coercion is its distinctive quality. Political elites may be concerned with peace, social welfare, individual freedom and self-realization, but their concern with these values as politicians is somehow related to compulsory actions such as taxation, law-making and law enforcement, foreign and defense policy. The political system is not the only system that makes rules and enforces them, but its rules and enforcements go "all the way" in compelling obedience or performance.

David Easton, who was the first political scientist to write about politics in explicit "system" terms, distinguishes two classes of inputs into the political system—*demands* and *supports*.[12] Demand inputs may be subclassified in a variety of ways. We suggest that they may be classified under four headings: (1) demands for goods and services, such as wage and hour laws, educational opportunities, recreational

[9] See Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York 1946), 78.

[10] Almond and Coleman, eds., *Politics of the Developing Areas*, 7.

[11] *Ibid.*, 8.

[12] "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), 383-400.

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facilities, roads and transportation; (2) demands for the regulation of behavior, such as provision of public safety, control over markets and labor relations, rules pertaining to marriage and the family; (3) demands for participation in the political system, for the right to vote, hold office, petition governmental bodies and officials, organize political associations, and the like; and (4) symbolic inputs, such as demands for the display of the majesty and power of the political system in periods of threat or on ceremonial occasions, or demands for the affirmation of norms, or the communication of policy intent from political elites.

Support inputs may be classified under four headings: (1) material supports, such as the payment of taxes or other levies, and the provision of services, such as labor contributions or military service; (2) obedience to laws and regulations; (3) participation, such as voting, joining organizations, and communicating about politics; and (4) manifestation of deference to public authority, symbols, and ceremonials.

On the output side, we may speak of four classes of transactions initiated by the political system that tend to match up with the supports we have listed above and may or may not be responsive to demands, depending on the kind of political system that is involved. These are: (1) extractions, which may take the form of tribute, booty, taxes, or personal services; (2) regulations of behavior, which may take a variety of forms and affect some subset of the whole gamut of human behavior and relations; (3) allocations or distributions of goods and services, opportunities, honors, statuses, and the like; and (4) symbolic outputs, including affirmations of values, displays of political symbols, statements of policies and intents.

When we speak of a stable political system, what we usually have in mind is a particular pattern of flow into and out of the political system, a particular kind of input-output flow. In the political system, properly speaking, the inputs of demands and supports are *converted* into extractive, regulative, distributive, and symbolic outputs. The demands can be handled by the political system; the strains which they impose are bearable without any basic change in structure or culture. The outputs are responsive to the demands in expected or legitimate ways; and the supports are responsive to the outputs again in expected or legitimate ways. When these conditions obtain, the political system may be said to be in a state of equilibrium both internally (in the performance of conversion functions by political structures) and in its relations with its environments.

One last point should be made about the flow of inputs and outputs.

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This is the question of the source of the inputs. We do not wish to leave the impression that inputs necessarily come only from the society of which the political system is a part, and that the political system must be viewed only in "conversion" terms. It is typical of political systems that inputs are generated internally by political elites—kings, presidents, ministers, legislators, and judges. Similarly, inputs may come from the international system in the form of demands and supports from foreign political systems. The flow of inputs and outputs includes transactions between the political system and the components of its domestic and foreign environments, and inputs may come from any one of these three sources—the domestic society, the political elites, and the international environment.

Something should be said about the relations between demands and supports. Generally speaking, demands stemming from inside or outside of the political system affect the policies or goals of the system, whether they be responsive, distributive, regulative, or the like, while supports of goods and services, obedience, deference, and the like provide the resources available to the political system which enable it to extract, regulate, and distribute—in other words, to carry out these goals.

V. The Conversion Functions

This brings us to the events which occur in the political system, properly speaking, or to what we have called the conversion functions. In every political system there is a set of political structures which initiates or processes inputs, and converts them into outputs. The demands entering the political system are articulated, aggregated, or combined; converted into policies, rules, regulations; applied, enforced, adjudicated. These kinds of conversion events occur in all political systems; they are incidental to any political process, no matter how simple or undifferentiated it may be. But the kinds of structures, institutions, or roles which perform these functions, and the way they perform them, vary from the intermittent political structure of a primitive band hardly distinguishable from the family, religious, and economic system, to the highly differentiated political systems of modern societies, with their complex interactions between domestic social and international systems, and the internal interaction of electorates, interest groups, political parties, media of communication, parliaments, bureaucracies, and courts. This conceptual language in regard to the political system enables us to discriminate effectively among these systems, to talk intelligently about their performance and prospects.

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This list of political conversion functions is not derived from generic system theory, or from concepts in use in sociological theory. Whatever virtue this classification of functions has results from the fact that it is derived from the observation of political systems. In other words, we are not forcing our data into categories that fit system concepts formulated in other disciplines, but developing concepts which can help us codify and classify political events.

The problem of developing categories to compare the conversion processes in different kinds of political systems is not unlike the problem of comparative anatomy and physiology. Surely the anatomical structure of a unicellular organism differs radically from that of a vertebrate, but something like the functions which in the vertebrate are performed by a specialized nervous system, a gastro-intestinal tract, a circulatory system, are performed in the amoeba by intermittent adaptations of its single cell. Hence we may say that the amoeba performs the same physiological functions as does the vertebrate. In addition we use the functional concepts which we derive from the study of more advanced biological forms to compare them with the less differentiated forms. Indeed, it is only by using the categories of physiological functioning derived from the analysis of differentiated organisms that we can compare them with the more simple ones.

In the same sense, if we look at complex political systems, we can observe specialized structures performing distinctive tasks. We observe electorates, media of communication, pressure groups, parties, parliaments, bureaucracies, and courts. By observing these structures and their interactions, we can explicate what distinctive jobs are being done in the process of converting political inputs into outputs. And we can use these functional categories to compare complex political systems with one another, and these with the less differentiated ones.

We suggest a sixfold classification of political conversion functions: (1) the articulation of interests or demands, (2) the aggregation or combination of interests into policy proposals, (3) the conversion of policy proposals into authoritative rules, (4) the application of general rules to particular cases, (5) the adjudication of rules in individual cases, and (6) the transmission of information about these events within the political system from structure to structure and between the political system and its social and international environments.

VI. The Capabilities of Political Systems

More than four decades ago when Max Weber delivered his lecture on "Politics as a Calling," he discouraged us from thinking of politics

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in terms of performance. He told us: ". . . The state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. There is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that has always been exclusive and peculiar to political associations. . . . Ultimately, we can define the modern state only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it . . . namely, the use of physical force."[13] Contemporary empirical political theory tends to follow Weber in its stress on power and process, the "who" and the "how" of politics. It emphasizes two questions: (1) Who makes decisions? (2) How are decisions made?[14] The performance of political systems tends to be inferred from structure and process or evaluated according to moral and ideological norms. When we introduce the concept of capabilities, their development and transformation, we explicitly add two more questions to the "who?" and the "how?" The first of these is what impact does the political system have, what does it do, in its domestic and international environments? And the second question is, what impact does the society and the international environment have on the political system?

Parsons comes closer to meeting the needs of the contemporary political theorist when he speaks of the function of the polity as that of the ". . . mobilization of societal resources and their commitment for the attainment of collective goals, for the formation and implementation of 'public policy.' "[15] Francis Sutton similarly emphasizes the importance of the functions of political systems in their social and international environments, stressing integration for the internal environment and representation for the international.[16] The development of the concept of the capabilities of political systems represents a pursuit of these leads, but we have had to go farther in specifying types of relationships between the political system and its environments, for "goal attainment," "integration," and "representation" must be broken down into their components, and these elements treated as continua, if we are to be able to code the performance of political systems in the environment in a discriminating way.

The concept of capabilities, then, is a way of characterizing the performance of the political system and of changes in performance, and of comparing political systems according to their performance. Our particular classification of capabilities is a coding scheme, derived

[13] Gerth and Mills, eds., *From Max Weber*, 77.

[14] See, for example, Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When and How* (Glencoe 1959); Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis.*

[15] Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe 1960), 181.

[16] "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Eckstein and Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics*, 77.

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from a kind of informal pre-testing operation. We have to try it out to determine whether it helps us discriminate among political systems, or handle political development in a meaningful way.

We suggest five categories of capability derived from our classification of inputs and outputs proposed at an earlier point. These are: (1) extractive, (2) regulative, (3) distributive, (4) symbolic, and (5) responsive. These five categories of capability may be viewed as functional requisites; that is, any political system—simple or complex—must in some measure extract resources from, regulate behavior in, distribute values in, respond to demands from, and communicate with other systems in its environments. There are surely other ways of categorizing the functional requisites of political systems at the system-environment level;[17] but this particular classification is presented as a useful starting point. It is the product of an informal coding of historical and contemporary political systems. A rigorous test of their usefulness can be made only by formal and explicit employment of these categories in coding historical and contemporary data.

But to say that these are functional requisites of any political system is only the beginning, since we are not interested in defining the minimal political system. We are concerned with characterizing real political systems both historical and contemporary, comparing them with one another at the system-environment level, dividing them into meaningful classes, and discovering their developmental properties.

For these purposes, we need to treat capabilities as performance magnitudes, either actual performance or potential performance. We stress that capability refers to performance and has to be separated from the institutions and agencies involved in the performance. To relate the institutions and structures to performance is one of the central problems of political analysis, and we ought not to confuse rates of performance with the means or instruments of performance.

Perhaps capabilities may be best thought of as ranges of particular kinds of performance. An examination of a particular political system may show variation in its rate of resource extraction over time. In war situations, the rate may be high; in normal periods, the rate may be substantially lower. But the problem of ascertaining the range of capability is more complex than examining rates of performance in normal and crisis situations. We may need to specify the extractive *potential* of a political system. What rate of extraction is this system capable of and under what conditions? This is only partly inferable

[17] See, for example, David Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," in *ibid.*, 82ff.

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from past record of performance. To get at this aspect of the range of capability we need to look at the support aspects of capabilities.

It is also necessary to distinguish between capabilities and elite policies and goals. Elite policies and goals may and usually do involve more than one capability. For example, a policy of economic development will require increases in resource extraction, and regulation, perhaps holding the line on distribution, and coping with demand inputs by increasing the symbolic capability. From this point of view capabilities may be viewed as ends intermediate to the policy goals of the elites. Since policies are made up of different doses of the different classes of outputs, capabilities analysis is essential to rigorous comparative policy analysis. It may enable us to distinguish sharply and operationally among different kinds of economic development, welfare, and other kinds of public policies.

It may also be in order to point to the implications of capabilities analysis for normative political theory. The inclusion of the performance or capabilities aspect of political systems may help bridge the gap which has been developing between the scientific and normative study of political systems. Questions regarding the "proper ends" of the state need to be grounded on empirical evidence of the different ways different kinds of political systems interact with individuals and groups in their domestic societies, and with political and social systems in the international environment. Empirical studies of the *performance* of political systems, of the *what* of politics (in addition to the *who* and *how*), should enable us to grapple operationally with what we mean when we speak of good and evil, just and unjust, political systems.

We may turn now to definitions of the five categories of capability. By the *extractive* capability, we mean measures of the range of performance of the political system in drawing material and human resources from the domestic and international environment. We separate this capability out because there have been political systems like the Mongol Empire, the warlords in China, guerrilla chieftains in Mexico, which have had little more than an extractive capability. Thus it makes sense to treat it separately, since it is to be found in all political systems, and is the distinguishing mark of a particular class of political systems. The extractive capability may be estimated quantitatively as a proportion of the national product; and its variations may be estimated quantitatively over time.

The *regulative* capability refers to the flow of control over behavior and of individual and group relations stemming from the political sys-

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tem. It is even more difficult to express it in quantitative terms than is the extractive capability, though aspects of it are measurable, and in a general way its magnitude, its pattern, and changes in its magnitude and pattern can be estimated. Here we have to concern ourselves with the objects of regulation, the frequency and intensity of regulation, and the limits of tolerance of regulation. While formulating indices to measure changes in this capability is a complex problem, the utility of this concept as an approach to political classification and development is evident. With these two capability concepts we can distinguish between primarily extractive political systems such as those referred to above, and extractive-regulative ones such as the historic bureaucratic political systems described by Eisenstadt in his recent book.[18] Furthermore, we can chart the developmental process from the one to the other, as regulative outputs cease being primarily unintended consequences of or instrumental to extraction and acquire goals of their own, such as some conception of social justice, order, economic advantage, or religious conformity.

The *distributive* capability refers to the allocation of goods, services, honors, statuses, and opportunities of various kinds from the political system to individuals and groups in the society. It is the flow of activity of the political system as dispenser of values or as redistributor of values among individuals and groups. Some aspects of this capability are more readily measurable than others. The structure of taxation may be viewed in its distributive aspects. The magnitude of welfare and educational programs can be expressed quantitatively, as proportions, and in terms of the social strata affected. Thus, while the general impact of public policy on social stratification is difficult to express quantitatively, there are aspects of it which are measurable, and the total pattern may be characterized for comparative and developmental purposes.

What we have said about political capabilities suggests a logic of capability analysis. An extractive capability implies some regulation and distribution, though these consequences may be unintended. A regulative capability implies an extractive capability, if only to gain the resources essential to regulation; and it is difficult to conceive of a regulative capability which would not in some way affect the distribution of values and opportunities. They are not only logically related. They suggest an order of development. Thus political systems which are primarily extractive in character would appear to be the simplest ones of all. They do not require the degree of role differentiation and specialized orientations that extractive-regulative systems or extractive-

[18] S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (Glencoe 1963).

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regulative-distributive ones do. Regulative systems cannot develop without extractive capabilities; thus the development of the one implies the development of the other. Increasing the extractive capability implies an increase in the regulative capability, as when, for example, political systems move from intermittent collection of tribute or raids to some form of regularized taxation. Similarly, a distributive system implies an extractive capability, and obviously can reach a higher distributive level if it is associated with a regulative capability as well.

At an earlier point we spoke of *symbolic* inputs, referring to demands for symbolic behavior on the part of political elites—displays of the majesty and power of the state in periods of threat or on ceremonial occasions, affirmations of norms, or communication of policy intent from political elites. We referred to symbolic supports, meaning such behavior as showing respect for, pride in, or enthusiasm for political elites, physical symbols of the state such as flags and monuments, and political ceremonials. And we spoke of symbolic outputs, including affirmations of values by elites, displays of physical symbols, displays of incumbents of sacred or honored offices, or statements of policies and intents. Thus we need to deal with the *symbolic capability* of political systems and treat its relations to the other forms of capability. Surely we do not mean by symbolic capability simply the quantitative flow of symbolic events into and out of the political system. If capability is a profile of rates of performance—e.g., rates of extraction, regulation, and distribution—then symbolic capability is a rate of *effective symbol flow*, from the political system into the society and the international environment. The displays of flags, troops, and ships, the conduct of ceremonies on the occasion of anniversaries, or on the birth, marriage, coronation, and death of princes, kings, presidents, and the like, the construction of monuments, visits by royalty or high officials, are symbolic outputs either in response to demands or independently initiated by elites. The effectiveness of symbolic outputs of this kind are difficult to measure, but political elites (and journalists and scholars) often attempt to do so by counting crowds and audiences, recording the decibels and duration of applause, examining reports on the demeanor of audiences, or conducting surveys of attitudes. Similarly, affirmations of values by elites may be effective or ineffective. They may create or mobilize reserves of support, as did Churchill's speeches during World War II. Statements of policies may facilitate other kinds of system capability, increasing the rate of acquiescence in extraction, obedience to regulation, acceptance of distribution, and reducing the input of demands.

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Symbolic output is not the same thing as symbolic capability. The output of symbols may cease to be edifying, menacing, stirring, credible, or even observed, listened to, or read. Royalty or high officials may be spat upon, pelted with rotten vegetables, statues thrown down from high places, pamphlets cast aside, television and radio sets turned off. Or, as in the case of new nations, the symbolism may have little if any resonance. Symbolic messages may be transmitted but not received. The symbols of local authority may be the only ones granted legitimacy, while the central symbolic output may have little, if any, meaning or effect.

While extractive, regulative, distributive, and symbolic capabilities are ways of describing the pattern of *outputs* of the political system into the internal and external environments, the *responsive* capability is a relationship between *inputs*, coming from the society or the international political system, and *outputs*. The responsive capability is an estimate of the degree to which outgoing activity is the consequence of demands arising in the environments of the political system. Again, the usefulness of this concept is suggested by the fact that it implies operational measures, i.e., a given quantity of responses to demands over the total of the demands. We are not minimizing the difficulties in translating this concept of responsiveness into specific measurable relationships. Obviously, in reality we shall have to settle for approximations, for measurement of aspects of the relationship between inputs and outputs.

The reader must forgive the crudeness of this provisional formulation of the concept of political capability. It is the logical next step from treating the political system in terms of interaction with its foreign and domestic environments, in input-conversion-output terms. The capabilities of a political system are a particular patterning of input and output, particular performance profiles of political systems. We are more interested in demonstrating the importance of this level of analysis than in making claims for the effectiveness of this particular schema, more concerned with focusing and directing theoretical speculation and research than in presenting what would be a prematurely formalized theory. The truth of the matter is that we shall only arrive at a good capabilities theory through historical and contemporary studies in which we test out these and other coding schemes.

Tentatively we suggest that we may use the same capabilities scheme for the international interaction of political systems. Just as a political system may have an extractive capability in regard to its own society, so also may it have an extractive capability in regard to the interna-

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tional environment. Thus it may draw spoils, booty of war, and tribute from the international environment, or it may conduct or protect trade and investment, receive subsidies or loans. In the same sense a political system may have an international regulative capability, as in the conquest and the assimilation of other territories and peoples, or in limiting the freedom of other political systems in their political, religious, or military arrangements, or through participation in international organizations which affect the conduct of nations. An international distributive capability may be expressed in tariff arrangements, the granting of subsidies, subventions, loans, and technical aid. The international symbolic capability is a set of measures of the impact of symbol output on political systems in the international environment. Revolutionary symbol output may have great impact on the performance and development of other political systems, and increase the impact of other capabilities in the international environment. Symbol output into the international environment in the form of appeals to common culture and tradition may similarly affect the performance and development of other political systems, and initiate feedbacks which benefit the initiating political system. Statements by political elites of foreign policies and intents may have important effects on the other capabilities of the initiating political system, as well as on the capabilities of other political systems. An international responsive or accommodative capability may be expressed as a relation between its extractive, regulative, and distributive capabilities, and demands from the international environment.

Again this concept of capabilities enables us to handle the relations between internal and international capabilities more systematically than has been the case in the past, just as it enables us to handle the relations among capabilities. Thus a political system which has developed only an internal extractive capability is unlikely to develop other forms of capability in the international environment. Only when a political system develops the institutions and orientations necessary for societal regulation is it likely to pursue regulative goals in the international environment. Similarly, a political system which has not developed an internal distributive capability is unlikely to pursue distributive goals in the international environment. Finally, a political system which has a high internal responsive capability will manifest a different kind of international responsiveness than a system in which internal responsiveness is less well developed. What we suggest here is that there are relations between domestic and international capabilities. But beyond this we can only say that the interrelation among domestic and international

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capabilities is a matter for deductive and empirical method used together, rather than for simple reliance on logical inference.

Thus the aims of research on political systems must be: (1) to discover and compare capabilities profiles summarizing the flows of inputs and outputs between these political systems and their domestic and international environments; (2) to discover and compare the structures and processes which convert these inputs into outputs; and (3) to discover and compare the recruitment and socialization processes which maintain these systems in equilibrium or enable them to adapt to environmental or self-initiated changes.

We have also to speak of the capabilities of other social systems. Just as the political system has a particular level and range of performance which we can summarize in terms of a capabilities profile, so also do other social systems in the society of which the political system is a part, and the international political system of which it is a member, have capabilities. Such social systems as the economy, the religious community, or family, kinship, and tribal structures also extract resources from the environment, regulate behavior, distribute values, display and transmit symbols, and respond to demands. Similarly, political systems in the international environment have capabilities, and the international political system may have some extractive, regulative, distributive, symbolic, and responsive capability. The flow of inputs into political systems, the kinds of problems they confront, and the pressure on them to develop capabilities will vary with the performance patterns or the capabilities of these other social systems. The distributive capability of an economy will affect the rate and intensity of demands for distribution, regulation, and the like entering into the political system. The need for developing the regulative capability of a political system will vary with the regulative capability of other social systems, including the international political system. When we think of the factors affecting the capabilities of a particular political system, we must see this problem in the context of interacting social systems, of which the political system is only one.

VII. The Support Aspects of Capability

Thus far we have stressed the performance aspect of capability, the rates which may be computed from the volume of particular kinds of output over time. We have already suggested that the range of capability can only partly be inferred from these performance rates, since political systems may operate at "less than capacity," or they may be

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drawing on reserves which in time will be exhausted. To get at this aspect of capability we need to deal with the question of supports. If we undertook the task of estimating the extractive capability of a political system, we would look for measures of the quantity or value of the money receipts, goods, and services drawn from the society in proportion to the total product of the society. But there are two aspects of political extraction which such a measure of the extractive capability would leave out. The first of these is the relation between the quantities "levied" by the political system, and the quantities delivered. How much tax evasion is there? How much evasion of military service, desertion? Is a day's work given for a day's pay? Do troops stand under fire? We speak of French and Italian *incivisme*, meaning by that a tendency toward nonperformance, evasion, unresponsiveness, desertion. In other words, we need some way of estimating social performance in response to the outputs of the political system. Does the population pay its taxes, obey the laws, accept the reallocation of values, opportunities, and wealth stemming from the political system, respond to symbolic displays and appeals?

Related to this support performance is the idea of "support potential." The tax receipts of a political system, the proportion of taxes paid to taxes levied, will not tell us what the tax potential of a political system is. In the same sense, measures of the output of obedience to regulations will not tell us what the obedience potential of a political system is.

The support aspect of capability has to be measured, therefore, in terms of the resources delivered in relation to the resources levied, the obedience accorded in proportion to the obedience required, the allocations accepted in relation to the allocations imposed, the responsiveness of the population to symbolic outputs in relation to that which is expected. And in addition to these support performance measures, we need to know what rate of extraction, regulation, distribution, and symbol receptivity a society might accept, under varying conditions, from its political system without fundamental structural change in the relations between the political system and the society.

This may appear to be a needless conceptual complication, but we are constantly making judgments of this kind about political systems, estimating loyalty, morale, and commitment in relation to the performance and stability of political systems. What we are suggesting is that the support aspect of capability may be measured in two ways, by estimates of support performance—in other words, of behavior—and by probing the political culture in order to ascertain what the support possibilities are, the depth of the loyalty, the intensity of the commitment,

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the availability of support for various purposes, and the like. These constitute a kind of political system "reserve," and we need to know something about this reserve in comparing political systems, or in speculating about developmental prospects.

One further point must be made about the support aspect of capability, and particularly about its system reserve aspect. It is a general reserve up to a point. It may be drawn upon in the form of support for the extractive, regulative, distributive, or symbolic outputs of the political system. Political loyalty and commitment, for example, may be drawn upon for support of a higher rate of taxation, a greater extent of regulation, a greater degree of social distribution, a more aggressive international capability. But there may be, and usually are, rigidities in the exchangeability of support for one kind of activity as against another. There may be greater potential support available for extractive measures than for distributive ones, or greater potential support for distributive measures than for regulative ones. And these potential supports will vary in different strata of the population, and under different circumstances. The system reserve component of capability is an aspect of political culture, the "support propensities" which are distributed among the various strata of the population, and the various roles of the political system. We have to estimate the content of this reserve, its magnitude, and its mobility, if we are going to be able to explain and predict political performance.

VIII. Dysfunctional Inputs

What we have presented so far is more than a classification of variables and less than a theory of political systems. It is more than a taxonomy, since it suggests interrelations among capabilities, and between capabilities, the structure and culture of the political system, and the performance of the system maintenance and adaptation functions. These relations, derived at least in part deductively, may be formulated as hypotheses for empirical testing against historical data. It is less than a theory, since prior to systematic study it is an open question whether these particular categories of capability and of conversion and maintenance functions will help us to discriminate the variables we need to know about in order to construct a good theory.

They may be viewed as a proposed first step toward constructing a theory of the political system and of the development of political systems. For example, our analysis of capabilities is suggestive of a theory of political growth, obviously not in any simple or unilinear sense. It

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is clear from the logic of capabilities analysis that there can be no extractive capability without some regulative capability, no regulative capability without a particular kind and level of extractive capability, no distributive capability without both a regulative and extractive capability, and that these output capabilities will be greatly affected by the development of a responsive capability. In addition, support of political system performance will be affected by the magnitude, content, and interrelations of the other capabilities, and in particular by symbol capability, and in turn will affect them. Finally, the particular pattern of domestic capabilities will significantly limit and affect, and be limited and affected by, the pattern of international capability.

In addition, capabilities theory enables us to relate the performance of the political system in its domestic and international environments to its internal characteristics. We mean that any level or pattern of system-environment performance rests on a set of structural and cultural conditions. An extractive capability, no matter how simple it may be, rests on some structural specialization and role orientations. A regulative capability requires some military, policing, and bureaucratic structure, and "command-obedience" expectations and orientations. A distributive capability requires further specialization of structure (a welfare bureaucracy, an educational system) and the development of distributive, welfare, and egalitarian orientations within the political system. A symbolic capability rests on some political liturgy and iconography, revered and respected offices and officeholders, and the development of attitudes of reverence and respect for these political rites and ceremonials, political roles, political persons. A responsive capability rests on the development of a specialized infrastructure and a political culture of participation, and the adaptation of the rest of the political system to their emergence. Finally, changes in the level and pattern of system performance require system adaptation in the form of role differentiation, changing recruitment patterns, and new forms and contents of political socialization.

What we have presented is less than a theory in still another sense. An analysis of the capabilities of a political system will enable us to characterize the kind of development a political system has attained, but it does not tell us what factors affect political change or development, what produces change in capabilities.

Changes in capability are the consequence of the interaction of *certain kinds* of inputs with the political system. Consider, for a moment, a political system in equilibrium. There are flows of demands and supports from various groupings in the society; flows of demands

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and supports from the international political system; and inputs from the political elites (within the political system itself). There are flows of output—extractions, regulations, allocations, communications—from the political system into the society and the international political system. Within the political system the demand and support inputs are converted into extractions, regulations, allocations, communications. When all these flows have a particular range of content and level of magnitude, such that the existing structure and culture of the political system can cope with them, we may speak of the political system as being in equilibrium. But suppose there is a change in the content or magnitude of any one or combination of these input flows.

Suppose there is a depression and the unemployed in a political system demand jobs and food from the government, or a war breaks out and a neighboring power threatens its territory. Or suppose a new dynasty in a political system wants to engage in large-scale construction of temples, palaces, and tombs. Or suppose a political elite embarks on a radical departure in taxation; or requires religious conformity of its entire population and suppresses other religions; or embarks on a large-scale program of welfare. Any one of these input flows may be innovative, dysfunctional—i.e., they may require significant changes in the magnitude and kind of performance of the political system. These dysfunctional input flows are what "cause" changes in the capabilities of political systems, in the conversion patterns and structures of the political system, and in the performance of the socialization and recruitment functions. What we need to know is how these dysfunctional flows affect political development, what kinds of dysfunctional flows affect what kinds of capability patterns.

To cope with this question operationally we need to lay out the dimensions in which the flow of inputs may vary. We suggest that they may vary (1) quantitatively, (2) in their substance or content, (3) in their intensity, (4) in their source, and (5) in the *number of kinds* of dysfunctional inputs affecting the political system at a given point in time. We also need to keep in mind, in considering the significance of these flows for political development, the reactions of elites to dysfunctional inputs from the domestic and international environments, and the capabilities of systems other than the one we are examining—other social systems in the same society and the international political system—as they affect or are affected by the processes of the political system. We will take these questions up separately.

First, the quantitative dimension. Dysfunctional inputs may be incremental. Thus demands for participation may begin in the middle

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classes, spread among the urban working classes, and then to the rural workers. In other countries, demands for participation may be for universal suffrage all at once. For lack of better terms, we may speak of this quantitative variable as a continuum with one extreme labeled "incremental" and the other "high magnitude." The quantity of dysfunctional inputs are of importance for political development because this will affect the scale of the cultural and structural adaptations which the political system is called upon to make. An incremental increase in demands for participation may require only a small adjustment in attitude and a limited set of structural adaptations; while a high magnitude increase may require a fundamental cultural reorientation and the establishment of a complex political infrastructure.

Second, dysfunctional inputs pertain to particular subject matter areas, such as the regulation of land-tenure, or of market relations, enfranchisement or eligibility for public office, religious practices, and family relations. The substance or content of the innovative flow will also significantly affect the pattern of political development, for a political system may be able, for example, to tolerate welfare innovations more readily than regulatory or participatory ones. In other words, the dysfunctionality of a particular kind of input will vary with the existing culture and structure of the political system.

Third, dysfunctional inputs may vary in their intensity. Demands by new strata of the population for the right to vote may take the form of orderly petitions or of violent demonstrations. Low-intensity demands will confront the political system with a different problem of adaptation than high-intensity demands. Low-intensity demands may produce no system adaptation, while high-intensity demands may result either in a change in the responsive capability of the political system in the form of enfranchisement of a new stratum of the population, or a change in the regulative capability in the form of a substantial increase in police forces and repressive action.

Fourth, dysfunctional inputs may vary according to their source. It will make a great deal of difference for the adaptation of the political system if the innovative flow comes from the international political system, from the political elite, or from the domestic society. And in the case of the last it will make a great deal of difference as to which stratum or subsystem of the domestic society is the source of the flow of demands. A political system which has been exposed to large-scale wars over a long period of time will develop a very different capability profile, and political structure and culture, than one which has been relatively protected from threats to its security. Innovation stemming

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from the political elites may be more immediately translated into changes in political capability than innovations stemming from either the domestic society or the international political system. And dysfunctional demands from the upper classes may involve less of a structural and cultural change in the political system than those emanating from less advantaged strata of the population.

Fifth, it will make a great deal of difference whether the political system is simultaneously confronted by demands for more than one kind of innovation. For example, a political system may be confronted by the threat of war at the same time that it is confronted by a rise in demands for political participation or welfare. It may have to choose among dysfunctional demands, responding to some and suppressing others. The political culture and structure of political systems will be fundamentally affected by such "simultaneous" or cumulative revolutions, just as those which have had the advantage of being able to meet crises one by one will show the marks of such historical experience.

We may also view political development from the vantage point of dysfunctional outputs. Whatever the source of the innovative outputs may be—the domestic society, the political system, the international political system—they may initiate a process of social change which affects inputs into the political system, or which produces capabilities in other social systems that affect the flow of demands and supports into the political system. But the relation of dysfunctional outputs to political development are indirect, through "input feedbacks." Thus the development of a welfare capability may produce changes in social structure and attitudes which will increase the support inputs of some elements of the society and the demand inputs of others. A shift from an aggressive to an accommodative foreign policy may increase the resources available for the development of a welfare capability, and result in innovative welfare inputs by the political elites.

In talking about dysfunctional inputs, we have stressed changes in the quantity, content, intensity, and incidence of different kinds of *demands*. But dysfunctionality can result from fluctuations in the flow of *supports* as well—losses of morale, failures of recruitment campaigns, declines in tax yields, widespread disobedience to regulations. Needless to say, fluctuations in support will be affected by the kinds of demands made by political elites on the society, as well as by the responsiveness of elites to demands stemming from the society.

The extent to which the political system is loaded by dysfunctional flows will vary with the capabilities of other social systems in the

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domestic society and international system. An economy may develop new capabilities—new systems of production and distribution—and as a consequence the loading of the political system with distributive demands may be significantly reduced, thereby affecting political development. Or a religious system may develop regulative capabilities that reduce the flow of innovative demands on the political system. Or the international political system may develop a regulative or distributive capability that reduces the pressure on the political system. A case in point would be the international military or technical assistance units of the United Nations that reduce the pressure for the development of extractive and regulative capabilities in some of the new nations. Thus the existence of, or the development of, capabilities in other social systems may affect the rate of flow of dysfunctional inputs, keeping the flow at the incremental and low-intensity level, and perhaps help avoid some of the disruptive consequences of multi-issue dysfunctional pressures.

We must never lose sight of innovation and change outside the political system in trying to account for a particular pattern of political development. But one variable which we must treat in greater detail is the reaction pattern of political elites, the behavior of important role incumbents in the political system as they are exposed to dysfunctional demands or supports. Perhaps the term "reaction" is incorrect, for it may lead us to overlook the originative and creative activities of political elites. Political elites both originate innovative flows and respond to innovative flows which originate elsewhere. When political elites are themselves the source of innovation, when they develop new goals and new capabilities in the pursuit of these goals, then we must examine these changes in capability and follow through the consequences of such developments for the society and the international system, and from these environments back into the political system again.

When political elites are "reacting" to dysfunctional inputs, then we must examine the relation between these reactions and the loading of the political system. The reaction pattern of political elites will often determine whether a flow of innovative demands changes from a low magnitude to a high magnitude, from a low intensity to a high intensity, from a simple to a multi-issue flow, from a single source to many sources. This interaction between dysfunctional pressures and elite reaction is on the same level of importance as is the response patterns of other social systems from the point of view of the development of political system capabilities.

A political elite confronted by dysfunctional flows of demands and

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supports has available to it three possible modes of reaction or some combination of these reactions. It may react adaptively. For example, if there is a demand for the suffrage among strata in the population, it may yield to these demands and accept the changes in culture, structure, and performance that this requires. An adaptive reaction is an acquiescence to demands in terms of those demands. Thus demands for innovation in welfare programs are met by such innovation, although even such adaptive behavior usually will require some creativity on the part of the elites. The content of a welfare program has to be specifically elaborated, staff recruited and trained, and modes of enforcement devised, tested, perfected.

A second possible mode of elite reaction may be described as rejective. The rejection of demands may take the form of elite indifference ("Let them eat cake"), explicit refusal to accept demands for innovation, or repression of the demands. The mode of rejection will, of course, affect the development of capabilities. Indifference may result in an accumulation of demands, in increases in their number, intensity, and the groups involved in the demands. The rise in pressure for innovation may reach the point where the elite must react either adaptively or repressively. Either reaction will affect the capabilities, culture, and structure of the political system but in different ways. For example, adaptation may result in the swelling of the welfare capability; repression may result in a swelling of the regulative capability.

The third mode of elite response is substitutive. Demands for "bread" may be met with an increased output of "circuses." Demands for the suffrage may be met by a tender of symbolic affirmations of national glory, an aggressive foreign policy, or by welfare measures. The history of elite reactions to dysfunctional demands—particularly for welfare and political participation—is full of examples of substitutive responses of this and other kinds. The ways in which substitutive elite behavior affects the development of the political system are rather complex. The substitutive reaction may "absorb" the dysfunctional demands, as in the case of Germany in the period after the establishment of the Second Reich, when the middle classes tended to "forget" their liberal impulses in their satisfaction with national unity and glory. Or the substitutive reaction may postpone the rendezvous with the innovative demands. Or it may do some of both. In addition, the substitutive reaction may in itself involve a change in capability—e.g., an expansion of international capability with all that this might entail in the development of bureaucracy, in the relative power of military and civil elites, and in political culture.

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IX. System Adaptation, Recruitment, and Socialization

New roles and new attitudes are the essence of system change. New capabilities or levels of capability, new political institutions and processes, call for new elites, changes in elite training and indoctrination, and changes in expectation, commitment, values, and beliefs among the various strata of the population. The socialization and recruitment processes of a political system have a special relation to political change. We need to consider the different ways in which these system adaptation functions can become involved in the process of political change.

One common way in which recruitment and socialization patterns affect political development is through changes occurring in other social systems. Consider, for example, the process of industrialization. The spread of industrial technology and associated phenomena such as urbanization and the spread of mass communication tend to mobilize (in Karl Deutsch's terms) new strata of the population, recruit them into new economic and social roles and attitudes. These changes in activity and attitude may spill over into political orientations and stimulate new demands for participation and welfare. New elites (middle- or working-class demagogues and organizers) may be recruited and constitute the source of demands for structural change in the political system. Adults recruited into the industrial economy will be resocialized; children raised in urban-industrial families will be socialized differently from children in rural-agricultural families. This illustrates a sequence in which industrialization affects general socialization, role differentiation, and recruitment, which affects political socialization and recruitment, which in turn builds up innovative pressure on the political system.

Changes in the religious system may have similar consequences. The Protestant Reformation and the rise of individual sects, such as Methodism, changed the content and form of socialization and recruitment in England. New religious elites—clerical and lay—were recruited and came to constitute a stratum from which political elites were drawn. In the case of Methodism, the early British trade union and labor leaders were in many cases recruited from the Methodist subculture; just as the "radical" middle-class elites of the first part of the nineteenth century were recruited in part from the earlier nonconformist sects.

A second way in which recruitment and socialization may affect political change is through actions originating with the political elites themselves. Thus a political elite may directly manipulate the socializa-

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tion and recruitment processes. This is dramatically illustrated in the policies of totalitarian countries, where the whole social infrastructure of family, community, church, and school is infiltrated, and where the party sets up an organizational system to indoctrinate and recruit among the younger generations. Resocialization of adults through party and party-controlled organizations and control of the mass media is also a totalitarian tactic. While this pattern is more deliberately manipulative in totalitarian countries, it is common in many others. The introduction of civic training in the schools is a common practice in democratic countries; and in clerico-authoritarian countries the church and its schools are self-consciously used as a device for political socialization.

A third pattern is one in which elite reaction to innovative pressures may affect socialization and recruitment in an indirect way. An adaptive reaction by political elites to demands for participation and welfare will not only produce immediate changes in political culture, structure, and capabilities. It may also have the longer-run consequences of affecting family and community socialization processes, producing young adults committed to the political system, providing it with support in the form of goods, services, and loyalty. Passive or alienated adults may be resocialized by adaptive and responsive behavior among the political elites, changing from alienated to allegiant orientations. Rejective reactions among political elites may have the contrary effect, transforming allegiant to alienative orientations and affecting the flow of support into, and the support potential of, the political system.

The consequences for political socialization and recruitment of aggressive foreign policies and frequent warfare should also be stressed. If successful, an aggressive foreign policy may increase support and introduce a nationalist-militarist content into family, community, and school socialization. If unsuccessful or excessively costly, it may produce a withdrawal of support and alienative tendencies in a population. French and German political history is instructive in these connections. The radicalization and alienative tendencies of French political culture during the life of the Third and Fourth Republics have often been attributed in part to the humiliating defeats and costly victories of the Franco-Prussian War and World Wars I and II. The rapid growth of the French Communist Party has been attributed in part to the strong pacifist currents set in motion by the enormous casualties of World War I. The fall of the Fourth Republic was triggered off by army officers who had experienced military defeat and the collapse of the French colonial empire.

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The failure of efforts to democratize Germany has been attributed to the bureaucratization and militarization of Prussian and German society in the course of their aggressive expansion in recent centuries. The German educational system and family life were shaped in this military-authoritarian society and tended to produce obedient subjects lacking in "civil courage." The National Socialist elites recruited heavily among the "irregulars" of World War I, the men who could not adjust to peaceful routines after years of battlefield life.

The sequence here involves a particular pattern of foreign policy which produces a feedback of socialization and recruitment consequences, which in turn affects the flow of demands and supports into the political system. In our efforts to relate political development to dysfunctional interaction among political systems and their social and international environments, we need particularly to illuminate the recruitment and socialization processes as they reflect social change and stimulate political change, as they are the direct instruments of political change, or as they become the instruments of political change through a particular pattern of public policy.

What we have been suggesting here is that the performance of a political system (e.g., its "immobilism" or "mobilism"), its conversion characteristics (e.g., the congruence or incongruence of its structures, the cohesion or fragmentation of its culture), the operations of its recruitment and socialization processes, are explainable in terms of a particular history of interaction between the political system and its social and international environments.

We are not simply making the obvious point that we can learn much about political development from the study of history. What we are proposing is an approach to political development in terms of systematic comparative history. This has to be done with a common coding scheme, a set of categories, and hypotheses about their interrelations. The adaptation of political systems theory proposed here may serve as a starting point. We need to meet both prongs of the critique of recent tendencies in comparative politics at the same time—by formulating a conception of the political system which is developmental, and by testing and elaborating this conception against the richness of knowledge of man's historical experience with politics.

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NEO-DESTOUR LEADERSHIP AND THE "CONFISCATED REVOLUTION"

By DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD

WHEN Philippe Herreman of *Le Monde* spoke of Tunisia's "confiscated revolution" in 1958,[1] he was referring to the rivalry of President Bourguiba and the vigorous union leader Ahmed Ben Salah. Three years later their differences were overcome and Ben Salah emerged as Minister of Planning and Finance, one of the most powerful positions in the government. The social revolution envisaged by the highly privileged and colorful labor leader in 1956 had been confiscated in 1958 and became the cornerstone of Tunisian domestic policy in 1961. Such have been the gyrations of the one-party system in Tunisia and in other African states.

There is certainly nothing original in noting the capacity of a one-party government in Africa or elsewhere to employ persuasion, cajolery, and coercion to achieve political leadership, but Tunisia's *Grand Combattant* is distinguished in the annals of one-party rule by having reversed himself on nearly every national issue, from Nasser to socialism. The one-party governments of Africa as a whole have been noteworthy for their resourcefulness, while using a minimum of coercion. The development of larger national armies on the African continent may bring an end to the political gymnastics of Bourguiba, Touré, and others, but their extraordinary flexibility has made them the object of particular interest.

There were many earlier one-party governments in developing countries outside Africa, of course, and a "Young Tunisian" clique existed in North Africa before World War I. Bourguiba himself was inspired by Kemalist achievements twenty years earlier.[2] The colonial regimes might also be thought of as one-party systems, and the lessons of their political manipulations in Africa have not been forgotten.

Despite the predisposing factors for one-party rule, the mass appeal of African one-party regimes has proved no panacea for Africa's political and social problems.[3] One must remember that 1962 has been

[1] *Le Monde*, January 30, 1958.

[2] For background on the Young Turk influence in early Tunisian nationalism, see Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Origins of Nationalism in Tunisia* (Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1962), 82-92; and A. Pellegrin, *Histoire de la Tunisie* (Tunis, Librairie Namura, 1948), 186ff.

[3] There have been several articles dealing with one-party states in sub-Saharan Africa. See, e.g., Ruth Schacter, "Single-Party Systems in West Africa," *American*

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dubbed the "year of the plots," when attempts were made to overthrow one-party regimes in Tunisia, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast.[4] Since then there has been serious violence within one-party regimes in Senegal, Chad, and Burundi, not to mention the desperate call for British troops to reinforce teetering one-party governments in Tanganyika and Kenya.

With no intention of underestimating the role of Bourguiba or any other of the highly capable men heading one-party governments in Africa, it is hoped that this article will shed some light on the future prospects of these regimes by examining several of the leadership crises through which Tunisia has passed, under conditions that are, on the whole, more favorable than those prevailing in most of sub-Saharan Africa. A review of the Tunisian experience may also serve to illuminate how Neo-Destour solidarity has been preserved through major reversals of national policy.

Writers on Tunisia seem to agree that "Bourguibism" represents a tactic more than an ideology or even a strategy.[5] Nothing demonstrates Bourguiba's manipulative skill better than his handling of the varieties of leadership to be found in Tunisia. The Neo-Destour's success should not be allowed to conceal the fact that the alternatives in leadership and policy have been certainly as great, and perhaps greater, in Tunisia than in much more heterogeneous regimes, such as Morocco. The great skill of a Bourguiba is that he never permits the alternatives to coalesce in a single front or major issue. By maintaining a position in the center of most controversies he makes such personal coalitions extremely difficult. The most threatening policy alternative, a form of Arab nationalism, represents a combination of Islamic fundamentalism and working-class egalitarian appeal not unlike Tory radicalism of the late nineteenth century.[6]

Political Science Review, LV (June 1961), 294-307; Martin L. Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single-Party Tendencies in African Politics," *World Politics*, XV (January 1962), 262-93; and Immanuel Wallerstein, "What Happened to the Opposition?" *West Africa*, November 21, 1961.

[4] *West Africa*, February 23, 1962.

[5] Over the past few years a respectable amount of monographic literature has appeared on the Neo-Destour. See Charles Debbasch, *La République Tunisienne* (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1962), Charles F. Gallagher, Jr., "Tunisia," in Gwendolen Carter, ed., *African One-Party Systems* (Ithaca 1962), 11-83; Charles Micaud, Leon Carl Brown, and Clement Henry Moore, *Modernization in Tunisia* (New York 1964); and Clement Henry Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?" *World Politics*, XIV (April 1962), 461-82.

[6] The meeting of left and right seems to be easier in Arab countries than in most parts of the world, a dramatic example being Nasser's acceptance of the Muslim

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To appreciate Bourguiba's versatility, four Tunisian foci of political leadership and their social bases must be outlined. The first of these are the Salah Ben Youssef group. Though he met a Trotsky-like end in Germany, his sympathizers are still to be found in Tunisia among veterans (*fellagha*) of the guerrilla movement. Coming from the island of Djerba, Ben Youssef had strong regional support from the south, where the resistance was active and where the tribesmen and peasants have felt neglected by the concentration of Neo-Destour strength and economic development in the coastal and northern regions. The second group are the strongly laicist modernizers represented by Ben Salah, who found an organizational base in the labor movement until adroitly eliminated by the President. The third group are the thoroughly bourgeois liberals, who share the President's faith in France but occasionally object to his arbitrary methods. Very much an urban, modern group, typified if not represented by Masmoudi, their inability to unite with the working class on the basis of similar programs for development can be explained by the latter's economic nationalism and suspicion of France. An agreement between the energetic modernizers and the pro-French liberals would have been fatal to the Neo-Destour. By fracturing the opposition of the two groups eager to develop the country on Western lines, Bourguiba accomplished a much more difficult feat than by discrediting the violent opposition of the pro-Nasser Arabists. The fourth group are the militant party leaders, indissolubly welded to Bourguiba and the core of unquestioning lieutenants needed to operate a one-party regime.

Political organizations in Arab countries seem to be able to tolerate only one fervent spokesman.[7] A French-educated lawyer like Bourguiba, Ben Youssef was associated with the Neo-Destour from its beginning in 1934. He was a fiery speaker, using intransigence and mysticism to accomplish what Bourguiba did with personal courage and supreme self-confidence. The President was disheartened by his experiences in Cairo after World War II, but Ben Youssef arrived there as the North African revolutions were being planned in the early 1950's

Brotherhood. See the treatment of Neo-Islamic and Communist totalitarianism in Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton 1963).

[7] Although the nature of the conflict varies from country to country, Ben Youssef's demise reminds one of the conflict between the equally persuasive personalities of Al-Fassi and Wazzani in Morocco and between Ben Bella and Boudiaf in Algeria. The heavily ideological position won out only before independence—i.e., in Morocco, where the split occurred in 1937 in favor of Al-Fassi—while the more nimble tacticians, Ben Bella and Bourguiba, won out in the two post-independence cases.

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and came under the spell of Nasser. As Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour, he managed the party while Bourguiba was drumming up international support, and later while Bourguiba was in prison. Most important, Ben Youssef was a key man in organizing the Tunisian *fellagha* for the North African uprising planned for the fall of 1954, cleverly averted at the last minute by French concessions in both Morocco and Tunisia.

The Tunisian resistance movement began on a sporadic, disorganized basis shortly after the French *ratissage* of Cap Bon.[8] Like the early terrorist cells in Casablanca, the Tunisian *fellagha* were not initially organized by the Neo-Destour, and close coordination began only in 1954 from bases in Libya, serving both Algerian and Tunisian bands. In scenes that were to be repeated in both Morocco and Algeria, Ben Youssef objected to the cease-fire agreement with the French and remained in Cairo throughout negotiations for autonomy. Ben Youssef's threat to Neo-Destour hegemony was indicated early in 1955 by student demonstrations at Zaytuna University, the ancient center of Islamic teaching in Tunis.[9] Fundamentalist Islamic opinion shared Ben Youssef's intransigence, and provided a basis for agreement between the remnants of the conservative Destour Party and Ben Youssef. But by the time Ben Youssef returned to Tunisia in the fall of 1955, Bourguiba had won over the other Neo-Destour leaders and Ben Youssef was expelled from the party in the November 1955 Congress.

Over the spring of 1956 Ben Youssef continued to direct *fellagha* terrorism in the south of the country, and Bourguiba called upon French forces to repress the guerrilla remnants. Despite three subsequent trials intended to remove Youssefite plotters, Bourguiba failed to assimilate and subdue the Arab extremists.[10] The evidence of his failure was assembled in the 1963 trial following the attempt on Bourguiba's life. The accused included several Islamic scholars, a number of discontented officers and ex-*fellagha*, and a disenchanted party official from

[8] Indiscriminate plundering and murdering were a French colonial technique long before the Algerian revolution. The Cap Bon affair was the prelude to a hardening of French policy throughout North Africa. The most explicit background to the Tunisian resistance movement is in Félix Garas, *Bourguiba et la naissance d'une nation* (Paris 1956), 239-45.

[9] *New York Times*, January 6 and 9, 1955. There was a short-lived resurgence of the original Destour Party, supported by the Bey and aristocratic elements.

[10] One manifestation of the "hard-line" political views, to be discussed below, was the series of trials in 1958 and 1959 to discredit completely remnants of conservative opposition to the party. In addition to two trials of Youssefists involving 180 persons, there were trials of Baccouche and M'Zali, both ex-premiers under the French. See *New York Times*, February 24 and April 6, 1959.

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Bizerte.[11] The party had bestowed substantial benefits on the guerrillas, often in the form of valuable import licenses and transport franchises, but Ben Salah's energetic efforts to reorganize the inefficient and overgrown commercial and transportation sector of the Tunisian economy contributed to the discontent of the *fellagha*, as did the creation of a more openly aggressively pan-Arab state to the east and the President's humiliation at Bizerte.

The President made no pretense of trying to convert the Arabist faction to Neo-Destour thinking. Within a few months after independence, Zaytuna University was under strict state control and Islamic scholars supervising the Muslim court system arrived at work one day to find the building securely padlocked. But the rumblings of discontent have continued, and the Neo-Destour is virtually helpless to combat Nasser's appeal except by patching up relations with Egypt. Remnants of the Youssefist faction have been operating in Paris, and the exiles from the coup attempt were welcomed in Algeria. Diplomatic relations improved in 1963, however, and the President's support for a more aggressive development program may neutralize the domestic appeal of the Youssefists.

Bourguiba's handling of the Ben Salah affair is perhaps more representative of the leadership problems of African one-party systems. In nearly all the more recent one-party governments there are delicate relations between workers and party. The Tunisian labor movement is no exception, and its history predates the Neo-Destour. Moreover, the assassination of Farhat Hached in late 1952 by French terrorists was the signal for violence across the Maghrib, which led to the revolutionary activity of the early 1950's.[12] Though Ben Salah's brilliant managerial skills did much to establish the UGTT (*Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens*) as a major political force, his privileged background and taste for middle-class pleasures hardly made him a working-class representative. In addition, elements of the miners' union shared the isolated feelings of the south and justifiably considered the port and mine workers as the backbone of the UGTT.

The second crisis of Neo-Destour leadership began as Ben Youssef terrorism was being subdued. Early in 1956 Ben Salah began to champion working-class interests with more enthusiasm and pub-

[11] For details, see *Jeune-Afrique*, December 13, 1962-January 5, 1963, and January 21-28, 1963. See also Habib Bourguiba, *Analysis of the Plot*, speech of January 18, 1963 (Tunis, Secretary of State for Information, 1963).

[12] The complete breakdown of the colonial regime in Morocco dates from the bloody repression of the sympathy strike in Casablanca following Hached's assassination. See Douglas E. Ashford, *Political Change in Morocco* (Princeton 1961), 272-73.

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licity than are normal in a one-party regime. He pressed for firm policies to prevent inflation and asked for public debate on the national budget. Over the summer Bourguiba arranged for a series of round-table talks on the future of the Tunisian economy, at which Ben Salah pressed his view that aggressive policies should be followed to eliminate French economic influence and monetary controls.[13] The labor leader openly criticized the country's planning effort, and only supported the budget after long talks with Neo-Destour ministers. The UGTT began to expand its organizational activities among workers, and initiated a series of "Popular Education" seminars that might have easily surpassed similar activity in the Neo-Destour.

The crisis reached its full proportions in September 1956, when the Sixth Congress of the UGTT endorsed a full-scale program for massive development and social reform.[14] In addition, Ben Salah publicly rejected the round-table talks as unproductive and excessively conservative. The labor leader's proposals were essentially the same as those inspiring the Tunisian Three-Year Plan, produced almost exactly six years later. Determined that party solidarity should not be broken, Bourguiba took the daring alternative of starting a rival union organization with Habib Achour, the secretary of the Sfax unions, in command. The rival group rejected "ideological subversion based on imagination and utopian ideas" in favor of what was strictly a laborers' union, seeking concrete benefits for the workers.[15] With full support from Bourguiba, a compromise figure, Tilili, became Secretary-General of the UGTT soon afterwards, and the rival union was quietly brought back into the fold, having served its purpose. Ben Salah was consoled by being named Secretary of State for Public Health and Social Affairs, a post in which he created a new social security program and expanded health program with the same vigor he displayed as a labor leader. Indeed, it was undoubtedly excellent preparation for the task he was later to perform in preparing the first national plan.

The third focus for issues and leadership in Tunisian politics has been a subdued collection of moderates associated with Masmoudi

[13] Early indications of the difference appear in *Petit Matin*, June 3 and 8, and August 21, 1956. In one humorous incident Ben Salah kept referring in a proprietary fashion to the new *Maisons de Travail*, built with government funds, as UGTT labor exchanges. Bourguiba continued to insist they were *Bourses de Travail*, stressing the relation of labor benefits to the government at the dedication ceremonies as well.

[14] The program appeared as "Rapport Economique," *6ème Congrés National de l'U.G.T.T.*, Tunis, September 20-23, 1956. The basic aims and proposals are repeated in Ben Salah's *Perspectives Décennales* (Tunis, Ministry of Planning and Finance, 1962).

[15] See *Petit Matin*, November 10 and December 25, 1956; also *New York Times*, December 31, 1956.

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and Ben Yahmed, the editor of *Jeune-Afrique*. The elusive character of their opposition probably explains how they have been able to survive for many years without directly challenging the Neo-Destour in the manner of Ben Salah and Ben Youssef. However, this does not imply that their criticisms are ineffective or their reservations unheeded by the party. If anything, subtlety is a source of strength in a one-party regime. Ben Salah's flamboyancy and ambition have offended many middle-class Tunisians, but the pro-French sympathies and liberal sentiments of Masmoudi are much easier to endorse. Masmoudi, once called Bourguiba's "preferred disciple,"[16] has left the Neo-Destour twice. He was also the party's key negotiator with the French during the hectic days of 1954 and 1955, when he was ably assisted by Ben Yahmed, then a Parisian student leader.

The importance of this quiet opposition is more easily judged by recalling that the Neo-Destour has always been a strongly middle-class party, depending on the merchants, small landowners, and craftsmen for support. Many Tunisians of this class could be manipulated by the party, but the more wealthy and more Paris-oriented hoped that Bourguiba would move slowly in refashioning the nation. Though not openly associated with the introspective Masmoudi clique, the somewhat ponderous, unimaginative wealthy class no doubt found sentiments they could share (or at least exploit) in the ideas of Masmoudi. Their cooperation is badly needed to achieve the goals of the plan, but their support for the regime has not been sufficiently altruistic or enthusiastic to win much confidence in the higher ranks of Neo-Destourian leadership.[17]

The first open break with the party came in the fall of 1958, when Ben Yahmed published a critical editorial on Bourguiba's proposal to try Tahar Ben Ammar for collusion with the French under the Protectorate. In addition to being a leading member of Tunisian high society, Ben Ammar had participated in various governments under the Protectorate along with several high-ranking Neo-Destour leaders. His political crimes were hardly comparable to Ben Youssef's treason, nor were his financial gains under the French greater than those of many aristocratic Tunisian families. Nevertheless, Bourguiba had Ben Yah-

[16] Garas, 241. Masmoudi's career is remarkably similar to that of the capable intermediary in Moroccan politics, Bouabid, who was also a key figure in negotiating with the French.

[17] The government has had to keep on reasonably friendly terms with the business community, and the UTIC (*Union Tunisienne des Industriels et Commerçants*) is regarded as an auxiliary party organization. As the country was mobilized for development, one of the early controversies concerned olive oil marketing and processing controls. See *Petit Matin*, February 7, 1961.

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med's newspaper suppressed for sowing "confusion among opinions and systematically disparaging government policy."[18] Masmoudi defended the relatively mild objections made in the paper and was removed from the party's Political Bureau. However, the President was in the midst of planning important organizational changes in the Neo-Destour and needed unanimous support from his colleagues in the forthcoming party congress. Masmoudi was reinstated two months later, and the paper reappeared under a new name.

As Secretary of State for Information, Masmoudi was able to support more liberal press and information policies, but the trend of events during 1960 and 1961 further alarmed the liberal wing of Neo-Destour opinion. In addition, Bourguiba alarmed moderate Tunisians with his unusually aggressive handling of the Bizerte crisis over the summer of 1961. An issue of Ben Yahmed's paper came out with a none too flattering photo of ex-King Faruk next to an editorial on *pouvoir personnel*. Noting that the police were "omnipresent," if not all-powerful, in such a state, the Ben Yahmed group charged that the Neo-Destour had created a sterile atmosphere for public discussion, by "dislocating, subjugating or eliminating" rival forces.[19] Again Masmoudi was abruptly removed from office in the Political Bureau and the government. Though not objecting to the Neo-Destour's predominance, Masmoudi and his followers felt that the Tunisian people had sufficient "political and social conscience" to use wisely those liberties that are "the necessary cement for popular support and national solidarity."[20]

The subsequent controversy is important not only for the light it sheds on Tunisian politics, but also for its implications for one-party governments in other parts of Africa. In a series of editorials in the party paper, the President's failure to extract concessions from de Gaulle on the Bizerte issue was defended. The editorials went on to claim that the regime had not changed since the removal of the Bey in 1957 and implied that those objecting to its policy now were guilty of duplicity or hypocrisy. The paper strongly defended the view that an attack on Bourguiba constituted an attack on the Neo-Destour. In a speech Bourguiba also insisted that discipline within the party must be total and added that he was "revolted" by confused domestic situations. He concluded by saying that the party would accept criticisms,

[18] *L'Action Tunisienne*, October 3, 1958. The paper was suspended that month and reappeared without the party slogan in its title as *Afrique Action*, later to become *Jeune-Afrique*.

[19] *Afrique Action*, October 7-18, 1961.

[20] *Ibid.*, November 21-27, 1961; and also *Le Monde*, November 18, 1961.

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provided that "they do not give place to tenacious interpretations or introduce doubt in [people's] spirits."[21]

The significance of Masmoudi's subtle opposition can be appreciated only by taking into account the critical importance of unanimity among major political figures in a one-party system. Ben Youssef was in open rebellion and easy to eliminate, even though he represented a meaningful and appealing alternative to Bourguiba's rule. Ben Salah was vulnerable partly because of his personal ambition, though this is hardly a rare quality among prominent politicians in any land. More important was the fact that his massive development program unavoidably took on greater importance as the magnitude of Tunisia's economic problems came to be known, and such a program can be carried out only within a government framework. Masmoudi represents a threat because, as Bourguiba noted when expelling him, one-party governments work better when domestic problems are simple and when top leadership presents a solid front. What the President did not add was that anything short of unanimity represents an intolerable admission of failure. Controversy among leaders destroys the popular image as well as the working relationships requisite to a one-party regime. The Masmoudi group, however, can be kept within tolerable limits so long as it does form an organization, which almost certainly has to be done at the expense of the Neo-Destour.

A controversy over the failure of the Tunisian press to report a serious miners' strike in late 1962 revived the liberals' feelings that the Neo-Destour was placing excessive restraints on Tunisian political life.[22] However, unless the young liberals acquire the support of an elderly and respected Neo-Destour leader, it is doubtful that they can challenge the party's organizational strength. Their influence is already magnified in proportion to their popular strength by the sensitivity of the one-party regime to any discordant notes in politics. Indeed, both the Ben Salah and Masmoudi groups have been able to exercise considerably more influence on national policy and party affairs than a comparable group might do in a multi-party system. Masmoudi's

[21] *Petit Matin*, November 21, 1961. In this speech, and again in the speeches given after the assassination attempt, the President defended himself against charges of neglecting the economy in order to engage in international endeavors. In the later speeches he also spoke publicly in defense of an especially luxurious palace built for his own use.

[22] *Jeune-Afrique*, October 29-November 9, 1962. An interesting commentary on how quickly fortunes change in a developing country is the fact that the president of the Sfax phosphate works had been a UGTT militant. About 6,000 miners struck against UGTT leadership when the government tried to place a levy on their wages to relieve unemployment in other areas.

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friendly encounter with Bourguiba during the Neo-Destour's National Congress in October 1964 indicates that the liberals will probably be content to remain the subdued critics and passive monitors of the regime.

Less is known of the top militants in the Neo-Destour than of the groups who have criticized them. It should be understood that militancy in the context of the one-party system indicates selfless, and possibly ruthless, devotion to party solidarity. Men like Masmoudi and Ben Salah may have entertained thoughts of curbing Neo-Destour excesses or overcoming Neo-Destour cautiousness, but it is unlikely that they thought of or could imagine a Tunisia without a powerful Neo-Destour government. The present sense of "militant," then, includes persons who have been meticulously loyal to Bourguiba and who value party cohesion over any other national issue. (This is not to imply disloyalty or opportunism on the part of the other leadership groups.) In a one-party system, militancy is constantly being tested, because party issues tend to become indistinguishable from national issues and party discipline tends to become synonymous with national loyalty. The high degree of harmony demanded is provided, in part, by placing the most trusted party lieutenants in high party and government positions. By tracing the role of the devoted militant, one learns something of the dynamics of the one-party system and also gains insight into the future of the Neo-Destour.

Because the paramount militants have never publicly challenged Bourguiba's judgment, they are on the whole less well known, although they were until recently the most influential persons in government. Hedi Nouira, for example, was Secretary of State for Finance from 1955 to 1958, when he became Director of the Central Bank of Tunisia. On the party's Political Bureau since 1948, he has served as deputy Secretary-General and is extremely popular. His support for Bourguiba in the critical days of late 1955 must have been most important in neutralizing Ben Youssef's party contacts. Another important leader, Ahmed Mestiri, became Secretary of State for Justice, and as such was instrumental in reforming Islamic legal practices, which had effectively barred fundamentalist Muslim leaders from access to government. Mestiri also wrote the basic civil service legislation, which affected a large number of Neo-Destour supporters, and he reorganized the civil service to eliminate vestiges of opposition to Bourguiba.[23]

[23] Mestiri replaced Nouira as the Secretary of State for Finance in December 1958 and was later Ambassador to Moscow. Finance ministries modeled on the French system have been notoriously difficult to adapt to development purposes in North

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At the core of Neo-Destour para-militants is Bahi Ladgham, most frequently seen at the President's elbow and thought to be his most trusted advisor. Retiring and modest, Ladgham was the crucial figure in the establishment of the one-party state in late 1955. He has been Vice-President and Secretary of State for National Defense since 1956.[24] In the struggle for independence he organized the Tunisian business community, and headed the country's United Nations mission in the early 1950's. Closely associated with Ladgham and his protégé is Taib Mehiri, who has been Secretary of State for the Interior since 1956. A relatively young man, he was a student leader and later assisted in organizing the *fellagha.*

In the scramble for power in late 1955, Ladgham shared Ben Salah's doubts about the economic concessions, police powers, and local representation rights extracted by the French in the autonomy agreement. He was not a fervent pan-Arabist like Ben Youssef, nor did he have confidence in Mendès-France, as did Slim and Masmoudi. Above all, Ladgham hoped to maintain party unity, and spent most of 1955 abroad trying to dissuade Ben Youssef from actively opposing the agreement.[25] No doubt assisted by Mehiri, he worked tirelessly in the south to keep the *fellagha* from provoking another French invasion. He returned to Tunis in the hectic days of the November 1955 Neo-Destour Congress, where his decision to support Bourguiba was essential to win over pan-Arab feeling and to calm justifiable fears of French treachery. In a contest with urbane and popular Mongi Slim, Ladgham emerged as the successor to Ben Youssef as Neo-Destour Secretary-General.

The para-militant in a one-party system is predisposed to exercise influence behind doors. Indeed, it is essential to the militant's technique in Tunisian politics that the party never make radical shifts in policy without careful preparation or expose itself to strong conflicting forces. Part of Bourguiba's formula for success has been tackling only

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Africa. With Mehiri in the powerful position of Secretary of State for the Interior, the two "hard-line" officials may have become too efficient in advancing their views. Similar allegations are made about sending Mongi Slim to Washington, where his contacts with the liberal group were cut off.

[24] Ladgham, Mestiri, and Mehiri were identified as the *étatiste* group by *Le Monde*, January 1, 1959. None of them joined the interim government of the fall of 1955, although the Neo-Destour officially participated and the liberal leadership group was fully represented.

[25] The most complete account of Ladgham's role in this critical period is in Lorna Hahn's *North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood* (Washington 1960), 169-70. It is worth recalling that Ladgham had led the fight against similarly framed reforms in the Neo-Destour's compromise effort in 1951, which broke down completely. His position in the fall of 1955 was very similar to that of Ben Bella in the summer of 1962.

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one center of discontent at a time and carefully anticipating each engagement in order to isolate forces that might otherwise coalesce. The technique has great value in consolidating a nation and in transforming the symbolic legitimacy of the independence struggle into a working, respected government. However, once the foundations of government are laid down, the roles of party and government must be defined. Except in those states like Ghana that have opted for a highly totalitarian regime, all one-party systems encounter the perplexing task of marking out the functions of an expanding government while the party tends to lose momentum. The potential conflict in terms of party leadership is manifest, since representatives of both viewpoints sit in the highest councils of both party and government.

Again, it should be noted that political relationships are too sensitive in one-party systems to assume that the leadership differences are likely to erupt into bitter personal disputes or impassioned opposition parties. The Ladgham-Mehiri faction has, however, built a powerful organization within the government based on the services of the Secretary of State for the Interior and, more recently, the army. In a very real sense, the attempt to overthrow the government in late 1962 was evidence of the faction's failure, and of the declining effectiveness of its approach in a developing country.[26] Under Mehiri's guidance the Governors assumed a role equal to that of cabinet member, a phenomenon that can be observed in many African one-party states. The para-militants undoubtedly favored the abolition of the Neo-Destour's regionally elected committees in 1959 and the appointment of party Commissioners by the Political Bureau.[27] Within the government, the group was concerned over the future of control agencies as opposed to the expansive, decentralizing tendencies of nation-building agencies.

The para-militants have been justifiably suspicious of Ben Salah's growing empire, partly because he defied the party in 1956 and partly because his organization for developmental purposes may easily surpass the control agencies in size and importance. The issue between Ben Salah and the para-militants has changed with time, and Ben Salah himself is no longer the brash young man of 1956. In talks with Tunisians in late 1962, as the new national plan was being imple-

[26] "Development" is used here in the simple sense of more intensive government efforts to effect many economic and social changes in a short time. The Neo-Destour's performance during this period in many specialized areas of development is analyzed in the writer's "Local Reform and National Development: The Politics of Integration in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan" (manuscript).

[27] The 1959 changes are outlined in Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia."

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mented, the nature of the conflict was alluded to on several occasions. The most serious bottlenecks stemmed from new burdens placed on local government, and from the need for more active local support. To coordinate budgeting, planning, and finance, Ben Salah hoped to place a delegate of his ministry in each province with extraordinary powers. This plan was abandoned, ostensibly because the Tunisians lacked trained personnel, and a new proposal was made to establish regional development committees under the Governors for specific projects. The first of these was formed in late 1963, when a joint committee was set up to implement regional development plans for Kairouan and Sousse provinces.

Possibly a more significant modification was the reorganization of the party following the attempted coup. Bourguiba confessed that the highly centralized party structure and ambition of provincial party Commissioners had produced a "duality of authority," detrimental to planning as well as to Neo-Destour popularity. Reportedly some Governors and Commissioners clashed so severely that they ceased to be on speaking terms. In a hastily summoned and secret meeting of the Neo-Destour National Council, a mixed body of high party officials,[28] the Political Commissioners were replaced with provincial "Coordination Committees." The new committees will group the officers of Neo-Destour cells, representatives of auxiliary party organizations, and selected technical and social advisors. The elected Secretary-General of each Coordination Committee will cooperate with the Governor in development programs, and will provide better communication with the grassroots. The party reorganization is obviously intended to fill new developmental needs, but it is also an implicit refutation of the earlier policy of concentrating effective power in a tightly centralized party.

Though neither leadership group confined its efforts to government or party channels alone, there were additional indications over 1963 that the use of government as a development vehicle, essentially Ben Salah's aim, outweighed the more cautious position of the para-mili-

[28] The National Council was defined in the 1959 party statutes as the Political Bureau, the Commissioners, and a cell delegate for every 5,000 members. It was seldom convened until difficulties were encountered in mobilizing support for the plan, and later when Bourguiba wanted to explain the coup. In convening the Council in 1963 to consider the party reorganization (before the party congress), youth and other "high Destourians" were co-opted. As the one-party system attempts to follow all the ramifications of a more complex society, the executive bodies take on more general functions. The National Council has become a kind of unofficial congress. In the new organization the Political Bureau will be expanded to some 50 members, and the President will have a "presidium" of five or six as the top executive body. See *Jeune-Afrique*, March 11-17, 1963.

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tants. The severe standards for acceptance in responsible positions had, for example, worked to exclude new leadership. Young persons essential to expanding developmental activities felt estranged from the party, and Neo-Destour youth activities suffered greatly. Tunisian students in Paris were a constant source of political embarrassment. At the height of the difficulty the Parisian students elected a governing body holding Communist, Trotskyite, and pan-Arab views, completely excluding the party. In his speeches following the attempt on his life, Bourguiba publicly admonished the French-trained students' zeal for liberty and insisted that more must be done to inculcate patriotic feelings.[29] When Bourguiba's son returned home, an event that was itself an indicator of change,[30] he took over government youth work, and a man favoring more vigorous government effort on behalf of Tunisian youth assumed control of the moribund Neo-Destour youth organization. By the end of 1963, steps were taken to improve Neo-Destour youth organizations at the rapidly expanding secondary-educational level.

A related change has been the transfer of leadership. Since 1956 the UGTT Secretary-General has been Tilili, also Treasurer of the Neo-Destour. Though primarily a party man, he does not share the paramilitary notions of the Neo-Destour hard core.[31] Indeed, his close relation to the President was assurance against the formation of a potentially formidable coalition of labor and Mehiri or Ben Salah. Nevertheless, the UGTT has constantly pressed for more rapid development, and its common cause with the new development program is obvious. At the same time, the union has also forged ahead of the government in sponsoring workers' housing projects, consumer cooperatives, and some production cooperatives. The UGTT tried for several years to establish its own bank, and in 1962 was given permission to create the *Banque du Peuple* to finance cooperatives, an important sector of the new plan. Throughout this period the UGTT leadership represented a variety of interests, in some ways corresponding to the various groups already described.

The most important of these was probably the conventional trade-

[29] See, for example, the speeches in *La Presse*, January 19-20, 1963, and April 14, 1963.

[30] See *New York Times*, December 28, 1963. In effect, Bourguiba, Jr., was given all the sensitive troublespots—supervision of youth and sports, information, and the management of his father's office.

[31] Tilili was important to the Neo-Destour as one of the few high officials originating in the south, where the Neo-Destour has had many difficulties. In addition to the strike of late 1961 and general resistance to new agrarian cooperatives, the party suffered a blow in the fall of 1962 when a major flood control project around Gabès failed to protect the city against unusually heavy rains.

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union faction, represented by Habib Achour. Achour was a close friend of Hached, the union's working-class martyr, and had some justification in feeling that Ben Salah's colorful leadership and political aspirations were not the best way to achieve labor's goals. At the 9th UGTT Congress in the spring of 1963, Achour became the new Secretary-General. Plans were announced to establish Neo-Destour committees for guidance purposes, but the UGTT also achieved its goal of having workers' committees in major enterprises.[32] Both changes sharpen the lines between party and union. In his speech to the workers, Bourguiba defended the UGTT against charges of subservience to the party and neglect of the working class.[33] Despite indications of some labor unrest, the President's comments appear to be more an assertion of the government's new orientation toward labor than an expression of anxiety about imminent conflict. The effect of the changes was to cut the umbilical cord between the Neo-Destour and the UGTT, and to put at the head of the union a man sufficiently wary of Ben Salah to guard against a new coalition of workers and modernizers in government.[34]

The transformation of a political revolution into a social revolution poses particularly difficult problems for the one-party state. Tunisia's peculiar brand of "Fabian nationalism" may have created obstacles that will be less formidable in other African countries, but the fundamental choice will be similar. The commitment to rapid development creates a new field of activity with specific and coordinated requirements. The success or failure of an agricultural cooperative or a plant to process esparto grass can be observed much more easily by an ordinary Tunisian than, say, the struggle for the evacuation of Bizerte. Development poses radically new problems of selecting and recruiting leadership. The policies advocated, and now being rapidly effected, by Ben Salah mean that many more Tunisians will have economic and social

[32] Part of the 1963 reorganization involved separating militants from adherents in party cells. The militants will very likely be used for such committees and to arouse more popular support for other developmental needs. One of the major weaknesses of the earlier system of highly centralized control was that the party could not exploit its membership fully, although some weaker members were weeded out.

[33] See *Accent on Planning*, speech of March 28, 1963, to the UGTT Congress (Tunis, Secretary of State for Information, 1963).

[34] The continuing wariness of the labor movement was again revealed in October 1964, when the UGTT strongly opposed the government's proposal to devalue the *dinaar*. (See *Jeune-Afrique*, October 18, 1964.) This is a good example of how the diversification of interest through development begins to place more delicate demands on the political process, which in turn makes reconciliation of policy differences within a one-party regime more difficult.

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opportunities. They will inescapably develop their own talents and judgment in political life. Some of the repercussions can already be detected in Tunisian events.

In the immediate post-independence period there are few challenges to the one-party system, especially if it is built on as thorough and experienced an organization as the Neo-Destour. But the highly centralized, oligarchic party is not necessarily the best vehicle for development. The para-militants have served a useful purpose in sheltering Tunisia against the inflammatory appeal from Cairo and in bolstering the tiny state during the Algerian war. But even in the second year of intensive planning and development, the dangers of confiscating revolutions are manifest. The student unrest, the rash of strikes, the reluctance to support marketing and agrarian cooperatives, and the declining interest in party affairs raise important problems for the tutelary regime, which may become a refuge for the possessive professor rather than the enlightened teacher.

Leadership groups often represent major social and political alternatives in one-party systems, precisely because the society is less developed and the lines of political exchange are rudimentary. The para-militants would like to see the Neo-Destour expand in order to dominate the more intricate pattern of political relationships in a complex society. The failure of this approach during 1962 helped to liberate the Tunisian revolution. The adjustment to youth and labor problems can already be seen. Bourguiba's conversion to "Neo-Destourian socialism" was the first step,[35] and the elevation of Ben Salah another. Though Ben Salah's forthright and occasionally arbitrary action to reconstruct the country may arouse some resentment, his model of society is a very different one from that of the para-militants, whose greatest weakness may be that they have none at all. But Ben Salah's victory will be elusive because his success will be measured very differently in the society he hopes to build. The elimination of

[35] The one-party system's reputation for expeditious action has probably been exaggerated as a result of the sheer chaos that many new regimes emerge from. However, getting a policeman on every street corner is not the same as getting peasants to use fertilizer. Bourguiba himself came out strongly for planning and sacrifice on behalf of development in early 1961, but as individuals Tunisians are only today beginning to feel the impact. There was immediate resistance from shopkeepers, who refused to sell goods and foods under price controls, and difficulties in getting peasants to work on cooperative farms or join cooperative marketing agencies. For Bourguiba's early commitment, see *Neo-Destourian Socialism*, speech of June 21, 1961 (Tunis, Secretary of State for Information, 1961). Another sign of the party's sensitivity to social change was alteration of its name to the Constitutional Socialist Party in the recent Congress. The old party label has been retained here to provide continuity.

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extremist leadership groups[36] has already reached a point in Tunisia where dramatic issues of national orientation are less meaningful. It remains to be seen if the Neo-Destour can adapt to its own creation.

[36] One of the most interesting common phenomena among one-party states in Africa is their antipathy to both the Communists and the tribesmen. Neither Marxist students nor paramount chiefs are permitted to disrupt party harmony.

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AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GRAND DESIGN

By SEYOM BROWN*

WE hear the term less these days. But our NATO policies, our policies toward the Common Market, and our reactions to French assertiveness still give the appearance of struggling to continue along the lines of the "Grand Design" for Atlantic Partnership. As frustrations have grown the momentum of the thrust has waned; but the direction, not yet feeling the impact of alternative formulations, is sustained.

The "Grand Design," as developed by the Kennedy Administration and carried over into the Johnson Administration, is far from a blueprint for future political, economic, and military relationships. Rather, it appears somewhat in the nature of an impressionist painting: the closer one examines it, the more obscure it gets. Only by backing away from its specific content, and viewing it in the large, in contrast with other possible gross configurations of the North Atlantic area, can one discern the pattern and meaning. Thus, Administration spokesmen, when pressed to elaborate the design for the future implied by present U.S. policies toward Europe, are more precise in their maps of where we *don't* want to go than in their maps of the preferred destination.

I. The Informal Hierarchy

One of the paths—now regarded as perilous—would involve an unswerving commitment to positions established in an earlier day when the military and economic hegemony of the United States in the Western alliance was unchallenged. In the first decade after World War II, when United States policy was the major determinant in the flow of trade and aid throughout the non-Communist world, and when the military requirements for resisting Communist bloc expansion had to be provided primarily by the United States, it was natural for the North Atlantic area to assume the configuration of an informal hierarchy, with the United States at its apex. This hierarchical decision-making structure could work without formal sanction (indeed, the NATO Treaty is *formally* an alliance among "equals"); the ties that

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sustained it were held secure by the vast disparity in effective power between the leader and the lesser members, and by the image of a bipolar world.

The "obsolescence" of the informal hierarchy is now solemnly admitted, and attributed to three massive developments:

First is the phenomenal economic recovery of Western Europe, for which we justly claim responsibility; and, as is to be expected in such a relationship, we must also reap the bitter reward—not all of it economic—of the new European self-assertiveness. (Nurses, like parents, sometimes become emotionally dependent upon the dependency of their charges.) Second is the Soviet development of long-range strategic forces able to inflict massive damage upon the United States directly, the awareness of which understandably affects European confidence in American readiness to utilize its transoceanic strategic superiority as a counter to the presumed local Soviet military dominance along the Iron Curtain. The third development is the apparent reduction in the threat posed to Western Europe by Soviet expansionism—a "trend" whose consistency is still a matter of speculation, and whose direction is highly contingent on unpredictable events, such as the complexion of the new Soviet leadership and the effects of the Sino-Soviet split.

All of these developments, it is recognized in Washington, lessen the the willingness of European members of NATO to subordinate their local interests and rivalries to the grander good of a transatlantic protectorate. "In today's relaxed environment," Under Secretary of State George Ball has cautioned, "there is danger that NATO may gradually lose some of its vitality through apathy and a kind of international wishful thinking . . . and some of our European friends—out of a sense of new-found confidence—may be led to consider NATO as too much of an American show. There is already an apparent trend that way."[1]

A deeper source of anxiety revealed by Ball and others in the Administration is their fear of the consequences of this new-found European confidence for the "proliferation" of nuclear weapons. They regard as "natural," in the words of Secretary of State Rusk, "the desire of a revived Europe—living under the gun of Soviet nuclear power—to carry a greater share of the responsibility for their own defense."[2] But they warn that such a desire will exhibit itself in increasing pres-

[1] Address before the Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1964.

[2] Address before the Virginia Bar Association, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., July 12, 1963.

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sures for national nuclear deterrents unless some alternative is found to arrangements which perpetuate the role of the United States as "nuclear trustee" for the entire free world.

II. National Fortresses

We have one obvious alternative, say Administration spokesmen. We could deploy MRBM's (medium-range ballistic missiles) to nationally manned and controlled forces. And we could help these countries with their own nuclear weapons research and development programs. President Kennedy, when presented with this alternative, responded categorically: "The question is whether the United States should join in helping make France a nuclear power, then Italy, then West Germany, then Belgium. How does that produce security when you have ten, twenty, thirty nuclear powers who may fire off their weapons under different conditions? That isn't in our interest or in my opinion in the interests of peace, or in the interest of Western Europe."[3]

The severest consequences have been catalogued by the Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, Walt Rostow:

> First, the Alliance would fragment into a series of national nuclear capabilities, the European components of which would be inefficiently produced, unsystematically targeted, and quite unpersuasive in Moscow. Second, we would be proclaiming in the Alliance that no effective protection could be afforded to those among our allies who did not command a national nuclear capability. We would be inviting Moscow, in effect, to put diplomatic and military pressure on these smaller powers, one by one, in the face of a doctrine which asserted that no other nation would rationally protect them.
>
> The acceptance of this doctrine could only mean the end of the North Atlantic Alliance—in fact, the whole system of American alliances—opening the way for the fragmentation and piecemeal diplomatic or military defeat of Western Europe and other now free regions of the world.[4]

III. Partnership and Integration

Since a system of national nuclear fortresses would be dangerous to our security, and since an attempt to preserve U.S. hegemony and exclusive control in nuclear matters would lead anyway to the national fortress reaction, we have no tolerable alternative, in the official view, but to "move" the North Atlantic nations in the direction of "a great

[3] In a radio-television interview by George Herman of CBS, William Laurence of ABC, and Sander Vanocur of CBS, December 17, 1962.

[4] Walt W. Rostow, address before Belgo-American Association, Brussels, May 9, 1963.

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new union for us all." The goal never has been defined clearly by Administration spokesmen (detailed designs contributed by enthusiastic "federalist" academicians are labeled premature). The *direction* is what matters, being both pragmatically necessary and historically progressive.

The Kennedy Administration, in its early enthusiasm, saw itself at a turning point in history, at the peak of the global movement for national independence, with the world now ripe—in Hegelian fashion—for its antithesis: supranationalism.

And the United States, because of its own national experience with an analogous dialectical process, was viewed as uniquely qualified to comprehend and advance the new wave of the future. "As this effort for independence, inspired by the American Declaration of Independence, now approaches a successful close," said Kennedy at Philadelphia on July 4, 1962, "a great new effort for interdependence is transforming the world around us. And the spirit of that new effort is the same spirit which gave birth to the American Constitution."

Even so, the clearest present manifestation of the "new spirit" has been assumed to exist in Europe, in the Common Market, and in the movement toward a full-blown European Political Union which Jean Monnet and his European and American disciples consider to be the necessary and inevitable culmination of the process begun in the economic realm.

The pace of European economic integration has allowed the American wing of the movement for North Atlantic integration to be wholeheartedly for the merger of national sovereignties in principle (that is, for others) while avoiding the domestic political implications of being for it in practice (namely, for us). Administration spokesmen, while warmly evoking the spirit of Atlantic Partnership, are prudent when it comes to sacrifices of American sovereignty. The agenda for United States involvement, which President Kennedy laid out, still guides our concrete policy decisions: "The first order of business is for our European friends to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will some day make this partnership possible."[5]

This "timetable" for Atlantic integration has been especially serviceable in our go-slow policy on the matter of parceling our shares for ownership and control of the strategic nuclear deterrent. The otherwise confusing program for a Multilateral Force (MLF) of Polaris-carrying surface ships has been wholly consistent with this policy. There are vague hints about giving our European partners authority to fire the nuclear missiles without requiring a weapons release order

[5] July 4, 1962.

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from the President of the United States—but these hints are always in the subjunctive language of *when-and-if* rather than in the declaratory *here-and-now*. "If Europe were sufficiently far advanced toward political unity," remarked Under Secretary Ball on the eve of the May 1964 NATO Ministerial Meeting, "we could hopefully look forward to an effective and integrated Atlantic defense founded on a true nuclear partnership. But this is not the case today nor is it likely to be for some time."[6]

Meanwhile the United States insists on retaining a veto on the use of any nuclear weapons we "share" with our alliance partners, while reserving the authority and capability to launch unilaterally, without veto by our allies, any of the weapons in the U.S. arsenal deemed necessary for destroying essential strategic targets. "If the word comes to Europe or comes any place that we are about to experience an attack, you might have to make an instantaneous judgment," explained President Kennedy. "Someone has to be delegated with that authority."[7]

It may irk us when European friends express suspicion that our pet projects for Atlantica all seem to lead to a preservation of U.S. hegemony, but it should not surprise us. They can, after all, always quote Dean Acheson back at us to support their incredulity. We can claim that the former Secretary of State spoke only in an unofficial capacity, but there is yet to be an official denial that the ideas in his widely read *Foreign Affairs* article of January 1963 reflect the blood and guts of the Kennedy-Johnson Grand Design for the NATO area. A "sound defense plan," said Acheson bluntly, is one in which "Europe would furnish the bulk of the conventional power and the United States the nuclear power, as well as very substantial conventional forces."[8] Such a specialization of function within the Alliance should not be demeaning to the self-esteem of any of the European partners, claimed Acheson. Indeed, since the European nonnuclear forces would be "called upon initially to block a Soviet attempt to impose its will," the European nations would have "an immense leverage on political and military strategy in the West. This would be an inevitable reflection of new power assumed by Europe within the alliance."[9]

We are properly pained at complaints that U.S. strategic con-

[6] Georgetown University, May 7, 1964.
[7] February 4, 1963.
[8] Dean Acheson, "The Practice of Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, LXI (January 1963), 258.
[9] *Ibid.*, 256.

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cepts relegate the Europeans to the role of footsloggers, whether these complaints come from French Gaullists, British Conservatives, or German editorial writers. Moreover, we cannot afford to respond with anything but outraged denial to apocalyptic visions of the United States' standing back paralyzed by its own fears of thermonuclear war, while Western Europe is blackmailed into submission by the superpower to the East.

IV. The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

The critical aspect of this dialogue of suspicion and denial is that by its very existence, even at the verbal level, it creates a reality out of what at base may have originally been only the paranoid hallucinations of a few jingoists on both sides of the Atlantic. It cannot be denied that today we do have a crisis of confidence in NATO which is much more than rhetorical. The major members of the Alliance are suspicious of one another's diplomatic dealings with the Communist world, fearful that bilateral trade deals and arms control agreements will be sealed prior to intra-NATO consultation, and that narrow national interests will be pursued to the sacrifice of the general interest and welfare of the larger North Atlantic community.

Although the NATO crisis extends beyond mere rhetoric, it may be that our prevailing verbal constructions have restricted our ability to formulate alternative concepts capable of directing us to alliance arrangements adaptive to increasing polycentrism on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Indeed, our habit of posing the alternatives starkly —Atlantic Partnership or a National Fortress World (Fortress France, Fortress Britain, Fortress America, and, horror of horrors, Fortress Germany)—may accelerate the complete and premature fragmentation of the anti-Communist coalition.

The prophecy of a breakup of the Alliance as the likely consequence of Europe's failure to adhere to U.S.-sponsored strategic concepts, force goals, and institutional arrangements can be self-fulfilling. Every frustration of our Grand Design for North Atlantica, if defined by the American public and in the halls of Congress as a push toward the National Fortress World, is likely to stimulate further European expectations of eventual American withdrawal from entanglement in the affairs of Europe. In Europe, such expectations are exploited by political leaders who have become champions of programs for nuclear independence, or, paradoxically, pacifistic neutralism. The more strident examples of these nationalistic European positions are picked up on

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this side of the Atlantic and often defined as a general European lack of gratitude for nineteen years of American welfare work and protection against aggression. The value of continuing to keep 400,000 United States troops in Europe is increasingly questioned in Congress and the spiral of mutual suspicion grows. All that is needed now is a visible reduction in U.S. European deployments (troop airlift exercises in the fall of 1963 required swift denials from Washington that the day of withdrawal was at hand) for it to be widely assumed in the United States and Europe that the stark prophecy of the collapse of NATO is being confirmed.

V. The North Atlantic Concert

But the fears, on both sides of the Atlantic, that the United States might return to its traditional hostility to "entangling alliances" if its Grand Design was frustrated probably underestimate the strength of the nation's image of itself as leader of the free world coalition. Curiously, those most prone to foresee a popular "Fortress America" reaction to the frustration of our Atlantic policies are usually our most committed internationalists. Their prophecies are more often than not a "bargaining" device for confronting the Europeans with the dire consequences of rebuffs to preferred U.S. policies.

Actually, our day-to-day policies for the North Atlantic area have been more adaptive to the reality of Western polycentrism than our platform rhetoric would suggest. Somehow our economic diplomacy has been able to absorb the shock of the British exclusion from the Common Market. There is also a growing realism about de Gaulle and others, a recognition that it is not only the General, but the legitimate pride of a great nation, and the pride of other nations within Europe, which makes them reluctant to see the evolution of North Atlantica occur along lines which would preserve the pre-existing military hierarchy with the United States at the apex. Despite all the rebuffs and frustrations we have suffered, there appears to be a rededication to continued American participation and entanglement in the affairs of Europe—whether or not our preferred design is accepted.

New concepts, however, are needed to define this emerging policy realism. It needs a "handle," and it also needs an orienting structural principle. As a handle, let me propose the North Atlantic Concert, and for the orienting structural principle: a Web of Special Relationships.

The metaphor of a "concert" suggests separate instruments, with relationships of domination and subordination among the instruments varying according to the particular score. There is room for counter-

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point and dissonance, and sometimes considerable latitude for improvisation, but within the discipline of common themes.

Unlike the still-dominant images of Atlantic Partnership, the Concert conception could accommodate itself to the global trend toward multipolarity. Those NATO designs which are based on the notion of increasing supranationalism in Europe would be severely compromised by regime changes in individual nations which shifted their foreign policies in a neutralist direction. Sudden changes of this sort—not at all implausible, say, for Italy, where governments are formed out of heterogeneous coalitions supported by slim parliamentary majorities—might paralyze major components of those NATO structures which require a consensus among the participants in order to act. A North Atlantic Concert of independent nations, bound together only where, and when, and to the degree there exists a real convergence on ideological goals or concrete interests, could tolerate the defection (or expulsion, when required) of member units without causing the whole structure to collapse.

This is where the notion of a Web of Special Relationships comes in. Under prevailing notions of what the Alliance *should* be, we are usually defensive about "special relationships." We are apologetic about our natural "special relationship" with Britain in nuclear matters (the roots of which extend back to our very close collaboration during World War II). And, by our own public reticence, we make ourselves politically vulnerable to suggestions that there is something illicit in the special German-American military relationship.

Once we disabuse ourselves of the notion that we are sacrificing a core principle of our foreign policy when we fail to treat "Europe" as an entity, we should be able to regard "special relationships" as natural to United States diplomacy in a time of increasing polycentrism. Indeed, *every* relationship that the United States sustains with another nation ought to be regarded as "special"—as based on a *unique* convergence of national interests, unique in light of the special tradition of U.S.-Country "X" relations, uniquely suited to the specific geographic characteristics of the alliance partner, especially the product of those economic and military *quid pro quo* arrangements that each particular country and the United States have been able to hammer out in their bilateral diplomatic meetings.

To insist that the European nations, in all critical aspects of their foreign policies, homogenize their separate positions before we will negotiate with them will be less likely to forge European unity than to highlight fissures within the European community. The impressive

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progress made by the Continental nations in implementing a common external tariff policy ought to be encouraged to continue at its own natural pace, and we should continue to be very cautious in exploiting potential conflicts of economic interests among the Common Market countries merely in order to gain temporary leverage in the tough trade bargaining we are facing with this group. But for the United States to expect of the Six the same degree of unity on foreign political matters and military strategy that they exhibit in trade matters may induce the Europeans to debate among themselves, prematurely, a Grand Strategy for Europa, without having first built up, through the experience of practical working together in lesser functions, that sense of "oneness" which is the prerequisite for constructive debate over a basic European foreign policy.

And without a basic European foreign policy, any strategic consensus arrived at among the Europeans is likely to be a disembodied consensus —inoperable in those critical crises when political decision-makers face their supreme moments of truth (how high a price to pay for the attainment of the specific objective). Nor is there any guarantee that such a basic European foreign policy, even if one could be fashioned by the Continentals, would be compatible with the values of the non-Continental members of the wider North Atlantic grouping—particularly Britain and the United States.

To recognize and plan for heterogeneity within the Alliance by no means rules out the forging of joint or multilateral ventures. But membership, even in these schemes, ought to be determined anew, and *ad hoc*, depending upon the specific functions to be performed by the particular bilateral or multilateral structure.

The United States, by virtue of its global superpower rivalry with the Soviet Union, will likely want to be a participant in many of these schemes—particularly those designed to effect joint strategy, force planning, and military operations all along the Iron Curtain. For example, the United States may, and indeed does, find itself the "other" member of bilateral weapons command and control arrangements with Germany and with Turkey. But this is no reason for insisting that arrangements on the Turko-American model are applicable for the German-American arrangements; nor is it necessary to have Turkey or Germany, as the case may be, intimately associated with the arrangements the United States has worked out with the other. On the other hand, arrangements for defense of the Baltic Sea area probably ought to be at least trilateral (Germany, Denmark, and the United States), and might, if NATO itself were not made the organizational

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focus, include Sweden as well. Similarly, the Mediterranean is central to our military planning and to that of Italy, France, Britain, and Spain, but need not be quite as prominent a concern of the Benelux countries, or, for that matter, of Germany.

In fact, it might be risking paralysis of essential military mechanisms, just at the time when they are most urgently needed, to give nations without primary security interests in a region equal weight with the regional nations in the decision machinery for managing the local defense of that region. This is not as serious a problem in an age when it is deemed credible to threaten a "strategic" response to localized Soviet thrusts, and when the United States is the strategic agent for the entire Alliance. But when tactical responses are to assume a major role in deterring and defending against local aggression, the prospect of fifteen fingers, or even ten, on the safety catch of the short-range artillery ought—literally—to give one pause.

This is not to suggest the abandonment of fourteen- and fifteen-nation commitments and organizational arrangements where they are appropriate and feasible. It may be that we can sustain a workable multination command for defense of Europe in case of a massive Soviet assault on the Central Front, or for nuclear retaliation to a Soviet MRBM attack. But even for these "ultimate" situations, we must be wary of constructing elaborate technical structures and plans for multinational operations which may be unable to function with sufficient dispatch, should the unanimous political commitments solicited during planning stages not show up in moments of supreme national risk.

As we become accustomed to the erosion of global bipolarity, special defense relationships and commands, designed in each case to fit the particular bilateral or multilateral convergence of national security policies of the members, should be regarded positively: as the rule, rather than, apologetically, the exception.

For many, the concept of a North Atlantic Concert based on a web of special relationships in trade and defense will sound less grand than a design for U.S. leadership of the trend toward new forms of political union. They may be right. Part of the motivation for our championing of supranational institutions in Europe, and ultimately Atlantica, derived from our desire for some historically "progressive" commitment to counter the transnational appeals of the Communist movement. "Containment" of communism was too antiseptic a goal—not well suited to the stimulation of popular attitudes of dedication and self-sacrifice necessary to sustain our vast array of foreign obligations. There was a brief flirtation with "liberation" as a romantic ideology

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for generating a positive thrust to our policies; but this concept served more to stimulate premature expectations abroad than commitment at home. A positive ideology was hard to come by, and thus it is to be expected that any suggestions for reorientation of our dominant notions of Atlanticism will meet with serious resistance.

But the times call for new themes—themes not at all dissonant to our ears. The special genius of the American temper, and our domestic experience, may find itself more truly in tune with the politics of polycentrism, with its requirements for improvisation rather than formal ideology. Our proudest national commitment, after all, is to the principle that respect for diversity need not be sacrificed in the pursuit of the general welfare. To implement this principle, actively, on the international scene establishes unique requirements for diplomatic flexibility; but we should welcome the challenge.

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WORKER-MANAGEMENT COUNCILS IN INDONESIA

By J. PANGLAYKIM

NUMEROUS articles and books have been written on worker-management cooperation.[1] It may be of interest to students of industrial and political relations to study such arrangements in Asian countries. This article will discuss such an arrangement in one of the Asian countries—i.e., worker-management councils (*dewan perusahaan*) in Indonesia, as they have developed from 1960 up to June 1964.

I. The Setting

Economic organization in Indonesia consists of a developing state sector, a rather complicated private sector, and a cooperative sector that still lags behind. This article is automatically limited to the state sector, since the worker-management councils are being established only among the state enterprises.

Before World War II, Indonesia's state sector consisted predominantly of public utilities, a few government agricultural estates, printing offices, etc. It was far less important than the private sector, which was dominated by Western (Dutch) enterprises.

After the war, and especially after December 1957, when the government nationalized all private Dutch enterprises, Indonesia's state sector began to play an important role in various economic activities. Today it operates in the fields of production (agricultural estates, industries, mining), marketing (both foreign and domestic trade), banking, insurance, shipping, and domestic transportation.

All these state enterprises are subject to the Law on State Enterprises,[2] which stipulates, among other things, that all such enterprises

[1] For example, W. Michael Blumenthal, *Codetermination in the German Steel Industry* (Princeton 1956); Adolf Sturmthal, "The Workers' Councils in Poland," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XIV (April 1961); Milton Derver, "Workers' Participation in Israeli Management," *Industrial Relations*, III (October 1963), 51-72; M. Bogosavlevit and M. Pesakovic, *Workers' Management of a Factory in Yugoslavia: A Monograph Dealing with the "Rade Koncar" Works* (Belgrade 1959).

[2] Government Regulation No. 19/1960. In Lieu of Act of Parliament, State Gazette No. 39, signed by Acting President Djuanda, promulgated in April 1960. It is to be noted that "Government Regulation in Lieu of Act of Parliament" indicates a regulation issued, because of urgency, before it has been passed by Parliament; such a regulation, however, must be adopted by the next session of Parliament or else be rescinded.

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are to be placed under General Management Boards (*Badan Pimpinan Umum*, or *B.P.U.*), whose responsibilities range from general management to staff functions. The state enterprises in the industrial field come under the *B.P.U.-Industri*; the agricultural estates (producing rubber, tea, palm oil, coffee, etc.) come under the *B.P.U.*-Rubber, *B.P.U.*-Tea, etc.; and state trading corporations come under the *B.P.U.-P.D.N.* (General Management Board for State Trading Corporations).

A government department (ministerial level) can have more than one *B.P.U.* under it. For instance, the Department of Agriculture has under its control: (1) *B.P.U.*-Sugar, (2) *B.P.U.*-Rubber, (3) *B.P.U.*-Tobacco, (4) *B.P.U.*-Fibers (*Serat*), and (5) *B.P.U.*-Various Agricultural Products, while the Department of Trade controls only the *B.P.U.-P.D.N.*, which is responsible for nine state trading corporations.

The various state enterprises are integrated horizontally. This means that only state enterprises of a similar character (the rubber estates, for example, or the state trading corporations) are put under the control of one *B.P.U.* There has been no case of a *B.P.U.* based on vertical integration.

Another point to be noted here is that the state enterprises do not issue shares to be sold to the public. The government is the only shareholder in all the state enterprises.

The various departments (ministerial level) delegate their authority to the *B.P.U.*, which act on behalf of the departments in controlling the state enterprises under their jurisdiction. It was found that the authority relationship between the *B.P.U.* and their enterprises did not work as efficiently as was expected by the government. The reason for this, among other things, was that Law No. 19/1960 allowed the *B.P.U.* to act as a super-management board, in the sense that they could intervene in the day-to-day operation of the state enterprises. Especially among state trading corporations, this type of authority relationship created a lot of friction between the *B.P.U.-P.D.N.* and the nine trading corporations under its control. This experience was one of the major reasons why the government has concluded that the status of the *B.P.U.* should be more or less equal to that of a board of directors. Thus the *B.P.U.* are now confined to the controlling function of management and to policy-making, leaving the execution of policy to the state enterprises.[3]

[3] Presidential Regulation No. 7/1963, with regard to the authority relationship between *B.P.U.*-State Trading Corporations and the state trading corporations. For further information about Indonesian labor relations, see Everett D. Hawkins, "Labor in Transition," in *Indonesia*, ed. by Ruth T. McVey (New Haven 1963), pp. 248-71. Hawkins states that the worker-management council (which he terms an "Enterprise

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II. The Establishment of the Councils

Establishment of Indonesian worker-management councils was urged by President Sukarno in his address to the nation on August 17, 1960. The President stated that he felt such councils were necessary in order to assist management to increase the quantity as well as the quality of production, and also to keep a watchful eye on those persons who might benefit from their position to enrich themselves. His remarks speeded up the preparation of a regulation governing such an arrangement. Within two months after the President's address, the Government Regulation on Worker-Management Councils (*Dewan Perusahaan*) came into existence.[4] The important aspects of it can be summarized as follows:

There are two types of councils: the Central Worker-Management Councils, at the *B.P.U.* level, and the Worker-Management Councils, at the enterprise level. Only state enterprises are obliged to establish a worker-management council. Private enterprises are not subject to Government Regulation No. 45/1960.[5]

CENTRAL WORKER-MANAGEMENT COUNCILS

Management is represented on these councils by a top executive of the enterprise concerned, who serves as chairman of the council. This provides the organization with a manager who is able to make decisions without outside consultation since he has wide experience in the state enterprise.

The council must also include a representative from the union associated with the enterprise. If the enterprise operates in the agricultural field, there is also a farm representative. State enterprises which are unrelated to agriculture have another labor, rather than farm, representative, which means that in practice labor is frequently represented on the council by two persons.

As well as these three representatives, the respective Minister is allowed to appoint an expert to the Central Worker-Management Council.

Council") can be seen as the manifestation of an increased tendency toward state guidance in labor relations.

[4] Government Regulation No. 45/1960, signed by President Sukarno on November 1, 1960.

[5] See, however, Presidential Regulation No. 58/SK/M/1963, dated November 1, 1963, which stipulates that newspapers (private and state) possessing their own printing works are obliged to form a worker-management council. If they do not, their allocation of paper from the government (at the official subsidized price) will be withdrawn.

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WORKER-MANAGEMENT COUNCILS WITHIN STATE ENTERPRISES

What has been said with regard to the management, labor, and farm representatives at the *B.P.U.* level is also valid for the worker-management councils at the enterprise level. The difference here is that the Minister concerned also appoints a representative from among several community leaders in the locality where the enterprise is situated; these candidates are suggested by the Governor of the locality.

It will be seen that the government (the owner) is represented in the council by the top manager and another appointee. The union and the farmers are also represented, but the consumers are not. This is possibly due to the fact that most of the state enterprises face a sellers' market, and it may therefore not be felt necessary to include a consumers' representative in the council.

All members are formally proposed by the Minister concerned, but final approval comes from a special Committee of Ministers. The members are appointed for a term of two years, with the understanding that they are eligible for a second term.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COUNCILS

At the *B.P.U.* level, the Central Worker-Management Councils have as their responsibility: (1) to consider questions and make recommendations to the *B.P.U.* with regard to such matters as how best to achieve the targets set by the government in its economic plans, the management of the state enterprises under the jurisdiction of the *B.P.U.*, and the coordination of activities to ensure an effective production process; and (2) to assist the *B.P.U.* in the smooth operation of the state enterprise and in safeguarding the nation's wealth.[6]

At the state enterprise level, the councils are expected to offer recommendations to the enterprise management on such matters as (1) production planning and the targets set by the enterprise; (2) methods of organizing the production process in order to maximize efficiency; (3) cooperative action among members of the enterprise based on the *gotong royong* principle;[7] and (4) the distribution of awards for significant contributions to the raising of production. These councils, too, are expected to assist management in the smooth

[6] Panglaykim, "Indonesian State Enterprises and Worker-Management Councils *(Dewan Perusahaan)*," *Asian Survey*, III (June 1963), 285-88.

[7] *Gotong royong* is the Indonesian term for the common voluntary effort of a community aimed at benefiting the community as a whole or some member of it. This term is often translated as "mutual cooperation," which is inadequate in some respects; *gotong royong* is a strong trait among Indonesian communities.

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operation of the state enterprises and in safeguarding the nation's wealth.

These are the most important points of the Law on Worker-Management Councils. To execute this law, a government regulation setting forth the necessary procedures was also required. It took the government almost a year to work out such a regulation,[8] whose major aspects will now be reviewed.

III. Procedural Provisions

A Committee of Ministers screens all the members, including the representatives of the labor unions, who sit on the councils. The Committee is chaired by the Minister of Labor and has a permanent secretary; the other members are Ministers from various departments concerned with production.

A union is recognized by the Committee when its membership includes at least 30 per cent of the total working force in the state enterprise concerned. Labor unions with no members in the enterprise cannot in theory be proposed for representation on the council.

The person representing either management, labor, or the farmers in the council must possess the skills of his job as well as certain qualities of leadership, and have an overall knowledge of the state enterprise concerned. It must be admitted that it is very difficult to judge leadership qualities in an individual. To do so will always entail a subjective evaluation, which may lead to friction among the various groups in an organization; some favoritism is perhaps inevitable.

As well as meeting these requirements, each candidate has to submit his *curriculum vitae*, stating, in addition to his present position in the enterprise, his age, education, business experience, experience as an organizational worker in the political and social field, and other data which might support his candidacy.

Every member who is nominated must take an oath, promising to serve in the spirit of the "Political Manifesto,"[9] to behave in good faith

[8] Government Regulation No. 232/1961, signed by President Sukarno on October 12, 1961.

[9] Briefly, the "Political Manifesto" (an official text) outlines the fundamental principles of the Indonesian Revolution and the general program for its conduct. The principles and objectives of the revolution are congruent with the social conscience of mankind and are elsewhere summarized as *Pantja Sila* (Five Principles)—i.e., religious belief, internationalism, nationalism (the fullest expression of the national identity), democracy, and social justice. The general program for the revolution calls for the application of these principles, under Indonesian conditions, in political affairs, in the economy, in social affairs, in mental and cultural development, in security arrangements, and in the setting up of new institutions, thus leading to the establishment of an Indonesian socialist society.

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and in all honesty, and to strive to increase production in the effort to implement Indonesia's economic policy, leading toward a socially just and prosperous society. Thus each member is required to have a fully cooperative spirit.

We have discussed so far the major aspects of the two government regulations on worker-management councils. The framework which they provide gives great promise and reveals the objectives of those who formulated them. In the light of this knowledge, it might now be appropriate to discuss some of the working experience of the councils.

IV. The Composition and Formation of the Councils

Considerable time elapsed before the state enterprises established their worker-management councils. Government Regulation No. 232/1961 was signed and made public on October 12, 1961, and the first worker-management council was established on April 12, 1962, for the State Electricity Enterprise. By June 1, 1964, there were 21 Central Worker-Management Councils at the *B.P.U.* level and 636 worker-management councils at the enterprise level. There were still some worker-management councils to be established, predominantly for the agricultural estates.

Table 1. Membership of 656 Worker-Management Councils

Representatives from	*Total persons*	*% of total membership*
Labor	1,640	60.5
Farmers	331	13.5
Experts (including leaders from locality of enterprises)	71	2.0
Management	650	24.0

As indicated in Table 1,[10] labor is heavily represented in the worker-management councils, comprising 60.5 per cent of the total representation. In seeking the reason, it must be noted that, historically, Indonesian cabinets have generally tended to side with labor in demands on management.[11] Moreover, public opinion in regard to state enterprises is rather unfriendly and in many cases even hostile; management thus has a weaker bargaining position from a political standpoint. Also, as has been mentioned above, when a state enterprise does not operate in the agricultural sphere, the seat of the farm representative is automatically given to the representative of a labor union. The fact that

[10] Data supplied by Mr. Godjali from the Department of Labor.
[11] Hawkins, 263.

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the work-management councils still to be established are related for the most part to agricultural estates thus constitutes another reason why the labor representation shown in Table 1 is so high.

One of the main explanations for the delay in establishing all the worker-management councils is that Indonesian management and labor consider themselves not as partners, but more or less as opponents. This may be due to the fact that the state enterprises consist of combinations or regroupings of former private foreign enterprises. During the colonial period the two classes were also antagonistic, and though management is now in the government's hands, something of the old attitude remains. That the relationship between labor and foreign management was not cooperative can be seen from the number of disputes that have occurred between them (see Table 2).

TABLE 2. TOTAL NUMBER OF DISPUTES BETWEEN LABOR AND FOREIGN MANAGEMENT

Year	*Disputes*	*Workers Involved*
1950	180	—
1951	2,754	—
1952	4,003	—
1953	1,823	1,268,410
1954	—	—
1955	3,697	3,488,747
1956	3,896	3,111,957
1957	4,131	5,057,478
1958	3,350	2,975,922
1959	2,825	1,956,500
1960	1,096	833,235
1961	1,159	900,009
1962*	914	672,391
1963**	807	725,404

SOURCE: Hawkins, Table 7 (in part), p. 266.
* Department of Labor, issued January 1964.
** Department of Labor, issued June 1964.

The figures for the years before 1957, when the nationalization of the Dutch enterprises began, give us an idea of the great number of these disputes, as well as of the workers involved in them. It will be observed that after 1957 the figures in both categories declined. The main reason for this decline was not that grievances ceased to exist, but that in the state enterprises the unions were no longer allowed to present their case to the Central Labor Dispute Committee (*Panitia Penjelesaian Perburuhan Pusat*, or *P4P*). In order to create a more co-

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operative atmosphere, a Body for Cooperation Between the Army and Labor (*BKS-Bumil*) was founded at the end of 1957, and continued to operate until 1962, when the state of war in Indonesia was declared at an end.

A second reason for delays in establishing the worker-management councils was the need for discussion in the Committee of Ministers with regard to the requirement that representation be accorded only to unions with a membership of at least 30 per cent of all the workers in the enterprise concerned. Some unions have less than 30 per cent membership but are the only ones associated with their enterprise. Admission of their representatives requires thorough discussion prior to the Committee's decision, but in practice it has sometimes proved very difficult to call such meetings, at which Ministers from several different departments must be present.

Another problem which came before the Committee was whether a representative from a labor union outside a particular state enterprise might be nominated as a member of a council. Although it was stated in the regulations that outside unions are not allowed to have a representative, some nation-wide union federations have tried to violate this ruling.

A fourth problem lay in the nomination of leading figures from localities where the enterprises are situated. Disagreement sometimes arose between the enterprise and the person suggested by the Governor —in which case, the manager of the enterprise and the Governor might both use their influence to convince the Committee that their respective candidates should be appointed. In practice, this can lead to weeks or months of discussion before a decision is reached.

A further cause of delay arose from the question of who was to finance the council. Although it was stated in the law that the financing of worker-management councils was to be regulated by the respective Ministers, in practice detailed regulations are still in process of preparation. Management which is still unwilling to speed up the formation of the Central Worker-Management Council may sometimes use the absence of these regulations as an excuse for delay.

Finally, in comparison with the problems that some of the state agricultural enterprises have had to face immediately, there has seemed to be no urgency about establishing worker-management councils; all their energies were turned to solving the matter of the rice supply for their employees. According to some information, the fact that the rice supply was given top priority in the state agricultural enterprises with-

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out worker-management councils may be the main reason why they still lag behind.

V. The Working Experience of the Worker-Management Councils

The working experience of the worker-management councils should be regarded as not yet fully developed, but some preliminary observations can be made.[12]

AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS

Basically, the Law on Worker-Management Councils is an instruction from the government. Moreover, the managers of the state enterprises were not consulted when the law was prepared by the Department of Labor. Since this law affects their authority relationship with the labor unions, varied reactions were only to be expected from the managers of the state enterprises.

One group of managers were sympathetic to this law, since long before it existed they had set up councils between management and workers, whether by formal or informal means. An example of such a council was to be found in the cement factory at Gresik, East Java. Cement Gresik was a factory built by an American contractor, Morrison and Knudsen. After it was in full operation, in accordance with the terms of the contract the management was taken over completely by an Indonesian staff. The personnel consisted in general of young university graduates, but they had as a nucleus a group who, during the struggle for independence, served together in a single army unit. They were given key positions in the factory, and this group of devoted persons established a council of workers and management predating the official worker-management council.

Other managers took a very indifferent attitude toward the instructions in the law, and some adopted an attitude of "wait and see."

A third group of managers, whether openly or not, opposed such councils. Some top managers even considered the council a burden to the development of the enterprise.

There is no way of knowing how strong the various groups are, but in the light of Table 1 (showing the membership in established councils) it might be concluded that, in general, managers have accepted the idea of worker-management councils, although some of them still have not done so wholeheartedly.

[12] Information was gathered from Mr. Godjali of the Department of Labor, various managers, and a group of students of the Faculty of Economics in the University of Indonesia who did some research on the functioning of worker-management councils.

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POWERS HELD BY MANAGEMENT

Since management has a monopoly on all data needed as a basis for decision-making, it is in a position to communicate the data in whole, in part, or not at all, as it chooses. Furthermore, management also holds the initiative when it comes to calling a meeting of the council. It is difficult in practice for a labor representative to set up such a meeting. If labor representatives are confronted with an unwilling management, they really have a difficult time. This is also the case with financing. Although it is stated in the law that the respective state enterprise should finance the worker-management council, actual expenditures are authorized by management.

All these prerogatives are guarded very carefully by management. In fairness it must be said that it is difficult for a manager to delegate part of his authority if he thinks that it will not be handled in the appropriate way by the workers.

ATTITUDE OF WORKERS TO MANAGEMENT

The workers were very active in taking over the former Dutch enterprises. As well as being the moving force in the takeover, they continued to make further demands on management. Their experience had taught them a tactic of attack rather than of defense. Management, on the other hand, was generally on the defensive. Some of the managers were old-timers in the nationalized enterprises and still remembered the long disputes between workers and management in the colonial regime.

Since 1957, the relationship between workers and management has been formally changed, but the spirit of defense and attack remains. This is strengthened by the fact that the workers are no longer allowed to present their cases to the Central Dispute Committee (*P4P*). Since they no longer have an institution where they can air their grievances, the workers generally have used the councils to channel these grievances, although the councils are not supposed to be used for such purposes. This situation is not conducive to the achievement of real understanding between management and workers.

LEVELS OF EDUCATION AND STATUS

It is well known that the level of education differs widely between management and workers. This has created a kind of inferiority complex among workers and a kind of superiority complex among the better-educated managers. There is no doubt that underevaluation of the

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workers by some groups of managers has created unnecessary friction.[13]

The feeling of distance between labor and management has been strengthened by the influence of the old feudal status-system, which still lingers in the minds of many managers. Sometimes it emerges as a new type of feudalism, so that managers with a university degree enjoy a preferred position. University graduates are usually eligible for the post of manager in the state enterprises even though they graduated only a few months earlier.

All the elements discussed above have created an atmosphere of distrust between workers and management. This distrust has been increased by the many facilities available to a top manager, who usually enjoys free housing, a free car, an expense account, and higher rations of goods at official prices. In addition, there is the fact that the bureaucracy and society as a whole have not yet developed a very friendly attitude toward the state enterprises.[14]

VI. Various Patterns of the Councils

During the period covered, various patterns of worker-management councils have emerged.

(1) *Worker-management council with representation from one local union.* The local union in this case is not a member of a nation-wide union. There are greater possibilities of creating a cooperative council with this type of arrangement.

(2) *Worker-management council with representation from the branch of a nation-wide union.* The chances of creating a cooperative atmosphere here depends on the union of which the local body is a branch. A council which has a representative from a union whose political objectives are rather radical has less chance of creating such an atmosphere.

(3) *Worker-management council with representation from two or more nation-wide unions.* When management has to face representatives of two unions, various possibilities are to be expected. The two unions may organize a united front against management, or management may follow the undesirable pattern of divide and rule. Thirdly, wise management may be able to influence the two unions and secure the cooperation of both.

[13] In the words of Kenneth A. Boulding: "The worker is part of the 'market' of the enterprise—economically he is something like raw material" (*Organizational Revolution: A Study in the Ethics of Economic Organization* [New York 1953], 19).

[14] See Panglaykim, *State Trading Corporations in Indonesia: First-Year Performance, 1961*, Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia, 1963.

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As we have seen, it is possible for a second union to gain representation in a council if it, too, can obtain a membership of 30 per cent of the workers. Such a campaign, however, may create further tensions among the workers.

VII. Government Efforts Toward Improvement of the Councils

Aware of all the possibilities for friction, difficulties, and an atmosphere which is not conducive to effective operation of the worker-management councils, the government is constantly looking for ways and means of improving the situation. One effort has resulted in the organization of meetings between councils from similar state enterprises (under one *B.P.U.*), in order to discuss common problems together, frankly and fully. These conferences have usually been held at a mountain resort, far away from daily work, where the two groups can meet and live together for a week or more. In new and more friendly surroundings, there probably exists more chance of straightening out grievances and obviating friction than a formal conference provides.

The tasks of such conferences include:

(1) Re-emphasizing that the worker-management council has primarily a staff function—meaning that it is not supposed to act as a super-management board.

(2) Making it clear that it is the responsibility of management to impart data that will enable all members of the council to function in their staff or advisory capacity.

(3) Stressing that the council is not an institution for settling grievances, but that each group should consider itself a co-partner in a single organization.

(4) Ensuring that meetings will be held regularly (for instance, once every thirty days) and be scheduled on the official program of the organization.

One such conference which was successful was organized by the enterprises under the jurisdiction of the Department of Industries, and met during September 10-12, 1963. Its participants came to the conclusion that the main matters that they had discussed (staff functions, finance, holding regular meetings, etc.) should be put in written form. The resulting document was then issued as a decision of the Minister of Industry. This meant that the document as a whole had the force of a ministerial instruction to the state enterprises under the Department of Industries. These instructions were clearer and better worked out than the government regulations.

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While the giving of such aid to the councils in the form of a ministerial decision is a step forward, since it provides written instructions, it remains to be seen how well the detailed instructions will be executed by the managers and workers.[15]

VIII. Conclusion

The worker-management councils which were established by the government regulations have faced many difficulties in actual operation. The different points of view of management and workers as well as the historical conflicts between them were not conducive to the creation of an atmosphere of cooperation among all the worker-management councils in all state enterprises. Vestiges of the feudal spirit and the emergence of a new kind of feudalism based on academic degrees and differing levels of education have been factors hampering development of a cooperative attitude between management and labor. This is not to say that no councils have been able to create such an atmosphere; the example of the council of the cement factory in Gresik shows that it is possible.

Plans to create such an atmosphere have been given due thought and executed by the Indonesian government and various departments at the ministerial level. The government is realistic enough to recognize that good will needs time to develop, but ways and means must be found to speed up the process. The hope is that, as the younger generation rises to responsible managerial positions, and as workers find themselves better able to acquire more education without experiencing the historical conflicts, a better atmosphere will materialize.

[15] Since this article was written, some progress has been made in the execution of these instructions.

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Research Notes

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN CHINA SCHOLARSHIP*

By CHALMERS JOHNSON

IN 1959, the tenth anniversary of the Communist take-over in China, Howard Boorman reviewed Western scholarship on Chinese politics in an essay subtitled "Some Remarks on Retarded Development."[1] Although a good deal has taken place in Western research since that time—and the Chinese Communists have, through their actions, generated considerably more subject matter—I am inclined to give my essay the same subtitle. Many books and articles on China have been published since 1959, but social science analysis has neither "staged a take-off" nor begun "the drive to maturity," to borrow two of W. W. Rostow's terms. In fact, in my opinion social science has yet to achieve "the preconditions for take-off" from which it can begin to theorize about China.

The conceptual underdevelopment of our subdiscipline can be illustrated in a number of ways. We have, for example, studies of factional activity (e.g., P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'o-ch'eng) and even of a proto-pressure group (the Democratic League during 1956 and early 1957) without any agreement on what are the sources of factionalism in China. Having failed to conceptualize clearly what the logical sources might be (e.g., regionalism versus centralism, the People's Liberation Army versus the Party, the expert versus the Red), our case studies contribute little toward understanding or predicting Chinese Communist political behavior. (Incidentally, neither the Kao Kang case nor the matter of the Military Administrative Committees of 1949-1954 has as yet received full-dress scrutiny.)

To take a different example, many Western economists are hard at work studying the Chinese "economy." Until political scientists contribute their analyses of the Chinese "command economy," however, it is doubtful whether they can go beyond the forging of statistical tools. Peter Wiles, who finds a clear-cut economic distinction between

* This paper was prepared for the SSRC's conference on political science research on contemporary China held in New York on April 17-18, 1964.

[1] "The Study of Contemporary Chinese Politics," *World Politics*, XII (July 1960), 585-99.

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capitalism and socialism, is forced to define communism as "any economic model imposed by a Communist Party."[2] There is a very important question inherent in this definition: namely, whether the traditional concepts of economics—"economic man," market articulation of prices, and so forth—are relevant to the analysis of a command economy. Certainly the industrial goals of the regime cannot be explained in terms of economics alone. Several "economic" problems to which the political scientist may have answers are: the implications of a production organ (a commune, brigade, or team) supplanting the constitutional political unit at the basic level, the precedents in the Kiangsi and Yenan periods for the strategy of the Great Leap Forward,[3] the philosophical relationship between the strategy of revolution and the "mass line," and the influence of economic performance on the Party's base of authority and ideology. Many of these crucial political problems have been misassigned to economists because social science has been slow to conceptualize regarding the Chinese Communist regime.

Turning to the Sino-Soviet dispute, we find a good half-dozen collections of basic documents, blow-by-blow accounts, content analyses, tentative historical interpretations, and comparisons of the dispute with religious factional strife. Nevertheless, virtually nothing has been done toward reevaluating Chinese Communist authority, political development, ideology, or minority policy in the light of the nine-year-old controversy. Concrete evidence of this is the fact that the United States has no policy toward the Sino-Soviet dispute comparable to its exploitation of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute. It is easy to say that the American people do not want to understand the Chinese revolution or the bases of Chinese foreign policy. Let us ask ourselves whether the social science community is able to inform the people should they become more receptive.

In essence I am suggesting that much of the work already done on Chinese communism has been in the nature of intelligence-collecting rather than social science research. This is neither surprising nor bad in itself, but intelligence compilation is not social science. The major potential contribution of social science is its capacity to provide for systematic thinking about the nature of Chinese Communist society and politics. Without the systematic application of social science theory to Chinese data, intelligence will provide only the most superficial

[2] P. J. D. Wiles, *The Political Economy of Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 3.

[3] I have begun exploring this problem in "Building a Communist Nation in China," in R. A. Scalapino, ed., *Comparative Communism in Asia* (Prentice-Hall, forthcoming).

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aids to either understanding China or formulating Western foreign policy in East Asia. To state the problem in terms of "preconditions for take-off": we must have theory-specific studies of Chinese politics in order to use even the data that we now possess and in order to generate newer and better theories. Karl Deutsch, writing on social science research in general, has said: "To understand and describe in full detail the political process even in a single country may well take the work of a lifetime. To do the same for several countries means to multiply the amount of possible data to be looked for and of possible questions to be asked. Clearly, selection is of the essence. What are the data most worth getting? What are the questions most worth asking? What are the propositions most worth verifying or disproving? Our answers to these questions will determine the shape of any investigation and may do much to determine the value of the outcome. But to say that we must choose our questions is another way of saying that we must choose our concepts or models. We obtain the answers to these questions by our preliminary 'understanding' [i.e., our choice of a concept or model] of the situation we propose to study."[4] Until a theory-specific foundation for Chinese studies has been laid and until scholars have agreed that "preliminary understandings" are necessary, each of our books on Communist China will continue to read as if it were the first thing ever written on the subject.

I intend to suggest several concepts and models—in some cases, only ideas for future models—that might profitably be applied to Chinese data. I do this not because I believe that these theories are themselves unchallengeable or that Chinese communism can be interpreted only in these terms. These ideas merely serve to illustrate the *types* of "preliminary understandings" we must have before monographic work on Chinese politics can be of much value to political scientists. The models and concepts I have chosen—the concept of "community," the role of totalitarianism in political development, the functional theory of ideology—are all deliberately broad and abstract. If a consensus should emerge among scholars on the validity of any one of them for China, however, it would immediately generate a great deal of theory-specific monographic investigation. Thus I shall also try to suggest some of the monographic research that might logically follow from the acceptance of a given idea.

Another reason why the present store of middle-level theories ought to be used to confront Chinese data is that the Chinese case might well

[4] *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York 1963), 4.

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help to make these theories more sophisticated. For example, one of the most commonly accepted tests, or criteria, of political development is the presence of role differentiation—the fact that in a developed society roles (and structures) are functionally specific.[5] It is commonly held that in traditional societies this differentiation does not exist. However, we know from the Chinese case that differentiation does not follow at once upon the disintegration of traditional society; instead, totalitarianism has displaced the old functionally diffuse role sets with different but still functionally diffuse roles. While the extreme politicization of every role is more radical than the diffuseness of roles in a traditional society and seems to characterize the transitional totalitarian polity, the call for members of the society to be both Red and expert is specifically directed against any future role differentiation. The study of Chinese totalitarianism may therefore be of great importance to the theory of political and economic development. It is also relevant to the study of elites, since in China we see elites seeking to prevent role differentiation in order to maintain their own positions after an economic take-off has been staged. (Russia and prewar Japan also illustrate this phenomenon.) These are only two ways in which the exploration of Chinese data using the tools of social science theory may help to sharpen our understanding of both China and theory.

One additional disclaimer needs to be made. It is usually presumptuous, if not insufferable, for one person to itemize the research that another ought to do. Moreover, it is always a waste of time; no major idea ever came to a thinker because he read of its possible utility in a scholarly journal. Therefore, the following suggestions should be regarded only as tentative and illustrative. If I knew exactly how to solve all of these problems, I would do so instead of talk about them.

I. The U-Shaped Development Curve: Old Society, New Community[6]

Professor Fairbank has recently taken political scientists to task for failing to study the "mandarin style of leadership" in East Asia. In a review of Tang Tsou's *America's Failure in China*, he writes: "It

[5] See, e.g., Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* (New Haven 1962), 16-31.

[6] Professor Tsou of the University of Chicago is working on this problem. The description of his research in progress in the "Newsletter, Collaborative Studies of China and Japan, 1900-1945" reads: "Twentieth-century China—a study in the disintegration and reintegration of a political community" (7).

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seems to me that Dr. Tsou as an American professor of political science suffers from the lack of understanding of Confucian government which has so long typified his profession. . . . All these client rulers, holding power in parts of the 'Chinese culture area' of East Asia, have been inheritors (as is Mao today) of the great tradition of Confucian government. As latter-day Sons of Heaven, their political behavior harks back to a different world that Western political scientists have only dimly perceived and even then seldom taken seriously."[7] The figures that Professor Fairbank chiefly has in mind are Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, and Ngo Dinh Diem; however, his suggestion that Confucian studies are directly relevant to contemporary politics in the Sinitic culture area and to Mao is disturbing. It raises fundamental questions about what is changing in East Asia, how rapidly, and in what direction.

Before attempting to answer Professor Fairbank, let us arm ourselves with some rather basic social science concepts. Following Durkheim, we may define the idea of "society" as "people united by the division of labor"; for us the limits of a society are the limits of a given pattern of the division of labor. But society, in this sense, is an abstraction unknown to the men living in one. Therefore we need another concept—community—to refer to the human solidarity that men living in a society feel. Community does not refer to the inescapable interdependence of men but to the formal expression by which men understand their complementary relations with each other. When a man identifies himself as a Kikuyu, a Frenchman, or (in some cases) a Muslim, he is referring to the community of which he is a member. The sense of community contributes "integration" to the functional social system.

For purposes of the study of social change, we note that there are several types of community—e.g., tribal, kinship, peasant (on Redfield's model), theocratic, feudal, national, and so forth. There are also subtypes in each category. In response to appropriate pressures the community overlying a society may change in various ways. For example, certain groups of Western Europeans who once thought of themselves as Bretons, Provençals, Alsatians, and so forth have become "Frenchmen"—a change in community.[8] Our understanding of social

[7] John K. Fairbank, "Dilemmas of American Far Eastern Policy," *Pacific Affairs*, xxxvi (Winter 1963-1964), 433.

[8] A stimulating and undoctrinaire discussion of the nature and degree of community formation is Hermann Weilenmann, "The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure," in Deutsch and Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York 1963), 33-55. One of the best studies of prenational community is Banfield's work on the Mezzogiorno. He writes: "Most of the people of the world live and die without ever achieving

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change in China is complicated by the unprecedented longevity of Chinese society, which is not necessarily the same thing as the longevity of the various expressions of Chinese community. A Chinese *national* community has at best a history of from forty to fifteen years, depending on the way in which the nation is defined and on the analysis of the effective membership of a Chinese nation. Before that time there may have been a Chinese society, but the Chinese (excluding the ruling class) thought of themselves only as members of clans or inhabitants of limited geographical areas.

It seems to me that intensive and theoretically rigorous investigations of the problem of community change in China must be made if our studies of Chinese politics are ever to outgrow their congenital superficiality. (I agree with Professor Fairbank that political scientists in the modern China field ought to be able to recognize Confucian government; I could not agree with him that Mao is a modern Son of Heaven unless I also believed that the CPR is a modern T'ang.) The old geopolitical bromides about the reestablishment of a Chinese dynasty (very current in discussions of the Communist intrusion into Tibet) must either be supported analytically or put to rest. The conceptual tools available to us in this field today are very rich; moreover, this is a subject which can be rather grossly measured, using the archives presently accessible. (The immense files of the South Manchurian Railroad could be mined for an effective polity profile, circa 1939, that would be extremely valuable to the study of community integration.) Until some consensus develops on whether China is a "dragon" or a "tiger," much of our analysis of Chinese politics will be futile.

In studying Chinese communal disintegration and reformulation, we must be careful not to treat the descriptive rubrics "dragon" and "tiger" (or, more commonly, "traditional" and "modern," or "peasant community" and "national community") as a dichotomy but, rather, as polar extremities on a continuum. The question we need to raise is the extent to which China, in its integrative myth (ideology), bureaucratic

membership in a community larger than the family or the tribe. Except in Europe and America, the concerting of behavior in political associations and corporate organizations is a rare and recent thing. . . . The extreme poverty and backwardness [of Montegrano] is to be explained largely (but not entirely) by the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good, or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate material interests of the nuclear family." This would be an appropriate description of premobilization Chinese in the lower (and larger) section of Redfield's model of peasant society. The quoted remarks are from Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), 7, 10.

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structure, role articulation, educational system, and personality formation (basic socialization) processes, has moved from "dragonness" toward "tigerness." In order to do this, it seems to me we need two research developments: (1) the dialogue between specialists on pre-1949 and post-1949 China must be reopened, and (2) inquiries into both periods must be structured, using the valuable models and concepts drawn from contemporary comparative government research (e.g., Riggs's model of "prismatic society"[9]).

One reason why we need more and better political science studies of China between 1911 and 1949 is to verify and enlarge upon the important theoretical work in comparative politics being done in Africa (Apter, Coleman), the Middle East (Binder, Halpern), and South Asia (Pye, Weiner). It is striking how many of the problems that have been encountered in studying these "transitional" societies have analogues in China's early transitional period. A first-rate analysis of warlordism in China would contribute directly to the study of contemporary Congolese politics. Certainly it would be a great deal easier to conceptualize the roots and functions of "guided democracy" if the Kuomintang's tutelage theory had ever been explored in a social science perspective. It is shocking how often General Nasution or Colonel Nasser is compared to Chiang Kai-shek when we have no objective study of Chiang Kai-shek. The number of Latin American specialists reading books on China is growing; it is too bad the books aren't better. The analysis of early "transitional" China has yet to be written; we need it not only for the reasons stated above, but also in order to give our studies of contemporary China a sound social science framework and to offset the natural tendency of historians to underscore only the unique features of a period.[10]

The fundamental question in community-integration research is to determine the characteristics and size of the "politically relevant stratum" in a polity.[11] In the simplest terms, we need to know what

[9] See Fred W. Riggs, "Prismatic Society and Financial Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, v (June 1960), 1-46; "Reflections on Development," preliminary unpublished MS, East-West Center, February 1963; "The Theory of Developing Polities," *World Politics*, xvi (October 1963), 147-71; *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Houghton-Mifflin, in press); and several other articles.

[10] The most important new development in this field is Howard Boorman, ed., *Republican China: Recent Political and Social History* (University of California Press, forthcoming). Boorman also has completed for publication a brief summary and appraisal of the career of Chiang Kai-shek.

[11] For the idea of "politically relevant stratum," see K. W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 497-98; and *The Nerves of Government*, 40.

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the Chinese regards as his self-identity, the way in which his self-identity has changed historically and is now changing, and the effects internal and external political events (e.g., the Sino-Soviet dispute) are having on his political consciousness. We must develop hypotheses to determine whether China at present constitutes one political community. If we conclude that it does, we must decide whether the Chinese community is a national community, a peasant community, or perhaps some new type. But only when we have first agreed on whether the orders of the Communist Party are backed by a form of legitimate authority can we proceed to interpret finite Chinese political information.

Various research projects would contribute to our knowledge about this problem. The nature of the educational system is one logical place to begin.[12] An exploration of the ethical and moral pronouncements of the Party (e.g., the strictures against elevating mental over physical labor) and the people's response to them would be useful. One particularly interesting and important project would be an attempt to determine whether or not the success of the production team is, as has been suggested, a reflection of residual parochial loyalties.[13] Another type of research might weigh the eufunctional/dysfunctional properties of known social conflict in Communist China. Mao's theory of "non-antagonistic contradictions" (i.e., those posing no threat to the community) happens, interestingly enough, to parallel the modern sociological concept of "eufunctional conflict."[14] It is clear that open rebellion in Tibet or Sinkiang cannot be regarded as "routinized conflict," but it is less clear whether *hsia fang*, rectification campaigns, and the 1962 refugee exodus into Hong Kong belong to the physiology or the pathology of the Communist regime. The analysis of community formation in China is only beginning, and we have a continuing need for both

[12] See the forthcoming volume sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the SSRC, *Education and Political Development*, James S. Coleman, ed. (Princeton University Press). The relevance of education to community formation can be illustrated by two well-known examples: (1) The Japanese Imperial Rescript on education (1890) was one of the key pieces of social engineering that the Meiji oligarchy undertook in moving Japan quickly from Tokugawa feudalism to nationhood. (2) In Burma today grandmothers still educate the children, as they did in Japan before 1890. Lucian Pye, in his *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building*, dramatically illustrates the incoherent socialization that results.

[13] See H. F. Schurmann, "Peking's Recognition of Crisis," *Problems of Communism*, x (September-October 1961), 9; and John W. Lewis, "The Leadership Doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party: The Lesson of the People's Commune," *Asian Survey*, III (October 1963), 463.

[14] The two main works on this subject are Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), and Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford 1959).

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broad macroscopic interpretations and more direct behavioralistic, microscopic theories.

In order to study political change in China we must also clarify our theory of the "transitional polity" in the light of the Chinese case. In my opinion Fred Riggs has persuasively demonstrated that the "transitional" sector of the traditional/modern continuum occupies a sufficiently long time span to require special conceptual treatment.[15] A "transitional polity" is a half-breed regime that is out of touch with the traditional system but that does not yet partake of the qualities of a modern, or "refracted," social order. China is clearly still in the transitional (prismatic) phase. (Of the late-developing polities, probably only Russia after 1953 and Japan after the occupation are refracted.) In recent years, however, most of the qualities usually associated with prismatic politics—charismatic leadership, bureaucratic nepotism, the significance of family ties in politics—have begun to disappear in China. China may therefore be an important and unstudied example of a late transitional system and one that might be of predictive value in analyzing other transitional systems if it were better understood. One obvious question to ask in exploring China's advanced transitional status is the extent to which the Communist Party is responsible. But this leads us to another major topic of needed research: Chinese totalitarianism.

II. Totalitarianism for What?

Recently Ernst Nolte has done for the study of fascism what is urgently needed in the study of communism: he has created a typology of fascisms using analytical criteria. This allows him to study and compare the effects of fascism in Italy, Spain, China, and Japan without being forced to rely exclusively on the extreme and, in his opinion, variant case—Nazi Germany.[16] In Communist studies we need a comparable typological analysis of the three obvious categories of states ruled by Communist Parties: the USSR, the militarily created satellites and buffers, and the regimes which developed independently of the USSR (China, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, and Cuba). Only when the differences in political authority in these three types are clearly under-

[15] Riggs, *World Politics*, October 1963; and "The Prevalence of Clects," *American Behavioral Scientist*, v (June 1962), 15-18. His trichotomous distinction among "primary groups," "clects," and "associations" is particularly apt for describing Chinese political groups (e.g., the wartime KMT was fractured into "clects"—part clique and part sect). It would be interesting to explore whether the Hunan group in the CCP also constitutes a clect.

[16] Ernst Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* (Munich 1963). Cf. Klaus Epstein, "A New Study of Fascism," *World Politics*, XVI (January 1964), 302-21.

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stood can we proceed to an analysis of the totalitarianism which all three have in common.

It is a source of error to suppose that Chinese totalitarianism imitates Stalinism. Purges or lack of purges in China are sometimes discussed as if Communist China *had* to experience something like the *Ezhovshchina*, and some of our studies of Chinese thought reform read as if we believed Stalin's policies were the only possible precedent for it. We must also be careful not to underestimate the degree and nature of mass support for the regimes in China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, and Cuba by weighing the effects of totalitarianism in these countries on the same scales with the effects in Hungary or East Germany. Whereas the Hungarian uprising was both nationalistic and counter-revolutionary, the Hundred Flowers demonstrations appear to have been anti-Party but not counter-revolutionary. Because the concept of totalitarianism is so imprecise, some political scientists have argued that it should be abandoned altogether. I believe that this would be a mistake, although I recognize the great need for analytical and comparative studies of the logic, purpose, and form of totalitarianism in Communist, Fascist, and other regimes.

One avenue of approach to the study of totalitarianism is in terms of its relation to the process of economic development. Nolte discovered that there was a close relationship between the two in Fascist Italy and Spain (but not in Germany). As many transitional societies illustrate, economic development does not come about solely as a result of investment; it is the product of a receptive social environment, determined leadership, technical competence, and money. Totalitarianism is related to economic progress to the extent that social engineering is being used to produce a cultural climate receptive to economic growth. An intellectual elite possessing totalitarian instruments of control can overcome some of the barriers to growth present in any prismatic society—for example, the persistence of caste, religious taboos, demands for social welfare investment, corrupt bureaucratic and political leaders, unrestricted population growth, nepotism, or "economic" trade unionism. All of these may stand in the way of economic development regardless of the amounts of capital available. In Communist China such conditions can be and have been removed by totalitarian means, and the state is also trying positive social engineering by inculcating the value of sacrifice and a work ethic into its people.[17]

[17] Commenting on the movement to force cadres to perform physical labor, the *People's Daily* stated on July 21, 1963: "It is a revolution in leadership style and working methods, aimed at revising the bureaucratic practices left behind by organs of the

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Considerations such as these, in my opinion, demand that *san-fan wu-fan* (which eliminated the old problem of "squeeze" in China), thought reform, Party rectification campaigns, *hsia fang* (downward transfer), and the like be analyzed in terms of their effect on the social environment. Too often we have taken the Communists at their ideological word—that landlords and bureaucrats had to be attacked because they harbored "bourgeois thoughts." If we tried, instead, to appreciate these campaigns in terms of the political, economic, and sociological needs of the system (without necessarily relieving the Chinese Communists of the moral responsibility for their hubris), it would help to clarify our understanding of the progress and capabilities of Communist China.

"Thought reform" is one area in which further political research is required. We have several historical accounts and at least one first-rate psychoanalytic interpretation (Lifton's), but probably the best book on the subject is by a Chinese intellectual who was himself caught up in the phenomenon—Mu Fu-sheng (pseud.).[18] Mu resents Communist excesses, but at the same time he insists that a reorientation of Chinese attitudes was mandatory if the revolution was to succeed. His attitude illustrates clearly Robert Guillain's remark that some Communist policies are good for China even if not for the Chinese, and it serves to remind us of the need to combine studies of totalitarian campaigns with research on social and economic environmental change in China. Of course, not all totalitarian social engineering can be tolerated by a population, even for the sake of revolution. *Hsia fang* and the extremes of communalization produced genuine passive resistance. Nevertheless, we must learn to measure how hard the Communists can safely drive the people in clearing away the old "social rubble," and when the Communists have successfully installed a basic innovation despite popular resistance.[19]

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old society. It is a revolution in the bureaucracy aimed at preventing and overcoming the erosive effects of bureaucracy and safeguarding the purity of our Party and state organs."

[18] *The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers* (New York 1962).

[19] The conclusion of Professor Wiles, an economist, on this point is directly relevant to political science research: "Communism [as an economic theory] has no secret weapon, no way of allocating capital that enhances growth, unless it be the ruthless application of market criteria to education. Quite the contrary, communist allocation policy is irrational and therefore a brake on growth, and all the more tribute must be paid to . . . other factors [emasculation of trade unions, abrogation of consumers' sovereignty, dedication of the government to the single task of growth, forced savings, absence of patents and commercial secrets, 'sharp stick and distant carrot']: a conclusion comforting to orthodox welfare economists but disturbing to parliamentary democrats." (*The Political Economy of Communism*, 329.)

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One such innovation was the communes, which illustrate a course of events encountered in many developing systems. An elite group directing the rapid modernization of a backward society tries to meet two different demands—demands which can easily become antagonistic. On the one hand, it must create a social environment conducive to long-range economic growth; on the other hand, it must meet the short-term needs of the society for food, clothing, defense, and welfare. Social engineering to meet the first demand often creates a short-term crisis so severe as to threaten the day-to-day operation of the system. This is what happened in China during the second five-year plan. Now that the crisis has been weathered, the Party and the people are beginning to reap some of the benefits of rural reorganization (notably the rationalization of land plots, irrigation, electrification, and improved distribution); however, the Party was lucky to survive the Great Leap Forward. It is doubtful whether a similar experiment by the present government of Indonesia, for example, would leave that government intact. That is one reason why some non-totalitarian transitional elites do not undertake basic reforms although they know these are required for economic development. Future studies will have to take account of both the long-range environmental effects of communalization and the damage it may have done to the Party's ability to lead.

When the Chinese Communist Party came to power it held a popular mandate for reform never enjoyed by either the Bolsheviks or the satellite Parties. Nevertheless, in order to launch real economic development the Chinese Party was forced to undertake many unpopular campaigns. Paradoxical as it may seem, the degree to which the CCP succeeds in advancing China economically is also a rough measure of the degree to which it is dissipating its popular mandate. There are many facets to this paradox that can be explored. Who does the Party blame for its mistakes or unpopular policies? How does the Party avoid serious cadre alienation? What is the effect of tactical mistakes on Communist ideology? Where is the threshold in China dividing positive values (e.g., nationalism) from negative goads (totalitarian terror)? Was this threshold crossed during the food crises of 1960 and 1961? Case studies and comparisons with Russia, Japan, and the KMT or warlord governments would help us to answer these questions.

III. The Functions of Ideology

Partial answers to many of the questions already raised in this article will be found in the description and analysis of Communist ideology.

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In the model of the functionally integrated social system (a model whose intellectual pedigree and potentialities need not be scrutinized here), ideology contributes to two main functions: it helps to "integrate" the various functional groups by expressing the purposes of the community, and it helps to organize the personalities of the members by means of basic socialization, political socialization, and "role articulation." In direct political terms, these two functions work together to legitimize authority, and it is its relation to authority that gives ideology its special political significance.[20] Ideology, in short, is the integrative myth of the functional social system; if the ideology becomes incoherent (fails to provide an acceptable symbolic interpretation of reality), authority corrodes and the system moves toward disintegration.[21]

In my opinion, we vitally need to study and understand Chinese Communist ideology in functional terms. This recommendation is based, first of all, on the known value of the functional approach to social research. There are special problems associated with the Chinese case, however, that make functional studies doubly necessary. One of these is the whole "revisionism" furor currently preoccupying the Communist world, against which the social scientist must inoculate himself by coming to some independent conclusion about the Marxist antecedents of Chinese communism. If the political scientist restricts his range of vision to that of the "student of Marxism," he will never perceive the truly important political science questions that need to be asked about Chinese Communist ideology.

[20] For an important functional interpretation of ideology, see David E. Apter's introduction to *Ideology and Discontent*, Apter, ed. (New York 1964).

[21] We need not accept a rigorously functional interpretation of ideology in order to acknowledge the need to examine ideology in terms of its emotional, as distinct from explanatory, value. Cassirer was arguing this point many years ago on the basis of primitive (simplified) examples: "If in a savage tribe the men are engaged in warfare or in any other dangerous enterprise and the women who have stayed at home try to help them by their ritual dances—this seems to be absurd and unintelligible when judged according to our standards of empirical thought and 'causal laws.' But it becomes perfectly clear and comprehensible as soon as we read and interpret this act in terms of our social rather than of our physical experience. In their war dances the women identify themselves with their husbands. They share their hopes and fears, their risks and dangers. This bond—a bond of 'sympathy,' not of 'causality'—is not enfeebled by the distance that lies between them; on the contrary it is strengthened. . . . When a Dayak village has turned out to hunt in the jungle, those who stay at home may not touch either oil or water with their hands; for if they did so the hunters would all be 'butter-fingered' and the prey would slip through their hands. This is not a causal but an emotional bond. What matters here are not the empirical relations between causes and effects, but the intensity and depth with which human relations are felt. The same feature appears, therefore, in all the other forms of human kinship." (*The Myth of the State* [New Haven, Yale paper ed., 1961], 38.)

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What are some of these questions? The first and most obvious is: How does Chinese Communist ideology legitimize Party rule and assist the Chinese population in making the enormous sacrifices necessary for economic development? In this context, we need to know how Maoism first came to fulfill the needs of the Chinese people. Does Maoism continue to perform its function satisfactorily? How has ideology been modified to serve more precisely the needs of the Chinese system? Concretely, how does the concept of "the people" in Maoism enhance the credibility of Chinese Communist ideology?[22] How does the progressive displacement of Marxism (the theory of class) and of Leninism (the theory of the Party) by Maoism (the theory of the people) affect communism's claims to universality and scientificity? Similar questions ought to be raised about the effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the food crises.

Many specific research projects would advance our understanding of the nature of Chinese Communist ideology. One of these would be a rigorous search into Party history for the origins of many peculiar features of Chinese ideology. For example, the "paper tiger" theory, the "mass line," a good deal of the theory of contradictions, and some of Mao's idealism clearly derive from his theories of guerrilla warfare and the specific revolutionary experience of the Chinese Party. It may prove of merely academic value to decide whether the Communists are materialists or idealists, whereas it is a fact that they were guerrillas, and the influence of their guerrilla heritage has never been carefully explored.

Another useful study of Chinese ideology might deal with Sino-American relations and attitudes as they developed during and after the Korean War. The fact that the Korean War was not the result of either U.S. or Chinese policy and forced both sides to adopt extreme

[22] Compare: "The term 'the people' has different meanings in different countries and in different periods in each country. Take our country, for example. During the war of resistance to Japanese aggression, all those classes, strata and social groups which opposed aggression belonged to the category of the people, while the Japanese imperialists, Chinese traitors and the pro-Japanese elements belonged to the category of enemies of the people. During the war of liberation, the United States imperialists and their henchmen—the bureaucrat-capitalists and landlord class—and the Kuomintang reactionaries, who represented these two classes, were the enemies of the people, while all other classes, strata and social groups which opposed these enemies belonged to the category of the people. At this stage of building socialism, all classes, strata and social groups which approve, support and work for the cause of socialist construction belong to the category of the people, while those social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution, and are hostile to and try to wreck socialist construction, are enemies of the people." (Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," in Harvard University, *Communist China, 1955-1959* [Cambridge, Mass., 1962], 275-76.)

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positions has never been carefully analyzed. If we can find a way to measure, no matter how crudely, the existential roots of China's anti-imperialist and proto-racist doctrines and the degree to which this ideology is fueled by internal political needs, we can begin to appreciate the capacity for the ideology to be spread abroad as well as to grasp its internal uses.

A third study might deal with the degree to which ideology is primarily the integrative myth of the Chinese elite rather than of the people as a whole. If such a dichotomy exists, is it changing over time? Or is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism merely used by the Party in order to preserve and expand its power within China (as many intellectuals in the Hundred Flowers period implied) instead of functioning as an integrative myth? What is the function of the cult of Mao in this connection? This will be a particularly important question as the present leaders approach the problem of finding his successor.

Thanks to the work of men like John Lewis and Stuart Schram, we now have a good knowledge of the content of Chinese ideology. Our next tasks are to analyze this ideology in functional terms and to compare it with integrative myths in comparable, developing systems. This type of ideological research would then directly inform our theories of Chinese community integration and totalitarian development.

The three areas of substantive research suggested above seem to me fundamental to making further advances in political science scholarship on China. However, they certainly do not exhaust the number of basic conceptual projects we need. Studies of bureaucratic practices and administrative development are clearly indicated. In terms of administrative differentiation, China's experience seems retrograde: from the "double track" of government and Party it appears to have moved, during the Great Leap Forward, to Party displacement of the government. The relationship between the two at present is clouded. We also need studies on the origins of institutional (as distinct from strategic) ideas. For example, where did the idea for the form of the communes come from? K'ang Yu-wei's utopian thought, the *kommuna* of the war communism period, the Russians' merging of *kolkhozy*, the practical experience of the Chinese peasantry during the winter of 1957-1958, and the personal left-communism of Mao and Liu—all have been advanced as explanations. One other precedent that seems likely to have had an influence—the guerrilla bases of the Kiangsi and Yenan periods —ought also to be studied.[23]

[23] For an example of the rich archives we now have on the Yenan and civil war

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The problem of data is always raised with regard to the types of research proposed here. I am not convinced that this is an insuperable barrier for the present. We have yet to penetrate much of the data we already have largely because we have failed to employ organizing questions to help us winnow the valuable from the irrelevant. As our research develops, however, our limited sources of information will become a major barrier. What is to be done? First, once we begin to set conceptual problems we may be able to pinpoint more precisely what type of information we need, and we may find that it is not as far beyond our reach as is presently supposed. The number of technical publications printed in Communist China and available in Western libraries is probably greater than for any other developing country. Moreover, during 1963 alone, over 1,000 Japanese visited Communist China. Surely these sources can be put to better use.

For the time being, however, the main tasks of China scholarship in America should be to train more China-oriented political scientists and to think harder about how to explain political events in China.

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bases, see Ch'i Wu, *I-ko ko-ming ken-chü-ti ti ch'eng-chang: K'ang-Jih chan-cheng ho chieh-fang chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti Ch'in-Chi-Lu-Yü pien-ch'ü kai-k'uang* [The Establishment and Growth of a Revolutionary Base: A General Account of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region During the Anti-Japanese War and the War of Liberation] (Peking 1958), 323 pp.

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CLAUSEWITZ
A Bibliographical Survey

By PETER PARET*

THE vitality of the social sciences in the United States has not prevented some of its most influential pioneers from becoming unread classics. A widespread preference for textbook treatment and up-to-the-minute analysis plays its part; but if the reader does want to turn to the originals, he often finds that they are not readily available. Complete and scholarly editions of writers who pursued new directions of inquiry are rarer than might be supposed—even in their native language. The situation is particularly bad when it comes to foreign authors. A writer's theories and insights may be transmitted through one or two major works, while the rest of his output is ignored, so that his thoughts are analyzed in isolation, without benefit of the preliminary sketches, correspondence, and marginal studies that would give depth and suppleness to the interpretation. Until recently Rousseau and Tocqueville have been in this position; another case in point is Max Weber, ignorance of whose fertile theorizing has misled more than one commentator. Still another, and extreme, example of intellectual discontinuity is provided by Clausewitz. Much of his work has never been published; even in German most of it is out of print; little of it has ever been translated. The result has been the partial loss of a remarkable historical and theoretical achievement. To the American reader, in particular, Clausewitz rarely means more than the "philosopher of war," a famous name associated with one or two clichés backed up by little of substance. Repeated attempts to outline Clausewitz's thought, or to present the "essential Clausewitz" in the form of excerpts, have never been of more than doubtful value, if only because his methodology and dialectic are scarcely less interesting than the conclusions they reach. It would be pointless to attempt the impossible once again. On the other hand, a brief survey of Clausewitz's writings and of the literature concerning him may provide a useful introduction to his theories and to the manner in which for the past 150 years they have influenced the study and the waging of war.

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I

Very few of Clausewitz's writings were published during his lifetime.[1] He first appeared in print as a 25-year-old lieutenant, with a destructive review of a book that attempted to reduce the diversity of war to geometric rules.[2] It was a highly indicative beginning of an argument he elaborated for the next quarter-century: to understand the physical and moral realities of war was more important than trying to master them by formulating "laws," which the next technological or political change might render absurd. In 1807 he wrote three articles on the recent French victories at Jena and Auerstedt, and on the subsequent collapse of the Prussian armies, in the course of which he had been captured.[3] Some short newspaper pieces followed that publicized the political and military changes advocated by the Prussian reformers.[4] During the Wars of Liberation he issued an anonymous account of the spring campaign of 1813.[5] From that time to his death in 1831 he published nothing, though much of his leisure was devoted to writing. In 1832 publication of his collected military works was begun: the first three volumes contained his unfinished manuscript, *On War*; the remaining seven, campaign histories from the sixteenth century to Waterloo.[6] Despite its size, the edition was far from complete, and during the succeeding century numerous other manuscripts from his literary estate were published. Among the more significant was a biographical essay on the leader of the Prussian reform movement, Scharnhorst, which Ranke accepted for the first volume of his *Historisch-politische Zeitschrift*; an account of the Prussian defeat of 1806, whose sharpness made publication inadvisable until 1888; and an early manuscript on strategy.[7] A second edition of his post-

[1] A comprehensive bibliography of Clausewitz's writings and correspondence does not yet exist. Useful lists can be found in *Carl von Clausewitz: Politische Schriften und Briefe*, ed. Hans Rothfels (Munich 1922), 246-47; and in Maria Hartl, *Carl von Clausewitz: Persönlichkeit und Stil* (Emden 1957?), 105-7.

[2] "Bemerkungen über die reine und angewandte Strategie des Herrn v. Bülow, oder Kritik der darin enthaltenden Ansichten," *Neue Bellona*, IX, No. 3 (1805).

[3] "Historische Briefe über die grossen Kriegs-Ereignisse im Oktober 1806," *Minerva*, Vols. I and II (1807).

[4] For instance, "Die preussischen Kriegsartikel," *Jenaische Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, October 11, 1808.

[5] *Der Feldzug von 1813 bis zum Waffenstillstand. Von einem Augenzeugen* (Glatz 1813).

[6] *Hinterlassene Werke des Generals von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegsführung* (Berlin 1832-1837).

[7] "Über das Leben und den Charakter von Scharnhorst. Aus dem Nachlasse des General Clausewitz," *Historisch-politische Zeitschrift*, I (1832); *Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner grossen Katastrophe*, No. 10 in *Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften*, published by the Historical Section of the Great General Staff (Berlin 1888); *Strategie aus*

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humous Works was not issued until the 1850's, with the contents now compressed into eight volumes, and the text heavily disfigured by editorial changes. The most important of these obscured, if it did not entirely reverse, Clausewitz's argument in Book VIII of *On War* favoring the supremacy of civilian over military leadership even in time of war. Less significant textual changes, which nevertheless coarsened both style and logic, ran into the hundreds, and were repeated and added to in later printings. Not until 1935 was the text of Clausewitz's major work restored to the original version of 1832.[8]

Aside from his historical and theoretical studies on war, Clausewitz wrote extensively on political and cultural topics—on the differences between Germans and Frenchmen, for instance, on the educational reformer Pestalozzi, on "The state of Europe since the partition of Poland." Most of these essays were first made public during the Wilhelmine era in the two-volume biography by Karl Schwarz, a typically discreet specimen of Victorian Life and Letters.[9] Schwarz also printed excerpts from Clausewitz's correspondence and diaries, of which a wider selection was later published separately. Other letters by and to Clausewitz are scattered through the historical literature on Prussia in the Napoleonic Age.[10] A fairly sizable body of manuscripts and letters remains unpublished today. Some documents, formerly in the possession of the German Army archives, are thought to have fallen into Russian hands at the end of the Second World War. During the last two decades Clausewitz papers have been discovered in private collections in Great Britain, West Germany, and Switzerland; only recently significant material turned up on the European autograph market.[11] A complete and critical edition of Clausewitz's military and non-military writings and letters has never been attempted, though work is now in progress in Germany on several volumes that will

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dem Jahr 1804 mit Zusätzen von 1808 und 1809, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Hamburg 1937).

[8] *Vom Kriege*, ed. A. W. Bode (Leipzig 1935).

[9] *Leben des Generals Carl von Clausewitz und der Frau Marie von Clausewitz* (Berlin 1878). A larger selection of the essays with valuable notes is contained in the edition by Rothfels cited in note 1.

[10] *Karl und Marie von Clausewitz. Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebuchblättern*, ed. Karl Linnebach (Berlin 1916). Clausewitz correspondence can be found in such works as Georg Pertz and Hans Delbrück, *Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neithard von Gneisenau* (Berlin 1864-1894); *Scharnhorsts Briefe*, ed. Karl Linnebach (Berlin 1914); *Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen*, ed. Karl Griewank (Leipzig 1939); *Aus den Jahren Preussischer Not und Erneuerung*, ed. Hans J. Schoeps (Berlin 1963).

[11] See, for instance, Werner Hahlweg, "Clausewitz bei Liddell Hart," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, XLI, No. 1 (1959); as well as the descriptive auction catalogues Nos. 551 (1961) and 554 (1963) of the firm J. A. Stargardt, Marburg.

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include at least some of the recently discovered manuscripts, together with a selection of essays and articles that have long been out of print.[12]

Of Clausewitz's very considerable literary output, only a small part has been translated. Aside from a few of the campaign histories and one or two incidental pieces, it was *Vom Kriege* alone that caught the attention of foreign readers.[13] The work was first translated in 1846, into Dutch. Several years later a French edition appeared, to be followed by two improved versions during the succeeding century.[14] The earliest English translation, which introduced the title *On War*, was prepared by J. J. Graham in 1873; it was revised by F. N. Maude in 1908, and reprinted in 1911, 1918, 1938, and 1949.[15] The Graham-Maude text was based on the corrupt third German edition of *Vom Kriege*, as was the first and—until now—only American translation, which came out during the Second World War.[16] In addition, several compilations of excerpts from *On War*, deleting "outdated and unnecessary material," have been published in the United States and England.[17] The first Russian translation of *Vom Kriege* appeared during the Tsarist regime; a Communist version followed, which has since been reprinted several times.[18] Japanese and Italian versions also exist, and parts of the work have been translated for internal service use

[12] *Carl von Clausewitz: Schriften—Aufsätze—Studien—Briefe*, ed. Werner Hahlweg. The first volume of the work is expected to be published in the near future.

[13] See, for instance, *La Campagne de 1796 en Italie*, translated by Captain J. Colin (Paris 1899); *La Campagne de 1812 en Russie*, translated by Captain M. Begouen (Paris 1900); *La Campagne de 1815 en France*, translated by Captain M. Niessel (Paris 1900).

[14] *De la guerre, par le général de Clausewitz*, translated by Major Neuens (Paris, 1849-1851); Carl von Clausewitz, *Théorie de la grande guerre*, translated by Lt.-Col. E. de Vatry (Paris 1886-1887, 1889); Carl von Clausewitz, *De la guerre*, ed. Camille Rougeron (Paris 1955).

[15] The many inaccuracies of the Graham-Maude translation have often been noted. See, for instance, the unsigned review in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, LII (1908), 584-85.

[16] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by O. J. Matthijs Jolles, with introductions by the translator, Joseph I. Greene, and Richard McKeon (New York 1943). The original Modern Library edition was republished unchanged by the Infantry Journal Press (Washington, D.C., 1950).

[17] E.g., General Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by A. M. E. Maguire, with notes by T. Miller Maguire (London 1909). The character of this edition is suggested by the translator's statement that "My father, T. M. Maguire, has helped me in various ways, principally by supplementing the original paragraphs with some remarks of his own, with which, as he says, Clausewitz would have agreed, had not that man of genius died in 1831" (p. xiii). More recent American compilations are those by Joseph I. Greene, *The Living Thoughts of Clausewitz* (Harrisburg 1943); and Karl von Clausewitz, *War, Politics, and Power*, ed. Edward M. Collins (Chicago 1963). In a different and far more useful category is the little volume prepared by Hans Gatzke, *Carl von Clausewitz: Principles of War* (Harrisburg 1942), a translation of an outline that Clausewitz prepared in 1810 as part of his lectures on war to the Prussian crown prince, which is generally included as an appendix in editions of *Vom Kriege*.

[18] Karl von Klauzewitz, *On War*, translated by General K. Woide (Moscow 1905).

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in other countries. Only today, however, are efforts being made to present the full range of Clausewitz's thought to the non-German reader. Work recently began on a critical English edition, to consist of several volumes, of Clausewitz's most significant military and political writings, including a translation of *On War* based on the original version.[19]

II

Clausewitz's publication history helps explain the ambiguous nature of his reputation. His work appeared in fragments, and it remains fragmented and difficult of access today.[20] His fame rests on one book, which more often than not has been presented to the reader in a faulty version. His political essays, his correspondence, and even his campaign histories have been overshadowed by *On War*. Only in recent years has the voluminous literature on Clausewitz begun to pay serious attention to his other writings.[21]

Until the First World War this literature, with some notable exceptions, was utilitarian in character. It looked to the arguments Clausewitz developed in *On War* for aid in settling the major military questions of the day: whether, for example, the aim of strategy should be to unite the advancing corps in front of the enemy's main force or whether they should be brought together in an enveloping position. Certainly these analyses added to the understanding of Clausewitz's work, particularly of his methods of interpreting historical evidence; but they evaded or minimized his basic concerns. Nineteenth-century commentators searched his pages for principles that held out correct solutions to every problem that a commander might encounter in the field; they paid far less attention to such central issues of Clausewitz's thought as the distinction between theory and practice; the role of theory in understanding—and controlling—social, political, and military forces; the interrelation of war and policy, in regard to which few professional soldiers felt entirely comfortable; his differentiation between limited and unlimited war; or the significance he placed on

[19] This is being carried out under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

[20] Of the four university libraries (Princeton; University of California, Berkeley; University of California, Davis; Stanford) which the writer consulted in preparing this article, none owns a complete first edition of Clausewitz's *Works*.

[21] A complete bibliography of books and articles concerning Clausewitz does not exist. A valuable list of titles has been assembled by Werner Hahlweg in his introduction and notes to the 16th edition of *Vom Kriege* (Bonn 1952). See also the same author's *Carl von Clausewitz* (Göttingen 1957), and the work by Maria Hartl cited in note 1.

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irrational factors, which appealed more to the early generations of Marxist intellectuals than to the representatives of the *status quo*. The approach of the Clausewitz literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was largely antithetical to that of its subject.[22]

In the bibliography of works on Clausewitz, German authors form the largest group. A few scholars such as Jähns and particularly Delbrück recognized that the importance of Clausewitz lay in his universal view, his effort to understand the basic characteristics of armed conflict between nations regardless of historical circumstance.[23] Most writers, however, whether they considered themselves adherents or critics of Clausewitz, were unable to prevent their interpretations from narrowing down to strategic and even tactical matters—a tendency which, naturally enough, was strongest among writers who were serving or retired professional officers.[24] Equally pragmatic, if more detached in tone, was the foreign literature, in which French and English titles assumed a dominant place. The earliest French work, proclaiming Clausewitz as the supreme codifier of the Napoleonic experience, appeared in 1853.[25] Interest in Clausewitz increased after the Franco-Prussian War had demonstrated the efficiency of German military institutions. Together with translations of *On War* and of Clausewitz's historical works, analyses of his methodology were published, to be joined a few years before 1914 by an excellent biography.[26] In England, too, from the 1870's on, the name Clausewitz was more frequently encountered in the professional literature and in the pages

[22] Some facets of these misinterpretations are discussed in my paper, "Clausewitz and the 19th Century," in *The Theory and Practice of War: Essays in Honour of Basil Liddell Hart*, ed. Michael Howard, to be published by Cassells later this year.

[23] Max Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften* (Leipzig 1891), III, 2852-76; Hans Delbrück, "General v. Clausewitz," in *Historische und politische Aufsätze* (Berlin 1907), and *Geschichte der Kriegskunst* (Berlin 1920), IV, 527-30. See also Delbrück's discussions of *Niederwerfungsstrategie* and *Ermattungsstrategie* in the same work.

[24] Among these, the greatest understanding for Clausewitz's theoretical approach and intentions was shown by General R. von Caemmerer, author of an excellent brief study, *Clausewitz* (Berlin 1905), as well as of the important survey *Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaften im 19ten Jahrhundert* (Berlin 1904), an English edition of which appeared under the title *The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th Century* (London 1905). More exclusively empirical in their approach than Caemmerer were such writers as Colmar von der Goltz, *Das Volk in Waffen* (Berlin 1898); and Frhr. von Freytag-Loringhoven, *Die Macht der Persönlichkeit im Kriege* (Berlin 1905), and *Kriegslehren nach Clausewitz* (Berlin 1908).

[25] Nicholas de la Barre Duparcq, *Commentaires sur le traité de la guerre de Clausewitz* (Paris 1853).

[26] See especially Georges Gilbert, "Etude sur Clausewitz," *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, August 1 and 15, 1887, reprinted in *Sept études militaires* (Paris 1892); Paul Rocques, *Le général de Clausewitz* (Paris-Nancy 1912).

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of such periodicals as the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.*[27]

Very different from the utilitarian attitude of the staff officers was the Marxist approach to Clausewitz's writings. His name first appeared in the correspondence of Marx and Engels towards the end of 1857. Some months later Engels wrote: "Among other things I now read Clausewitz's *On War*. It is a strange manner of philosophizing, but very good nevertheless. To the question whether one should use the term 'art of war' or 'science of war,' he answers that war most resembles commerce. Combat is in war what cash payment is in trade: though it rarely occurs in reality, everything aims towards it, in the end it must take place, and it is decisive." Clausewitz, Marx replied, "has the kind of common-sense that borders on wit."[28] The contribution of Clausewitz to Communist theory has often been exaggerated; but undoubtedly it proved useful to have available a dialectic analysis of war by an acknowledged military authority, a general who recognized that war was a product of social and political forces, that it was an extension of political action which could not be isolated and placed under the exclusive control of military professionals.

Later Communist writers, such as Franz Mehring, took over Marx's and Engels' sympathetic view, and Lenin did no more than continue a well-established intellectual tradition when during the First World War he came to read and analyze Clausewitz's major work.[29] Of course

[27] Of all British writers, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, without ever devoting a special study to Clausewitz, entered most fully into his thought. See Henderson's essays, posthumously collected under the title *The Science of War* (London 1905), and reprinted several times. See also Major Stewart L. Murray, *The Reality of War: An Introduction to Clausewitz* (London 1909).

[28] Letter from Marx to Engels, October 31, 1857, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke* (Berlin 1963), XXIX, 205; Engels to Marx, January 7, 1858, *ibid.*, 251-52; Marx to Engels, January 11, 1858, *ibid.*, 256. See also the references to Clausewitz in Vols. XIII, XIV, XVII, and XXI of the *Werke*.

[29] See Lenin's excerpts from *On War*, together with his comments, "Vypiski i zamechaniya na knigu Klauzevitsa 'o voina i vedenii voin'" ["Excerpts from and Comments on Clausewitz's Book 'On War and the Conduct of Wars'"], in *Leninsky Sbornik* (Moscow 1931), XII, 389-452. Excerpts from the so-called *Tetradka* have also been published separately; for example, *Clausewitz' Werk "Vom Kriege": Auszüge und Randglossen* (East Berlin 1957). A good summary of Clausewitz's influence in Russia between the Revolution and the Second World War is given by Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe 1953). However, Garthoff is misleading when he writes that Lenin read *On War* in "the incomplete manuscript of July 1827. Precisely how much was available to him is not certain. . ." (p. 54). Lenin read the Berne city library copy of the first edition, which contained *On War* in the state Clausewitz left it at his death. The greater part of the manuscript was completed in a first draft in April 1827. Clausewitz revised Book I by 1830. The remaining sections are in various stages of completeness, but no other versions exist in print. See Werner Hahlweg, "Lenin und Clausewitz. Ein Beitrag zur politischen Ideengeschichte

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he was impressed by the thesis of the interrelation between politics and war, which Clausewitz reiterated in numerous ways. "'War,'" Lenin wrote on one occasion, "'is the continuation of politics by other' (i.e.: violent) 'means.' This famous aphorism was uttered by one of the profoundest writers on the problems of war, Clausewitz. Marxists have always rightly regarded this thesis as the theoretical basis of views concerning the significance of any given war."[30] Clausewitz's dialectical and historical approach to the problems of organized violence, which was conducive to the linking of ideological commitment with the professional study of war, left its mark on Soviet military education and strategic theory. After the Second World War, Stalin tried to minimize Clausewitz's significance for the twentieth century, motivated perhaps both by anti-German feelings and by a wish to detract from Lenin's stature as a military thinker. He dismissed Clausewitz as a "carrier of the military ideology in Germany"; a description that the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* reinforced with the label "the ideologue of reactionary Prussianism."[31] Since Stalin's death there has been a return to the previous favorable interpretations, the rehabilitation beginning with a lengthy article by the Russian military commentator Major-General J. A. Rasin, who had already championed Clausewitz in the Stalin era.[32]

III

Neither the Marxist view of Clausewitz nor that of such bourgeois historians as Delbrück was fundamentally changed by the First World War. The progress and aftermath of the European catastrophe could only reinforce their interpretation of war as something essentially political in nature. In the attitude of the professional soldiers, however, 1914-1918 marked a great divide. Clausewitz's arguments continued

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des 20. Jahrhunderts," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, XXXVI (1954). A translation by the present writer of the article in somewhat changed form appeared under the title "Clausewitz, Lenin, and Communist Military Attitudes Today," in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, CV (May 1960).

[30] V. I. Lenin, *Socialism and War* (Moscow 1952), 21-22.

[31] J. V. Stalin, letter of February 23, 1946, to J. A. Rasin. The German text was published in *Neue Welt*, II (1947), 23. The Encyclopedia's description is contained in the article "War" by F. D. Chrustow, *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 2nd edn., XXII (Moscow 1953). See also the article "Klauzewitz" in Vol. XXI of the same edition.

[32] Rasin's lecture first appeared in April 1956. The following year it was published in German under the title *W. I. Lenin: der Schöpfer der sowjetischen Militärwissenschaft* (East Berlin 1957); Clausewitz's influence on Lenin is discussed on pp. 33-39. Typical of many other favorable Communist interpretations of Clausewitz are Otto Hennicke, *Clausewitz: Bemerkungen zur Bedeutung seiner Kriegstheorie für seine und unsere Zeit* (East Berlin 1957); and Otto Lapacz, *Zur Überlegenheit der sowjetischen über die bürgerliche Militärwissenschaft* (East Berlin 1957).

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to be applied to contemporary conditions, and tested against them; but now even the technological and tactical specialist could no longer deny the determining influence that political, economic, and social factors exerted on the course of operations. The military literature became more flexible in its treatment of Clausewitz's thought. It was in the light of his works that soldiers, particularly in Germany, now discussed the central problem of their profession: the relationship between politics and war. At the same time, Clausewitz was becoming more of an object of historical enquiry than ever before. Not only the accuracy of his theories, but the extent to which they had influenced events, now concerned military analysts and historians alike.

In their answers to the question of coordinating political and military leadership, two major schools of thought could be discerned in the German Army. One, stated in works by Groener, last Chief of Staff of the Imperial Army, and Seekt, the leading figure of the new *Reichswehr* until 1926, tried to resolve the conflict between political and military authority through mutual education. Clausewitz, Seekt wrote in an essay marking the anniversary of the theorist's 150th birthday, addressed *On War* to the politician as well as to the soldier; he wanted to teach political thinking to the soldier, and soldierly determination to the politician.[33] Characteristically Seekt did not call for military thinking on the part of the civilian, but for the will to risk and to endure. Despite a high degree of sophistication, his and Groener's analyses represented a primarily military approach: they would not grant civilians even a share in the formulation of strategy; in effect they accused past German political leadership of having set the armed forces an impossible task, and demanded improvements for the future. Nevertheless their modified militarism differed considerably from the line taken by proponents of total war, some of whom tried to strengthen their texts with quotations from Clausewitz, while others recognized that his weighing of the military means against the political ends, which led to a theory of limited war, turned him into an opponent rather than an ally. Ludendorff, especially, did not hesitate to condemn Clausewitz's emphasis of the political purpose. The importance of the political sphere, he claimed, demanded that it be more effectively organized and disciplined for war, and he ended by reversing Clausewitz's po-

[33] Wilhelm Groener, *Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen* (Berlin 1927), and *Der Feldherr wider Willen* (Berlin 1930). Hans von Seekt, "Schlagworte" and "Clausewitz. Zum 150. Geburtstag," both printed in the collection *Gedanken eines Soldaten* (Leipzig, 1935). For a discussion representative of the attitudes held by a coming generation of senior officers, see Erich von Schickfus und Neudorff, "Clausewitz," in *Führertum*, ed. Friedrich von Cochenhausen (Berlin 1930).

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sition: politics were subservient to war, not only during the actual fighting, but also in time of peace, which he redefined as the preparatory stage to combat.[34] The ignorance of the present and past revealed by these statements, the parochial view of military affairs being carried forward on a groundswell of nihilism, presaged the concepts of war proclaimed by the rising authoritarian movements in Europe.

At the same time the professional critics—largely West European—of the methods employed during the First World War sought in Clausewitz, or at least in the debasement of his work by the general staffs of Europe, one of the principal causes of the blood-letting. Such innovators as General Fuller and Captain Liddell Hart attacked Clausewitz as the prophet of mass armies and of violence for its own sake.[35] They recognized that his theories should not be confused with those of his utilitarian disciples; but Clausewitz's abstract approach was too alien to their own to enable them to avoid the error they saw in others, nor could scholarly detachment be expected from men who were deeply involved in fighting the Western Front mentality, which continued to influence strategic thought in the 1920's and 1930's. It must be admitted, Liddell Hart wrote in a characteristically veering passage, that ". . . Clausewitz invited misinterpretation. . . . A student of Kant at second hand, he had acquired a philosophical mode of expression without developing a truly philosophical mind. His theory of war was expounded in a way too abstract and involved for ordinary soldier-minds, essentially concrete, to follow the course of his argument—which often turned back from the direction in which it was apparently leading. Impressed yet befogged, they grasped at his vivid leading phrases, seeing only their surface meaning, and missing the deeper current of his thought." It was these phrases, Liddell Hart contended, that ". . . blurred the outline of his philosophy, already indistinct, and made it into a mere marching refrain—a Prussian Marseillaise, which inflamed the blood and intoxicated the mind. In transfusion it became a doctrine fit to form corporals, not generals. For by making battle appear the only 'real warlike activity' his gospel deprived strategy of

[34] Erich Ludendorff, *Kriegführung und Politik* (Berlin 1922), and especially *Der totale Krieg* (Munich 1935). On the appearance of the first work, Hans Delbrück immediately attacked some of its numerous falsifications and misinterpretations in his pamphlet, *Ludendorffs Selbstporträt* (Berlin 1922). For more comprehensive and detached criticism, see Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton 1963); and Rudolf von Albertini, "Politik und Kriegführung in der deutschen Kriegstheorie von Clausewitz bis Ludendorff," *Schweizerische Monatsschrift für Offiziere aller Waffen*, LIX, Nos. 1-3 (1947). See also the works listed in note 47 below.

[35] See, for example, J. F. C. Fuller, *Armament and History* (New York 1945), and B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London 1954).

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its laurels, and reduced the art of war to the mechanics of mass-slaughter."[36] In the same vein, a German critic summed up strategic policy before 1914 in the statement that "It was for the unconditioned and absolute war that the military in Germany and France finally prepared in the light of Clausewitz's teaching."[37]

With the advent of National Socialism the old misinterpretations were coupled with a new and wholly subjective dynamism. If in the past Clausewitz's arguments had been coarsened by depreciating the restraints and modifications of force that he attributed to the real world, while translating his abstract concept of total violence from a methodological to a policy function, this abstraction was now backed by the will to pursue it to its ultimate. Clausewitz's life was falsified by turning him into a Greater German patriot before his day, "a pioneer of the German people . . . who . . . made the absolute into God on earth."[38] At the same time his methodology was mobilized for the theoretical structure of National Socialist war studies, a newly launched academic discipline, which in its comprehensive approach was reminiscent of geopolitics or of the racially inspired school of history that took the *Volk* as its basic measure. In their investigations of Clausewitz's philosophic method the defense theorists could draw on the work of earlier authors, though not everyone among their authorities was now suitable for quotation. As far back as the 1880's the Jewish metaphysician Hermann Cohen had suggested that *On War* was impregnated with the spirit of Kant.[39] Shortly before the First World War, in a work which despite its exaggerated and unhistoric argumentation gained wide acceptance, Lt.-Col. Paul Creuzinger traced Clausewitz's debt to Hegel.[40] Creuzinger's view was corrected and modified some years later by Hans Rothfels in a study that still remains the best analysis of the intellectual background of Clausewitz's thought.[41] These findings now became the basis of a learned exercise in frustration, engaged in most notably by the philosopher Walther Schering: to bring Clausewitz's philosophic idealism into line with the political ethics of the new system.[42]

[36] Liddell Hart, 352-53, 355.
[37] Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York 1959), 185.
[38] Paul Schmitthenner, "Clausewitz," in the National Socialist biographical dictionary, *Die Grossen Deutschen*, II (Berlin 1935), 648.
[39] *Von Kants Einfluss auf die deutsche Kultur* (Berlin 1883).
[40] *Hegels Einfluss auf Clausewitz* (Berlin 1911).
[41] *Carl von Clausewitz, Politik und Krieg: Eine ideengeschichtliche Studie* (Berlin 1920).
[42] Walther M. Schering, *Die Kriegsphilosophie von Clausewitz* (Hamburg 1935); *Wehrphilosophie* (Leipzig 1939); *Carl von Clausewitz: Geist und Tat* (Stuttgart

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Far superior to such products of a decadent scholarship was a short essay written in the same period by Benedetto Croce: "Action, succès et jugement dans le 'Vom Kriege' de Clausewitz."[43] As might be expected, Croce did not confuse Clausewitz's distinctions between theory and reality; instead he addressed himself directly to the treatment of this central problem in *On War*. One of the basic assumptions of the work, he pointed out, held that the more closely theory approaches its goal of exact knowledge, the more it changes from the objective state of knowledge (*savoir*) to the subjective state of ability (*pouvoir*). Further, he speculated on Clausewitz's method of conducting research that aimed at effective action: a combination of clearly defined concepts, historical analysis, and an understanding of—and sensitivity to—logic and metaphysics. In his discussion of the historical examples employed in *On War*, Croce suggested that they were ". . . causal reflections, whose theoretical aim is to prevent the mind from turning historical facts into paradigms . . . and consequently to underline the abstract possibility of different solutions." Elsewhere he attacked the failure of professional philosophers to study Clausewitz: "It takes . . . the poverty of their culture, their unintelligent specialization, the provincialism of their spirit—to call things by their proper name—to explain their indifference and their ignorance of a work such as that of Clausewitz. They consider its reasoning strange, and inferior to their own, when in fact we are dealing here with investigations that penetrate in the most concrete manner to the core of certain philosophic problems."

Croce's knowledge of the intellectual climate of the Napoleonic era contributed greatly to the power of his interpretation. It had been a major flaw of much of the Clausewitz literature that its authors considered *On War* in a timeless vacuum. Research that sought to understand the work in its own terms had been the exception. By the 1920's it was nevertheless growing apparent that much more needed to be learned about the Napoleonic Age, which witnessed both the coming

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1941); "Clausewitz als Philosoph," *Europäischer Wissenschafts-Dienst*, IV (May 1944). To be noted among other discussions of Clausewitz's philosophy and methodology published at this time are Walther Elze, "Von der Lehre und Lehrweise im Buch vom Kriege von Clausewitz," *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Wehrwissenschaften und Wehrpolitik*, I (Hamburg 1934); Ernst Hagemann, *Die deutsche Lehre vom Kriege*, I (Berlin 1940); Karl Linnebach, "Die wissenschaftliche Methode in Clausewitz' Werk 'Vom Kriege,'" *Wissen und Wehr*, XIV (1933); Erich Weniger, "Clausewitz als Philosoph," *Frankfurter Zeitung*, August 7, 1937. After the war, Weniger expanded on his arguments in "Philosophie und Bildung im Denken von Clausewitz," *Schicksalswege deutscher Vergangenheit*, ed. W. Hubatsch (Düsseldorf 1950).

[43] In *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, XLII (April 1935).

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of the modern nation-state and the development of modern concepts of war, as well as about Clausewitz's career and his writings. The discovery and publication of new manuscripts contributed to more vigorous textual scholarship, which in turn placed historical and theoretical analyses on a firmer footing.[44] Since the Second World War a newly critical view of the Prusso-German past has led to a fresh appraisal of Clausewitz's share in the evolution of strategic thought, in the context of a re-evaluation of the role the military have played in German history. Interestingly enough, it is a conservative, not a debunking, writer who has produced the most important work on this subject so far.[45]

The application of Clausewitz's thought to contemporary defense theory has also become more effective than it was in the past. In Germany the literature found a starting point in an essay that General Beck, the military head of the anti-Hitler conspiracy, wrote in 1942.[46] Influenced by the impending German disaster, Beck pointed to the absurdity of Ludendorff's thesis that modern nations should and could wage only total wars for total aims, and called for a return to the fine gradations suggested by Clausewitz. Since then European and American defense analysis no longer finds Clausewitz an obstacle to be overcome or avoided. Often without realizing it, writers are pursuing the goals indicated by Clausewitz: the defining of means, ends, and implications, so that they can be used theoretically and applied in the formulation and execution of policy.[47]

[44] See especially Herbert Rosinski, "Die Entwicklung von Clausewitz' Werk 'Vom Kriege' im Lichte seiner 'Vorreden' und 'Nachrichten,'" *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLI (1935); and Eberhard Kessel, "Zur Genesis der modernen Kriegslehre. Die Entstehungsgeschichte von Clausewitz' Werk 'Vom Kriege,'" *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, III, No. 9 (1953). Rosinski's book, *The German Army* (London 1939), contains a good, brief analysis of Clausewitz's place in the history of military theory. A more detailed treatment can be found in Sigfrid Mette's work, *Vom Geist deutscher Feldherren* (Zurich 1938), especially in ch. II. Compare also Hans Rothfels' chapter, "Clausewitz," in Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*.

[45] Gerhard Ritter, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk*, I (Munich 1954), especially chs. II, III, and IV.

[46] Ludwig Beck, "Die Lehre vom totalen Kriege," printed in *Studien*, ed. Hans Speidel (Stuttgart 1955). Compare also Wolfgang Foerster's biography, *Generaloberst Ludwig Beck* (Munich 1953), especially 158-63; and Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm, "Das politisch-militärische Testament des Generalobersten Beck," *Wehrkunde*, VIII (July 1959).

[47] Some examples of recent titles dealing with Clausewitz's theories are Eric Weil, "Guerre et Politique selon Clausewitz," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, V, No. 2 (April-June, 1955); Werner Gembruch, "Zu Clausewitz' Gedanken über das Verhältnis von Krieg und Politik," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, IX, No. 11 (November 1959); Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton 1959), ch. II. Reminiscent of an older pejorative approach is the section dealing with Clausewitz in the West Point pamphlet, *Clausewitz, Jomini, Schlieffen* (West Point 1951), which

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The idea that war is an extension of policy and that it may assume many different forms seems not revolutionary but self-evident. The very obviousness of such truths makes it difficult to understand why people have often been unwilling to recognize them. But even those who did not shut their eyes have not always translated recognition into action; and such current phrases as "no win policy" and "fighting with one hand tied behind one's back" suggest that many minds are still confused about the nature and purpose of war. People instinctively resist the attempts of theory to impose limitations on permissible violence. The theoretical literature, at least, might have accepted more fully Clausewitz's logical subordination of the military to the political; that it did not is partly due to the fact that until recently it was almost entirely the work of soldiers, who naturally tended to claim as much for their profession as possible. Their one-sidedness in turn affected policy. Nevertheless, it is easy to exaggerate the influence on actual events of wrongly understood theory; the whole trend of European society and politics since the industrial revolution was towards all-embracing conflicts, in which men placed their faith in the machine and the mass.

It was, in any case, not the generalization, "War is an extension of policy by other means," but linking it with the identification of violence as the basic component of war, and the theoretical elaboration of these two recognitions, that enable Clausewitz to raise a theoretical structure which has proved to be incomplete but never restrictive of reality. With the appearance of his writings in scholarly editions in this country and in Europe, his thought is being made more easily accessible to the academic community. It will soon become possible to follow the development of his theories in a systematic rather than impressionistic manner. An important gap in the history of political and military ideas may then be closed. It is not too much to expect that Clausewitz will come to assume a position in the study of war that is similar—not only in reputation but in substance—to the one now held by Tocqueville in the study of democratic societies.

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concludes with the sentences: "Clausewitz's influence is not dead. The philosophy of *On War* is the philosophy of Bismarck's Blood and Iron and the philosophy of *Mein Kampf*" (p. 46). Besides being bad history, this confuses recognition that war is an arm of national policy with an eagerness to engage in it. In the fall of 1964 the Department of Military Art and Engineering at West Point issued a new edition of the pamphlet, with a much improved section on Clausewitz by Colonel John R. Elting.

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Review Articles

THE POLICY SCIENCES OF DEVELOPMENT

By HAROLD D. LASSWELL

Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Studies in Political Development, 1), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, 381 pp. $6.50.

Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Studies in Political Development, 2), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, 487 pp. $8.50.

Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Studies in Political Development, 3), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964, 508 pp. $8.75.

THESE first three volumes of a promising series are strong evidence that the policy sciences of development are beginning to emerge as an identifiable problem-oriented frame of reference, intersecting every specialized field of knowledge. The goals of development are gaining clarity; the historical perspective deepens; the interdependence of conditioning factors is better understood; the probable lines of future growth are more fully projected; and the invention and evaluation of policies designed to maximize or at least to achieve minimum results are forging ahead. The editors of each volume have woven theory and data into coherent patterns, and many essays—such as the chapters by Marx, Riggs, Lerner, and Pool—are sharply centered on the hitherto underdeveloped topics with which they come to grips. The Almond-Coleman model of political development lurks meaningfully in the wings.

An intellectual distinction of fundamental importance in elucidating comprehensive and specialized theories of development is provided by the concepts of value and institution. Economists are accustomed to recognize the distinction and to weave back and forth between value and institutional analysis; and economists were early introduced into post-World War II programs, since it was usually assumed that the problems involved were "economic." Although well-versed in the use of theory and the processing of data, economists are as a rule unacquainted with the institutional details of tribal societies, of reviving ancient civilizations, or of non-industrialized nations. The conception

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of economic value, however, provided them with an abstract model of what to look for. However novel the institutional practices of concrete societies, a search instrument was available for use in scanning unfamiliar practices, and identifying production, distribution, investment, and consumption processes. Whether the particular operations had to do with fishing, mining, animal husbandry, plant cultivation, transportation, merchandising, or personal services, the economic observer-analyst was provided with definitions which he could apply to social phenomena, whether the participants in particular situations were accustomed to think the same way or not.

The categories of value and institution were helpful in stating theories of economic growth. Growth was conceptualized as a sequence of levels or stages, a mode of analysis that made it possible to think of development as progress toward a self-sustaining process of value accumulation. It was taken for granted that in contemporary times this implies such important institutional changes as the introduction of technologies which rely on non-personal sources of energy, like electricity, for assembling and processing the factors of production. It was understood that the choice of growth in preference to non-growth outcomes depends on changes of value demand and expectation which presently become stabilized as institutions. Institutions are patterns of practice; and economic institutions are relatively specialized to the shaping and sharing of wealth. Each practice is a relatively stable pattern of subjective events (perspectives) and of operations (behaviors). Conceived as an aggregate, the perspectives constitute the economic myth of a society; the operations are the economic technique of managing men and resources in the value process.

It has never been news to economists that in any social context non-economic values may interfere with economic values, and that economic institutions interact with all other institutions. So long as the economies of advanced industrial societies are the object of study it was convenient to leave the study of non-economic factors to others. Catapulted into analytic and advisory roles in programs of development, it has been necessary for economists to become more explicit about the interplay of production with all factors of the social process. Hoselitz and Spengler allude casually to such examples in the volume on bureaucracy. It is not unusual to perceive the importance of religious and moral values in situations where economic growth is affected by ecclesiastical doctrines of money and interest. Family obligations often stand in the way of choosing efficient personnel, or of buying and selling in the most advantageous markets. Local pundits

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may oppose new subject matters of education and obstruct the expansion of "vulgar" media of general communication. Time-hallowed customs can result in water contamination and the spread of debilitating diseases which affect the labor force. Caste or class distinctions often foreclose respectable or able people from engineering or business careers. Political considerations set limits on readiness to accept foreign experts or to give hospitality to direct foreign investment. Whatever the values at stake—whether religion and morals, affection and loyalty, skill and taste, enlightenment, well-being, respect, or power—they are sure to affect economic growth. Not, of course, that all these factors are invariably adverse. In any case it was sensible to revise economic models to give more explicit indication of the place of such facts. Thus W. W. Rostow introduced certain "propensities": to develop fundamental science (physical and social); to apply science to economic ends; to accept innovation; to seek material advances; to consume; to have children. But the chief responsibility for completing and correcting the special maps of development must rest with those who are primarily competent to deal with various categories of value and institution.

The volumes under review bring into the open in concrete detail many of the questions that arise in connection with the political dimension of development. Interplay between value and institutions is obviously becoming better understood. The conception of power plays the same role for political scientists and jurists that wealth plays for economists. Students of public opinion, of public administration, or of any subdiscipline in the field can employ the conception of power as a tool of search when scanning institutions for the purpose of discovering how community-wide decisions are processed.

In the light of the available material, what can be said about the appropriate content of a theoretical model of political development? While the power model displays many parallels to the wealth model, a satisfactory political conception is by no means identical.

(1) Suppose we begin by proposing to characterize political development *as a sequence of approximations toward a self-sustaining level of power accumulation*. At first glance this appears to parallel the model of economic growth; and reflection reveals many similarities. Whether we speak of accumulations of power or of wealth, the reference is to "predispositions" which are found at selected cross-sections in time. The relevant predispositions are potentials—potential behaviors, potentially usable resources. The measurement of capital aggregates is a relatively straightforward matter, since it is possible to describe a cur-

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rent stock of instruments of production, and to assume the presence of motivations and capabilities to use them. With regard to accumulations of power, however, the problem is more complex. So far as an internal process of decision is concerned, power accumulation means potential support of the constitution; more explicitly, accumulation covers all changes in the predisposition to employ or defend basic allocations of authority and control in the state. The complexity arises from the fact that it is not as satisfactory to infer potential behaviors from an existing stock of instruments as in the case of economic analysis. True, the established order may have a stock of weapons, arsenals, and trained personnel. But a weapon count is a notoriously defective gauge of potential obedience or disobedience to established elites. Inferences can be made more dependable by applying methods that measure communications and other behaviors which indicate any lack of predisposition to support existing symbols and structures. Attempted uprisings and secessions are at least partial indicators of the state of solidarity and cooperation in a body politic. More affirmative measures can also be obtained by surveys and by content analysis of public and private media of communication. The results indicate the degree of loyalty, belief, and faith with which the political myth is accepted and elites are approved.

Further specification is needed if we are to define power accumulation in a way that meets the requirements of a theory of political development. An essential trait of development is innovativeness; it introduces changes which are structural, not merely cyclical. The negative and affirmative indices mentioned above describe changes of all kinds, whether cyclical or structural. A model of political development must stipulate that all changes in authority and control are relevant which alter the basic features of the decision process. Structural changes may take the form of shifts in the degree of participation in power-shaping and power-sharing; or in the allocation of power among decision-making organizations. Transformations from autocracy to oligarchy to democracy (or in the reverse order) are changes in degree of participation. Substantial shifts in the balance between central and non-central units, or among organs at a given level of competence, are examples of changes in the allocation of power. In drawing up an economic model of growth, it is usually redundant to be fully explicit about structural changes: they are taken for granted, since sizable increases in self-sustaining levels of capital formation cannot take place unless important transformations are permeating the economy. Such transformations include effectively increased demand for capital accu-

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mulation, for strategies of technological improvement, and for the products that issue from a renovated process of production.

A self-sustaining level of power accumulation is reached when the nation is able to furnish its own trained personnel, to achieve structural innovations with minimum resort to coercion, and to mobilize resources for national goals.

Granted that a theory of political development properly requires structural transformation of values, patterns, and institutions, are all such changes to be regarded as acceptable? Assume, for example, that a counter-revolutionary government denounces progress, exalts the revival of past institutions, and seeks to curb popular participation in politics. Or consider the totalitarian rules which in the name of progress liquidate the "decadent" institutions of parliamentarism and use police coercion against collective activity by political parties, interest groups, or communication media.

(2) I agree with those who urge that *models of political development should be explicitly preferential*; and that the preferred model requires an *ideology of progress* and *commitment to wide participation in power as a long-run goal.*

It is sometimes proposed that verbal commitment to progress be included among the specifications of political development, which appears to be the definition most acceptable to Ward and Rustow. Such a solution wisely excludes nativistic or revivalistic movements; but it recognizes cases in which power is restrictively rather than generally held. Considered apart from criteria of performance, this type of model is eminently unsatisfactory since it commits the policy scientist to a reactionary value position, and does so indirectly. One of the most important policy conflicts in the contemporary world continues to turn on the pattern of power distribution. In terms of manifest content, the ruling elites of the globe are substantially united in support of democracy as an ideal of government. They differ, however, in the stringency with which they apply the conception to themselves and others. Totalitarian states diverge in practical operation from popular government; and there need be no hesitation in saying so. Similarly, many non-totalitarian states diverge in degree from effective power-sharing; and there need be no tactical unwillingness to be equally outspoken about these discrepancies.

What emerges from this discussion is the importance of recognizing and living with controversial models of political development. A primary function of any model is to provide a guide for taking sides in controversies over basic objective. I join with all who recommend

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a conception that gives expression to the overriding goal of human dignity and that defines this phrase to include effective general participation in the decision process. Such a position means, for example, that the connection between economic and political growth is candidly accepted as problematic. Today, it is impossible to demonstrate that industrialization necessarily achieves the preconditions of popular government. In the volume on bureaucracy Carl Beck, for instance, makes a strong case against "inevitable democratization" in the totalitarian polities of Eastern Europe. LaPalombara is right in recognizing the existence of cases in which a change-oriented elite does in fact accept the conscious goal of seeking to achieve and stabilize "the specific structures that we associate with Western democracy." These structures are understood to be "a healthy party system, strong and responsive legislatures, vigorous voluntary associations, responsible bureaucracies, and strong restraints on government" (p. 56). With these long-term objectives in mind he proposes strategies which include: de-emphasis on "the goal of economic development," encouragement of "the development of a private economic sector," raising belief and desire for democracy to "the same level as economic development."

It ought to be emphasized that commitment to widely distributed power as a value goal does not carry with it any necessary attachment to socialistic or capitalistic institutions. It is speculatively conceivable that socialist economies in advanced industrial societies and in big states can learn how to maintain high levels of economic progress by other strategies than maintaining high levels of terror. Western European states have learned to have confidence, though not unqualified confidence, in the role of a private sector in maintaining the effective dispersion of economic assets which has been in many countries an important condition of popular government. Socialist decentralization and guided competition can, perhaps, achieve an equivalent level of effective freedom in big-scale industrial states: but it hasn't happened yet.

(3) An adequate model of political development emphasizes the importance of *obtaining sufficient power to maintain national independence*, and therefore includes *effective political demands not only for economic development, but for growth in all the value-institution sectors of the body politic.*

Effective independence is a collective demand to function as a nation-state, which carries with it recognition of the necessity for control over the base values upon which effective power depends. In this perspec-

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tive it is obvious that political development calls for economic growth, and that lagging economic growth is at least a partial consequence of political underdevelopment. If the past decision process had been more realistic in planning for the future, many states would not have lagged behind states which eventually infringed their independence after achieving economic superiority. If one looks back at the expansion of Europe, a fascinating question is why the elites of the extra-European world failed to estimate the significance of their changing present for the future. Equally impressive are the examples of effective acceleration which power elites have often been able to give to economic growth. For present purposes the significance of the record is that it draws attention to the reality-orienting task of the decision process of every political unit in the arena of world politics, and underlines the significance of social development for political realism.

(4) Political development needs to be understood as including *willingness and capability to play a responsible role in world politics.*

The criterion of developed national states mentioned immediately above in (3) underlines the relevance of power to the task of maintaining an independent role in the world arena. The present criterion stresses a related point, which is that *unrestricted* pursuit of power is not an acceptable component of a developed national state.

It is not unusual in the study of development to give insufficient emphasis to external power relations. The theory of economic growth might seem to furnish a precedent for neglecting the external dimension of acts of accumulation. The impression that economic models deal exclusively with the internal evolution of an economy is largely illusory, however. Early capital accumulation is understood to have depended in most cases on active participation in foreign trade, investment, and aid; and modern strategies of production must be imported from a few centers of conspicuous creativity. True, the history of Soviet development shows that at various phases rapid accumulation can be largely divorced from active engagement in world markets.

It is clear that political modernization is not to be achieved by progressive withdrawal from world politics. A nation-state has a self-sustaining power position when it plays a responsible role in foreign affairs and has achieved an internal process of decision which is stably innovative. A developed nation-state expects, and is expected by other members of the world arena, to conform to an inclusive body of authoritative prescription; and this expectation implies an internal system of public order both able and willing to comply.

In a political sense, every nation-state must remain somewhat under-

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developed so long as the arena of world politics falls short of an inclusive public order in which transnational responsibilities are effectively defined in terms of human dignity. There are, of course, great differences among nations in the levels of political growth attained during a given epoch. No one seriously doubts that Great Britain currently sustains a high level of responsible participation in world affairs, or maintains an internal public order which affirms and approximates many ideal norms. On the other hand, the states of the Soviet bloc which have been dependent on the Kremlin are only beginning to move toward a sufficient breadth of contact with other states to gain the cumulative experience and discipline needed for full acceptance as internationally responsible.

It may be pertinent to give some examples of the indices which show the accumulation (or dis-accumulation) of predispositions to act responsibly in external affairs: universality of recognition; exchange of diplomatic officials; membership in transnational organizations; acceptance of third-party assistance in the persuasive settlement of disputes; participation as a third party in the persuasive settlement of disputes; acceptance of obligation to aid in the sanctioning activities of transnational bodies; maintenance of impartial legal protection of aliens in harmony with transnational norms.

(5) Political development calls for an *internal process of decision whose structures—both formal and informal, organized and unorganized—constitute a system of public order capable of creative, realistic problem-solving in pursuit of a rising level of participation in all values.*

The contributions to the series under review are chiefly directed at two of the principal phases of the decision process: intelligence and application. It will be helpful, perhaps, also to introduce some comment on the remaining and less well-considered dimensions of decision: promotion, prescription, invocation, appraisal, and termination.

The *intelligence* phase functions appropriately when it supplies a flow of realistic information about trends, conditions and projections which foster the clarification of overriding goals and the invention and evaluation of policy alternatives. As technology advances, it becomes both necessary and possible to rely heavily on mass media and research agencies to supply current intelligence and, in conjunction with schools, to shape the socialization process. In the volume edited by Pye, Lerner provides a convenient check list of the facilities essential to modern networks and Mosul's report on Thailand gives quantitative data about the dimensions of a new national network.

The *promotional* phase of decision is in some respects the chief dis-

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tinguishing mark of advanced polities. Promotions include diverse demands and operations which are non-coercively pursued for the purpose of affecting the course of decision. In caste-bound societies, it is unthinkable that the political process could operate on the basis of authoritative and controlling expectations that the non-power castes would have anything to say about what goes on. Under conditions of vast distress they may erupt into the arena of politics; but this is a sign of chaos, not of orderly participation. Political party systems (not one-party dictatorships), pressure groups, and public commentary are fundamental features of power-sharing in big-scale states; and they are substantially missing from "village plus oligarchy," or "village plus monocracy," at the inclusive level.

When we consider the *prescribing* function, the limitations of current research are particularly apparent. Prescribing is the act of formulating perspectives relating to authority and control; in a word, it is a fundamental aspect of law-making. It is often hinted that the discipline of rule-writing, resented and evaded as it may be, spreads the expectation that controversies will be impartially resolved, and that traditional loyalties of family, neighborhood, and tribe will be undermined for the ultimate benefit of officials who live up to the Weberian model of rationality. Evidently there is little empirical knowledge of the volume and impact, if any, of the attempt to stabilize expectations by resorting to codification, for instance.

Administrative structures are heavily, though not exclusively, specialized to the *invocation* and *application* of prescriptions. A principal point in the study of bureaucracy is that structures become more specialized to functions. Braibanti's report on Pakistan describes in detail the overwhelming burden resulting from the tiny inheritance of skilled personnel from the colonial services of British India. He gives analytic and quantitative information about the role of the judicial personnel inherited from an earlier system who cut through thickets of confusion, seeking to do substantial justice. Actually our knowledge is singularly deficient in detailed accounts of the interplay of police, magistrates, and citizens.

Under the prod of foreign sources of aid, many developing countries have acquired personnel and facilities for conducting *appraisals* of their own performance. Again, in the volume on bureaucracy, Fainsod and others give some hint concerning the potent role of organs of appraisal in Soviet systems, but states in which the activity is more peripheral are rarely scrutinized from this point of view.

One of the most neglected and potentially rewarding features of the

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study of decision in developing nations is the *termination* phase. By definition, modernization brings accelerated rates of obsolescence. It is not impossible to arrive at quantitative estimates of many traditional claims, or to inquire into the policies of compensation, if any, which have been adopted in reference to them. There are hints of what can be done in connection with land reform or the expropriation (or continuation) of alien claims.

(6) Adequate political models provide *strategic guidance for timing the component elements in sequences of development.*

The invention, evaluation, and selection of development policy presupposes that goal values are clarified and that knowledge is available of the identity of factors whose combinations account for the facilitation or blocking of progress. Strategies are likely to be most realistic when the problems of a particular nation can be seen in the global context of change, which includes the making of estimates of the future no less than the gathering of descriptions of the past and present. The current volumes give helpful summaries of the state of knowledge about many factors which condition political development. I shall comment first on some discussions of the social process and of resources; and, more specifically, on social factors such as cultures, classes, interests, personalities (and crisis levels).

(a) Among identifiable components of the social process, attention is bestowed on the predispositions that affect development in various cultural configurations. The Japanese, for instance, perceive their civilization as derived from China, and presumably find it easier to acquire foreign traits than do the Chinese. All folk societies are self-absorbed, hence predisposed to regard the stranger and his works as inimical or irrelevant. Although peasant villages may be drawn to some extent into a general political and market system by the demand to supply recruits and taxes (or tribute in kind), there is often no image of the self that extends far beyond the village, and especially no expectation of capability or demand to affect the mysterious decision process of larger units. The volume of studies devoted to comparing Japan and Turkey brings many formative cultural predispositions into focus.

The class structure in a stable society provides a set of social environments which affect the predispositions of each class group in ways that condition political development. At any given moment, the significant question is whether and to what extent the active elite perceives itself as threatened from within or without by the appearance of novelties. If indigenous elites have already been subordinated (though permitted to continue) by foreign empires, predispositions

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are deeply affected by the strategies of the imperial rule to which they are subjected. If progressive patterns have been partially incorporated by the indigenous elites, it is probable that a split will eventually occur in which dissenting elements break away from accommodation with the colonial master and join a coalition of middle- and lower-class elements who strive to secede from the empire. Since Japan, Turkey, and Thailand were not formally colonialized, their evolution diverges from India, Pakistan, or Burma, for example, or from much of Africa. The generalization that appears to account for the peculiarities of innovation from above is *the principle of minimum power loss or risk*, which means that political elites seek to make the fewest changes in power they expect to be able to get away with. Again, the Japanese-Turkish studies are very much in point.

Contemporary research is particularly impressive in the study of interest groups—that is, of groups which are less inclusive than classes or which cut across class lines. Important results in the study of interests come from researches on communication. As Pool emphasizes in the Pye volume, totalitarian rulers have been more alert to the use of communication instruments than democracies; and this proposition is elaborately documented for Communist China in Yu's chapter. Pool shows that contemporary studies of communication media have demonstrated two sequences of impact. The two-step model describes the situation in which a reader, listener, or viewer acts for his primary circle as the interpreter of media content. In the one-step model any regular audience member is seen as directly acquiring a more inclusive map of social reality, and as launching on a prolonged period in which his demands and expectations are readjusted.

The two-step model casts into relief in a wide variety of contexts the innovative and counter-innovative impact of many important interest groups. In some feudal societies the lead as against the lag role was taken by military leaders when they saw traditional weapons and tactics collapse before the products and the strategists of industry. Crucial initiatives might germinate in the minds of top officials or diplomats who saw the handwriting on the wall; or initiatives came from traders and go-betweens who recognized how to exploit novelty for gain. In many cases a new class of scholars rose in connection with translation, journalism, teaching, and eventually research. Passen describes the diverse role of writers, and Shils provides a discerning sketch of the distinctive place of modernizing scholars and scientists in new societies. In value terms, we appear to be rediscovering the

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difference between intellectual skill and enlightenment. A skill specialist is prone to act like Pye's civil servant in Burma who holds tenaciously in post-independence years to a laboriously acquired set of operations which he uses to obtain such personal objectives as economic security, respect, and shreds of power. An enlightenment-oriented intellectual, on the contrary, is concerned with an inclusive version of man and nature which is at once innovative and realistic, meditative and compatible with active participation in life.

Communication studies bring into view the place of personality factors in development. Lerner provides evidence of the place of empathy in enabling individuals to entertain a wider and more accurate image of other human perspectives; and McClelland brings the demand for individual achievement into the foreground of analysis. In a volume outside this series, Hagen undertakes to probe the deeper motivations and mechanisms of the enterpriser.[1]

National strategies rest on the natural resource base at the disposal of the elite. Turkey was so positioned that it was an object of active power-strivings by the elites of other nations and empires; Japan, by contrast, was less focal to the world arena. Top elites in Turkey became adept at postponing internal changes that would modify the traditional bases of authority and control. Postponement was achieved by the strategies of playing one external rival against another, and introducing promised rather than consummated innovations.

(b) Strategies of political development are so much affected by the timing and placing of conditioning factors that it is important to keep the entire global picture in view. The present volumes contribute rather indirectly to the technique of depicting the centers of *origin, diffusion, and restriction* of political, economic, and other social changes on a world scale. Ward and Rustow comment on the importance of noticing the models that were actually perceived by the Japanese and Turks at different moments in the course of their growth. More generally, it must be emphasized that a relatively complete map of inclusive change is necessary for understanding the dynamics of accelerated or retarded diffusion. The circumstances can be identified in which innovations come to the attention of individuals who are situated at various geographical and social distances from where the novelties appear. Who perceives himself better off by directing anyone's attention to changes? By ignoring them? Among those who hear of change, who sees himself as better off (in terms of all values)

[1] Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Ill., 1962).

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by facilitating or blocking diffusion? As a result, what patterns of route and zone are followed as innovations spread?

(c) Although it was not part of the plan for individual contributors to these volumes to formulate principles of strategy, many partial generalizations and concrete cases appear that point to such principles. As a prod to further work in this field the following provisional statements may not be beside the point.

(*i*) A general principle can be addressed to advisors or makers of final decisions who are responsible for programs of political development: *Think contextually; keep policy questions related to the goal values of all whose effective support is required for success.*

The challenging task is to invent policies and to devise programs for presenting policy that elicit the coalitions needed for effective demand to innovate. Expectations must be strengthened or modified that affect value demands and self-identification.

Individual perspectives are always involved. But individuals are frequently members of organizations whose collective activities must be adapted to the requirements of development. It is important to stress the point that an organization is to be understood as a pattern of situations which are interconnected by communicative and collaborative activity. An official agency exists when a stable routine of formal and informal messages comes to the attention of officials (and other significant participants) and when these messages are interpreted by common criteria. The message flow must be managed in a way that permits the overt collaborative operations of the organization to be stabilized. The personnel, equipment, and other facilities available to the total enterprise are assembled, processed, and eventually released as a stream of outputs. Each component situation within the organization is appropriately structured when it mobilizes the value expectations, demands, and identifications which are necessary to lead the participants in the situation to expect to be relatively better off by performing the operations required than by failing to do so, or by acting inefficiently.

This analysis of an organization shows why it is necessary to apply to organizational analysis all the categories pertinent to any social process, whether organized or unorganized. Every pattern must be specified in terms of the values at stake and of institutional routines. The contextual approach to the strategy of development provides guidance in formulating the criteria to be employed, and in choosing the procedures to be used in thinking about their application.

(*ii*) Among more particularized guides to political development

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is the *principle of decisiveness*. It affirms the importance of avoiding confusion or paralysis during nation-building by maintaining a decision process that produces realistic and timely commitments. As Karl Deutsch has elsewhere emphasized, the communication networks may be overloaded; but indecisiveness may also be a consequence of poor collaborative as well as poor communicative synchronizations.

The principle of decisiveness is not applicable to all circumstances and must then be subordinated or set aside. When the effective elite of a nation is largely hostile to political innovation, the strategy of development calls for measures that increase the strength of whatever factors make for indecisiveness in the official process of decision, and that simultaneously cultivate a revolutionary alternative.

A similar strategy is indicated if the established elite is oriented toward a totalitarian or reactionary bloc in the world arena (unless there are solid grounds for predicting that further development will change the alignment of the state).

(*iii*) Strategies of national development require *simultaneous emphasis on a universal minimum of literacy and education, and on the rapid preparation of highly expert personnel*. This is a warning against unbalanced skill and enlightenment policies; more concretely, a warning against the neglect of universal education (as in Turkey) or the overproduction of university-trained students without a future (as in several countries).

(*iv*) The present volumes give extended, original, and realistic recognition to the strategy of *encouraging administrative merit without undermining or precluding the growth of responsible legislatures, parties, and other plural associations*. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the volume on bureaucracy edited by LaPalombara is to contextualize Max Weber's well-known version of a bureaucratic system. A vivid example of contextual thinking is offered by Riggs, who deals expertly with power values and shows that he is disembarrassed of parochial devotion to specific administrative institutions. He analyzes "the conditions under which non-bureaucratic power centers capable of subjecting bureaucrats to political control flourish or decline" (p. 120). His objectives are clearly implied in the proposition that "when the political arena is shifted to bureaucracies—a shift marked by the growing power of military officers in conflict with civilian officials—the consequences are usually ominous for political stability, economic growth, administrative effectiveness, and democratic values" (*ibid.*). The extent to which he has disabused himself of automatic devotion

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to specific practices is suggested by such comments as these: "Without for a moment denying the evils associated with the spoils system, one cannot escape noting the intimate relation between spoils and the growth of political parties" (p. 128). ". . . in most of the new nations . . . legislatures lack effective machinery for auditing administrative spending. Even where, under technical assistance, new tools of accounting and auditing have been provided, they have been largely conceived for management purposes, and hence have perhaps strengthened the internal control system of the bureaucracy, the office of president or prime minister, but not the legislature as a political control center" (p. 150).

Hoselitz turns to the history of European feudalism in the ninth and tenth centuries to trace the institutional characteristics of the bureaucracies that have been evolved by emerging modern units. The exercise of an office was tied to the fundamental rights and obligations of an individual in the social system. "Much of the alleged corruption that Western technical advisors on administrative services of Asian and African states encounter, and against which they inveigh in their technical reports with so little genuine success, is nothing but the prevalence of these non-rational norms on the basis of which these administrations operate" (p. 190). Under various circumstances the sale of public offices strengthened the position of the monarch in his struggle to obtain revenues and loyalty sufficient to overweigh the strength of such rivals as the great landlords or ecclesiastical authorities.

As Marx points out in his chapter: "The chief effect of the emerging merit bureaucracy may be said to have been in the direction of vastly increasing the viability of constitutional government. Popular rule, easily distorted by volatile partisanship, cries out for the counterweight of considered assessment of issues. . . . The political spokesman and the practitioner of administration, though often at odds with each other, learned to appreciate their separate yet mutually dependent contributions" (p. 64).

(*v*) Sound strategy requires the *ideological incorporation of the entire nation into the challenging task of popular development, and encourages self-awareness of the process.*

The role of leaders to whom charismatic eminence is imputed has often been a conspicuous feature of national consolidation. The personal image of the hero is a common experience that contributes to the popular components of an all-embracing myth. Such miranda must be supplemented by more generalized and explicit doctrines and

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formulas; but they are indispensable to a system of national identification.

It is to be kept in mind that miranda, doctrine, and formula gain impact, elaboration, and stability as a by-product of collective problem-solving. LaPalombara rightly contends that popular government needs to be part of national programs of action; and the same point applies to the acceptance of international responsibility, or to any other objective of comprehensive political growth.

It is unfortunately necessary to leave many principles of strategy in an ambiguous state. When we try to sum up our nation-building experience to date, remarkably few guidelines that touch on the details of organizational structure are available. There is agreement that development means substituting specialized for generalized organs. Yet all is indefinite when we search for criteria for judging the degree and timing of specialization. That a balance is required between centralization and decentralization is admitted. Yet we are left with few suggestions to apply when confronting concrete circumstances. The same ambiguousness is found if we pose other problems of organization, such as the concentration or deconcentration of power in organs at the same level of competence.

In view of the ambiguities involved, it is appropriate to underline the contextual principle as it relates to planning, and to suggest that all relevant events be kept at the focus of attention of advisors and makers of final decisions. Elsewhere I have referred to the use of micro-modeling in chart, map, and demonstration rooms as illustrations of the principle. The chances of realistic, goal-related judgment can be improved by the contextual handling of communication.

Summarizing the model of national political development outlined above, we characterize the sequence of pertinent events as movement:

Toward a self-sustaining process of power accumulation and structural change.

Toward an ideology of progress and commitment to power-sharing as a long-run goal.

Toward sufficient power to maintain national independence, hence effective political demand for economic development and for growth in all value-institution sectors of the body politic.

Toward willingness and capability to play a responsible role in world politics.

Toward an internal process of decision whose structures—both formal and informal, organized and unorganized—constitute a system of pub-

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lic order capable of creative, realistic problem-solving in pursuit of a rising level of participation in all values.

Toward optimum timing of the component elements in a sequence of development.

One objective of models is to assist in the performance of all intellectual tasks relating to development. As information becomes more available, the theoretical structure can be more highly formalized and operationalized. As a step in this direction it may not be premature to consider some of the problems that arise in outlining the first sequence of development mentioned in (1) above, or the movement toward a self-sustaining process of power accumulation and progressive structural change.

Our analysis has indicated that the accumulation of power, as of any value, is a change of interactive potential. National development is national progress. So far as power is concerned, progress is a self-sustaining accumulation of potential support for the political institutions whose characteristics are partially particularized in paragraphs (2) through (6) above.

A comprehensive model of power specifies the salient features of the entire political process as it occurs in the social process. It is necessary to characterize participants, perspectives, arenas, base values, strategies, outcomes, and effects. The *participants* include all members of the national community (and influential non-nationals). Since any social process is interactive, every participant is in some degree a shaper and sharer of power. It is convenient to single out for special inquiry those who engage most actively and effectively in decisions (the severely sanctionable commitments of a body politic). The power-shapers are those who hold lawful (authoritative and controlling) power, plus wielders of naked power. We refer to power-sharing when it can be used either to obtain more power (accumulation) or to acquire other values (enjoyment). Although the active elite typically exercises more power than other community members, everyone may be in a position to share no inconsiderable power. For instance, the individual who is supported against arbitrary official conduct is able to employ his freedom from interference to pursue other power objectives, and also to obtain economic or other indulgences. If one looks at a body politic as a whole, it can be said to accumulate "power for progress" when lawful and progressive participation is more and more effectively supported.

Since a developed polity is composed of participants who share appropriate *perspectives*, value accumulation is expressed in intense sup-

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port for the relevant myth. The myth includes self-identification with the nation, the incorporation of value demands for a developed nation, and realistic expectations about the past and future of the national unit. The myth can also be described in terms of the doctrines, formulas, and miranda of the national collectivity.

Any stable interacting collectivity which is relatively specialized to power is an *arena*; and a developed polity includes lawfully organized and permissible informal arenas. Value accumulation occurs when the appropriate structures gain and hold support. (Governmental, party, and plural associations are all involved.)

Base values are necessary for influencing decision outcomes, and value accumulation implies the growth of potential support for the authoritative expectations and other values required to make the appropriate participants effective.

Strategy is a matter of managing base values; and in a developed polity strategies are persuasive rather than coercive. Hence power accumulations which pertain to development are expansions of potential support for persuasion.

Outcomes are culminating events of commitment in a power process. They register the alignment of support or non-support; and in a developed polity they preserve the integrity of the power process itself.

Effects are the net growth of potential support for progressive institutions.

It is practicable to present a provisional sketch of political development in terms of outcomes (and effects), since the specification of relevant outcomes makes it necessary to scan decisions which refer to institutional practices regarding participants, perspectives, arenas, base values, strategies, and final outcomes. The first step in applying such a model is to identify all the changes which have occurred during a given period in the structure of the decision process (the constitutive process). Some changes become issues; they reach a specified minimum of attention. Changes also differ as to whether they are in harmony or in conflict with whatever is postulated as the preference model. Even preferred innovations carry value deprivations (costs) with them, and a balance sheet of value accumulation must take costs into account. At this stage of research it is not necessary to insist upon one single method of measurement. Let us assume that "specific costs" are the base values required to neutralize or overcome non-support on issues. It is not unreasonable to assume that cost varies inversely with the margin of success or failure, which implies that the narrower the margin, the more opposing or non-committal elements are neutralized. Non-issue

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changes involve non-specific costs or gains. The issue and non-issue changes during a period can be counted equally, or assigned weights according to their scope. In order to reduce the arbitrariness implicit in weighting, it is wiser to present several models of development according to the principal criteria employed. Thus a model can be devoted to changes in the inclusiveness and intensity of power participation, or in the degree of responsible participation in the arena of world affairs.

We have not yet raised the question of identifying self-sustaining power accumulations. We might arbitrarily assume that continuous movement for a period of years justifies the assertion that a situation is self-sustaining. Or we might select various features of constitutive institutions which are judged to be indicative of a self-sustaining level. Pertinent figures would refer to the proportion of trained civil servants (and advisors) who are recruited at home rather than abroad; or the degree of equality in the selection of civil servants (and political leaders) from all territorial regions of the country, and from all classes of society. (Kingsley gives some illuminating figures for Nigeria in the bureaucracy volume.) From the standpoint of general power analysis, we are referring to the base values at the disposal of the structures in the decision process to achieve a flow of preferred decision outcomes. The realism of decisions, as distinct from equality of participation, is not measured directly when we describe only recruitment and training. Eventually the data obtainable from a developing body politic may be sufficiently representative and pertinent to enable quite refined criteria to be employed. In some cases it may be easiest to measure the perspectives of the population (as Almond and Verba have done), and to assign them degrees of approximation to a preference model.

The following model of political development is limited to changes in the constitutive process, in degrees of support for preferred structures of decision:

POWER OUTCOMES (during selected period)
gross = marginal support on successful preferred issues (in terms of analyst's postulated goal)
− marginal support on unsuccessful preferred issues
net = gross outcome
+ preferred non-issue change
− non-preferred non-issue change

POWER EFFECTS (accumulation)
= initial support of preferred constitutive institutions
+ net outcomes

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In case this appears unduly complex, it is to be recalled that in economic analysis capital accumulation is by no means as simple as it seems when summarized as new investment minus depreciation on initial stocks. This quantitative statement must be corrected in developmental models to allow for the costs of unbalanced innovation, and the loss of potential advantage (opportunity cost). In concrete cases, whole sectors of an economy (such as Soviet agriculture) may lag.

Our discussion of political development has put us on the side of those who propose a model that includes the decisions necessary to achieve an all-value, all-institution reconstruction of society in terms of human dignity. I shall not attempt to formulate in this place the complex requirements of a truly comprehensive policy-science model of development, since this would call for elaborate specifications of what is to be defined as preferred. However, in view of the increasing scope of modern research, it may be opportune to bring into the discussion some preliminary outlines of the total task. The following models are *not* developmental, although they can be adapted for the purpose. Rather, these outlines are *stability-instability models*, since they regard any increase of support for a constitutive structure as a value accumulation, whether the structure is progressive or not.

These modes of examining the social process call attention to specialized and unspecialized value shapers and sharers, and to the flow of gross and net value outcome during a given period; and they summarize the results of value accumulation or enjoyment. The fundamental viewpoint is parallel to the more familiar cases of power and wealth, since some events are seen as the culminating outcomes in a sequence of preparatory activities. We speak of a decision as made when influencing strategies culminate in a commitment (such as a vote); and we classify wealth as produced when it is available for market transactions. Similarly, enlightenment has been shaped when it is available for dissemination; skill when it is ready for a performance; respect when a form of recognition is completed; affection when it is available for direction to an individual or collective target; rectitude when a general pattern of responsible conduct is crystallized or applied; well-being when body and mind are able to function in safety, health, and comfort. In what follows, mention is made of the participants as a means of concreteness. (Full analysis would call for the addition of perspectives, situations, base values, and strategies.)

ENLIGHTENMENT VALUE

participants = shapers = reporters, researchers, forecasters, storers (librarians, etc.)

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= sharers = learners (of accumulated knowledge), viewers, readers, or listeners to news
outcome = gross = news reports, research reports, forecasts, storing, exposure to media, exposure to educational presentations
net = gross
— loss of knowledge
effect = initial knowledge stored
+ initial level of reporting (expected volume)
+ initial level of forecasting
+ initial level of exposure to media
+ initial level of exposure to educational presentations
+ or — net outcome

SKILL VALUE
participants = shapers = practitioners
levels of training and experience
levels of performance
+ apprentices
+ masters (trainers)
sharers = evaluators
critics, connoisseurs
outcome = gross = improvement in levels of training and experience
+ improvement in levels of performance
— deterioration
net = gross outcome
— teaching outlay
effect = initial level
+ or — net outcome

WELL-BEING VALUE
participants = shapers = caretakers, therapists, preventers, destroyers
= sharers = experiencers of safety, health, comfort
outcome = gross = population additions (birth, immigrants)
+ vigor
= net = gross population
— deaths, emigrants
+ gross vigor
— injury, illness, defect, discomfort, anxiety
effect = initial population (expectation of death, injury, illness, defect, anxiety, discomfort, vigor)
+ or — net income (terminal population's expectations)

AFFECTION VALUE
participants = shapers = family partners
= sharers = experiencers of affection
outcome
individual congeniality = positive activities
toward others
+ from others

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— negative activities
toward others
+ from others
loyalty (own group identity) = positive activities
— negative activities
collective congeniality = positive activities
toward other groups
+ by other groups
— negative activities
toward other groups
+ by other groups

effect
initial congeniality (individual)
+ or — net individual outcome
initial loyalty
+ or — net outcome
initial congeniality (group)
+ net outcome

RESPECT VALUE
participants = shapers = formulators of respect, standards, and appliers
= sharers = experiencers of respect
outcome
individual = indulgences (recognitions)
toward others
+ from others
— deprivations (discriminations)
toward others
+ from others
collective = indulgences
toward other groups
+ from other groups
— deprivations
toward other groups
+ from other groups
effect
initial respect position (individual)
+ net outcome
initial respect position (collective)
+ net outcome

RECTITUDE VALUE
participants = shapers = formulators and appliers of religious and ethical standards
= sharers = experiencers of estimates of responsibility
outcome
conformity to standards
— non-conformity

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effect
initial disposition to conformity
+ net outcome (terminal disposition to conformity)

Since the application of all models calls for the selection of measuring units, a few comments may be made about the fundamental indices appropriate to social process measurement. These indices are required by the fundamental conception of social process, which refers to two categories of "events": subjective events, or "symbol-perspectives"; and non-subjective events. The latter are divided for convenience into "somatic" events, which include the energy and mass of the body, and "physical resources," which are the energy and mass of the environment. "Signs" are somatic or resource events, which are relatively specialized to communication (mediators of symbol-perspective interactions). Collaborations are other interactions. Values, as said before, are preferred outcomes in interaction.

Three categories of basic measuring units are relevant: units of communication (or communication equivalents); of somatic events; of resources. Some value outcomes are usually measurable in simple units (of one category); others require composite units. Many power outcomes require simple units, since the vote is a communication that is recognized as an act of support or non-support. Hence a vote is a statement of demand, of volition. Gestures can be taken as vote equivalents; and acts of protection or opposition are also equivalents. Affection is measurable in communication units (or equivalents); so, too, is rectitude, respect, or enlightenment. Enlightenment is indicated by a matter-of-fact statement which is offered (or withheld) or received (or rejected). Wealth requires composite units. One unit is a communicated and recognized claim to a raw material or a produced resource; the others are somatic or resource units of mass and energy. Skill also requires composite units. A relevant communication characterizes a performance according to excellence; measuring the performance requires somatic or resource units. Well-being calls for composite indices: a communication employing references to safety, health, and comfort; and somatic or physical units characterizing the events referred to.

In concluding it is appropriate to emphasize the gratifying expansion of the policy sciences of development, and to join in applauding the importance of the volumes so admirably edited by Pye, LaPalombara, and Rustow and Ward. They and their associates have achieved a self-sustaining level of creative concern with the power value and its

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diverse modes of institutional expression. Their work has brought the time closer when a comprehensive theory of value accumulation and institutional development can provide an inclusive frame of reference for the decision makers and choosers involved in giving or receiving assistance, or in directing self-sustaining and integrated growth.

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PEACE AND WAR

By ROBERT W. TUCKER

Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre entre les nations*, 3rd edn., Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1962, 794 pp. 28.50 NF.

I

IN the preface to *Paix et Guerre entre les nations* Raymond Aron writes that: "Mon but est de comprendre la logique implicite des relations entre collectivités politiquement organisées." As an effort to comprehend the implicit logic of state relations, *Paix et Guerre* is clearly one of the most ambitious works to appear in recent years. In terms of sheer scope, it has few—if indeed, any—serious competitors among general treatises on international relations. Moreover, in terms of substantive accomplishments, it is in many respects one of the most impressive works to appear in a long time. It is impressive if only because of the critical function it performs. Few theories of significance directly or indirectly relating to "l'institution belliqueuse" escape Aron's attention and criticism.[1] *Paix et Guerre* is impressive for the way in which it seeks to encompass and to organize the disparate materials making up the study of international relations and, in particular, for the manner in which it attempts to comprehend certain behavior—diplomatic-strategic action—from diverse points of view. It is equally impressive for its awareness that the progress of a discipline generally and the utility of comparative study particularly depend on drawing clear and precise distinctions and devising useful classifications. Finally, *Paix et Guerre* is impressive for the perceptiveness with which it analyzes contemporary international politics. Aron's chapters on the diplomacy and strategy of the nuclear age—"le monde fini"—form a model of political analysis. Not the least of its virtues is the modesty of the conclusions drawn and the disavowal of oracular pretensions. The same modesty characterizes Aron's theoretical endeavors. If a pervasive skepticism is applied to the theories of others, and particularly to "les grandes hypothèses," Aron is almost as skeptical of his own efforts to lay bare "les conditions des choix historiques." In large measure, *Paix et Guerre* is a sustained and often brilliant effort to demonstrate the

[1] Thus there are critical appreciations of such diverse thinkers as Thucydides, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau, Hegel, Kant, Clausewitz, Proudhon, Treitschke, Lenin, Bergsen, Spengler, and Toynbee. In addition, the recent American literature receives special attention. The realists are dealt with, as well as a number of systems and game theorists.

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limits of our present knowledge. That effort performs a much needed service.

Paix et Guerre is not without its blemishes, some small and some not so small. If Aron's literary style is felicitous, his manner of presentation is often distracting to the point of annoyance. The technique of examining problems through the posing of questions is carried to an excess. There is no apparent reason why a position of doubt or uncertainty must be expressed through the almost endless series of questions that fill the book. Then, too, on frequent occasion the reader is left to wonder whether Aron's questions are really questions or whether they are merely rhetorical, intended to put forth a view without indicating a clear commitment to it. Equally distracting are the sudden shifts; the analysis of one problem is abruptly terminated and the analysis of another problem initiated for reasons that must often remain obscure to the reader. It is perhaps this feature more than any other that leaves the impression of a book which, though well-written, is not quite "composed." In part, of course, these and other distracting features are the almost inevitable result of the attempt to cover so vast an area. They point, however, to a more serious criticism. The analyses of problems are frequently very partial analyses, stimulating perhaps, though barely more than impressionistic in character. The critiques of theories are frequently very partial critiques, and sometimes not altogether fair ones. *Paix et Guerre* represents a heroic effort to accomplish what is probably impossible to accomplish within the limits of one volume.

II

How may one define the study of international relations? What are the scope and limits of the discipline? Does it have a unique center of interest? Does it deal with human conduct whose distinctiveness sets it apart from other behavior and permits theoretical elaboration? What is the nature of the theoretical elaboration to which "la conduite diplomatico-stratégique" lends itself? Aron's response to these questions is to begin by stating the obvious. International relations are, by definition, the relations between nations, understanding by the term *nation* any "political collective, territorially organized" (p. 17).[2] The

[2] "Disons, provisoirement, que les relations internationales sont les relations entre *unités politiques,* ce dernier concept couvrant les cités grecques, l'empire romain ou égyptien aussi bien que les monarchies européennes, les républiques bourgeoises ou les démocraties populaires" (p. 17). ["Let us say provisionally that international relations are the relations among *political entities,* the latter concept covering the Greek city-states, the Roman or the Egyptian empire, as well as European monarchies, bourgeois

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discipline of international relations must presumably concern itself, first and foremost, with these relations. Against the frequent objection that this definition does not indicate precisely where or at what moment interindividual relations begin or cease to form a part of international relations, Aron replies that no scientific discipline comprises precisely delineated boundaries. Nor is it necessary that it should possess such boundaries. What is necessary is to determine the center of interest, the specific significance of the phenomena that make up the core of a field of inquiry, rather than the marginal, and frequently ambiguous, phenomena. Elsewhere,[3] Aron has declared that definitions describe, so to speak, the "perfect" phenomenon. Marginal cases do not thereby invalidate the definition but simply afford evidence of the graduation always to be found in social phenomena.

What Aron considers as the center of interest of the study of international relations is evidently what we would normally define as the foreign policy of a state. Interstate relations are expressed, he writes, in and by the conduct of the diplomat and the soldier. "Deux hommes, et deux seulement, agissent pleinement non plus comme des membres quelconques, mais en tant que *représentants*, des collectivités auxquelles ils appartiennent: l'*ambassadeur* dans l'exercice de ses fonctions *est* l'unité politique au nom de laquelle il parle; le *soldat* sur le champ de bataille *est* l'unité politique au nom de laquelle il donne la mort à son semblable" (p. 17).[4] The statement need not be taken literally. The significant point is Aron's insistence on the *representative* character of the acts which typically comprise interstate relations. Expressed in other terms, the problem of identifying the conduct that forms the core interest of the study of international relations is a problem of imputation—that is, a problem of determining which acts of individuals may be imputed (attributed) to the "political entity." Generally speaking, those acts are imputed to the state which are undertaken by individuals authorized or competent to act on behalf of, or in the name of, the state. When such acts are directed toward other independent po-

republics or popular democracies."] It is clear that the decisive characteristic of these "unités politiques" is their possession of "le monopole de la violence légitime." Cf. Aron's essay, "A propos de la théorie politique," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, XII (1962), 24-25.

[3] Cf. Raymond Aron, "Conflict and War from the Viewpoint of Historical Sociology," in *The Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions* (Paris 1957), 186.

[4] ["Two men, and two only, act not as members but wholly as *representatives* of the collectives to which they belong: the *ambassador* in the exercise of his functions *is* the political entity in the name of which he speaks; the *soldier* on the battlefield *is* the political entity in the name of which he kills his fellow man."]

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litical units—whether they take the form of the conclusion of treaties, the waging of war, the granting of economic aid, or the like—we are in the realm of "foreign policy" proper, the distinctive concern of the science of international relations.[5]

The study of international relations not only has a distinctive domain; it also deals with conduct the substance and meaning of which must be distinguished from the substance and meaning of all other social relations, including domestic political relations. Thus interstate relations are conducted "à l'ombre de la guerre ou, pour employer une expression plus rigoureuse, les relations entre Etats comportent, par essence, l'alternative de la guerre et de la paix" (p. 18).[6] Each of the "actors" reserves to itself a monopoly of the means of violence; moreover, each claims "le droit de se faire justice elle-même et d'être seule maîtresse de la décision de combattre ou de ne pas combattre" (p. 20).[7] It is not only that the possibility of organized armed violence—war—is normally greater in interstate than in domestic politics.[8] Equally, if not more, significant is the recognition by the participants that such violence is implicit in interstate relations, whereas

[5] Given this distinctive concern, the study of international relations must obviously comprise as well those factors—social and material—which determine (affect) foreign policy in the sense defined above. The study of international relations may therefore be defined in terms of its distinctive, or specific, concern as well as in terms of the various factors which determine the conduct forming the center of interest of the discipline. It is clear, however, that without identification of the center of interest, the specific focus, of the discipline there would be no way of determining, even grossly, where the discipline begins or ends.

Aron draws no distinction between "international relations" and "international politics." Many writers, however, insist upon making such a distinction, the basis for the distinction presumably being that the study of international politics deals with state actions which have "political" objectives, whereas the study of international relations deals with state action which may or may not have political objectives. This distinction is evidently based on the view that an action can be characterized as "political" in character only if the objective of the action is the maintenance or the increase of power (or, at least, the demonstration of power) vis-à-vis other states. Even if this view is accepted, one cannot be sure of its practical utility. The international economic policy of a state may have as its sole objective to secure the best possible terms of trade. On the above view, such a policy would have to be considered unpolitical. But if the policy affects—as it clearly will affect—the power potential of the state, are we still to regard it as outside the proper purview of international politics because its objective was presumably not of a "political" character? On the other hand, if a political action is one which in some way affects the power potential of a state, hence its capacity to control the behavior of others (i.e., to exercise power), then there will be very few state actions that cannot be characterized as "political."

[6] [". . . in the shadow of war, or, to use a more precise expression, the relations among states comprise in their very essence the alternative of war and peace."]

[7] [". . . the right to make justice for itself and to be the sole master of the decision to fight or not to fight."]

[8] Indeed, we know that for certain periods and for certain states the expectation of violence is as great, if not greater, in domestic politics.

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it is not so implicit in domestic politics. Domestic political societies could not function if the participants were under the continuous necessity to calculate the "relationship of forces" and to govern their behavior in accordance with this relationship, if the participants recognized that war remained an ever-present alternative to peaceful relations, given the right claimed by each participant to make justice for itself. It is precisely the continuous necessity of making such a calculation that Hobbes considered as an essential attribute of a "state of nature." Armed conflicts within domestic societies may and do occur, but revolution has seldom been conceived as the continuation of (domestic) political policy by other means.[9] Far from being recognized as compatible with the continuity of a domestic political order, revolution is seen on both sides as a radical break in the order. In interstate relations, however, war normally has not been interpreted by the participants as representing a radical break in, or rupture of, the established order, but as a means provided for by the order itself. Thus, in traditional international law, the status given to war reflected the institutionalization of this means, or, to put the matter more directly, its legitimacy in interstate relations.

In view of these considerations, Aron insists that "l'action diplomatico-stratégique" not be assimilated to, and thereby confused with, domestic political action. All politics involve the use and pursuit of power. But this banality should not be employed to obscure the essential differences between the two kinds of action. So long as the means of violence remain in the exclusive control of the various participants, interstate politics—comprising the alternatives of peace and of war—will have a meaning objectively different from domestic politics. So long as each of the participants claims a right to make justice for itself, or, at the very least, claims a right to determine the circumstances in which it will employ force to defend what are conceived to be the collective's vital interests, interstate politics will have a meaning subjectively different from domestic politics.

If the distinctive qualities of diplomatic-strategic conduct set it

[9] We need not take up the issue whether the nature of politics within a domestic society undergoes a qualitative change once the use of force by dissident groups no longer constitutes a meaningful possibility. Even where organized domestic violence remains a meaningful possibility, the significance given to it by the parties differs from the significance given to war by states. At any rate, Aron regards the issue as premature. "A l'intérieur des nations les plus anciennement constituées—telle la nation française—aucun groupe social, aucun parti politique n'a définitivement renoncé à l'emploi de la force pour défendre ses revenus ou son idéal" (p. 630). ["Even in the oldest nations—e.g., the French nation—no social group or political party has irrevocably renounced the employment of force to defend its material interests or its ideal."]

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apart from other social relations, it is Aron's view that these qualities also preclude the possibility of a general theory of international relations. To be sure, the conduct that forms the specific concern of the discipline of international relations permits theoretical elaboration. "La théorie des relations internationales part de la pluralité des centres autonomes de décision, donc du risque de guerre et, de ce risque, elle déduit la nécessité du calcul des moyens" (p. 28).[10] At the same time, the kind of theory to which diplomatic-strategic conduct is amenable is of modest compass. A theory of international relations can analyze the sense or logic of diplomatic-strategic action, elaborate the fundamental concepts which characterize this conduct, distinguish typical situations, and specify the variables that make up a diplomatic constellation or international system. To a limited extent, it may aspire to rough generalizations on the relationships between these variables. It cannot go beyond these modest aims, however, and legitimately aspire to a general theory comparable, for example, to economic theory. Whereas economic theory may postulate an "immanent end" of economic action (the maximization of resources) and utilize a precise standard of measure to analyze this action (money), a theory of international relations can neither postulate an immanent end of diplomatic-strategic action nor utilize a standard of measure comparable to economic theory. In particular, the concept of power is unsatisfactory, and falsifies the sense of diplomatic action, when it is employed either as a description of the immanent end of diplomatic action or as a standard of measure by which to analyze this action. The ends of diplomatic-strategic action are multiple and irreducible. "L'*homo diplomaticus*" may, and does, pursue a number of objectives and the choices he makes among these objectives cannot be deduced either from the relationship of forces or from the internal structure of the state. The maximization of power cannot be considered the measure of diplomatic conduct as the "maximisation des satisfactions monétaires" can be considered the measure of economic conduct. If the calculation of forces is always necessary, this calculation is neither the first nor the last word of diplomatic-strategic conduct.[11] Moreover, even if we were

[10] ["The theory of international relations posits a variety of autonomous centers of decision and consequently of the risk of war, and from this risk it deduces the necessity of calculating the means."]

[11] Thus: "Le calcul des forces, auquel *le diplomate idéal* ne peut se soustraire, n'est ni le premier ni le dernier mot de la conduite diplomatico-stratégique. Les amitiés et inimitiés à un moment donné ne résultent pas toutes du rapport de forces: *le diplomate* s'efforce de maintenir un équilibre, mais certaines amitiés ou inimitiés lui sont donnees comme irréductibles. . . . Non seulement les objectifs historiques des unités politiques ne sont pas déductibles du rapport de forces, mais les objectifs ultimes des unités sont légitime-

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to assume that power provides a rigorous measure of diplomatic action, that it permits "les égalités comptables" for diplomacy which money permits for the economy, its maximization would be a rational objective only if the statesman entertained certain objectives and not others.[12] The maximization of power need not be a rational objective of policy if, for example, the statesman wishes only to maintain an equilibrium of power. Nor does it follow that if we assume an evident —or immanent—end of policy (e.g., security) and neglect the ambiguity that always inheres in the ends of diplomatic-strategic action, we may then calculate with assurance the means (power) adequate to this end. Thus an increase of power may serve, and on occasion has served, only to provoke a reaction by others that results in a diminution of security. Power need not prove an adequate—or ra-

ment équivoques. Sécurité, puissance, gloire, idée, sont des objectifs essentiellement hétérogènes que l'on ne ramènerait à un terme unique qu'en faussant la signification humaine de l'action diplomatico-stratégique. Si la rivalité des Etats est comparable à un jeu, ce qui est 'en jeu' ne saurait être désigné par un concept unique, valable pour toutes les civilisations et toutes les époques" (p. 100). ["The calculation of forces, which the *ideal diplomat* cannot avoid, is neither the first nor the last word of diplomatic strategic conduct. Friendships and enmities of a given moment are not entirely the result of relationship of forces: *the diplomat* tries to maintain an equilibrium, but some friendships or animosities are irreducible givens. . . . Not only are the historic objectives of political entities not deducible from the relationship of forces, but the ultimate objectives of the entities are understandably equivocal. Security, power, glory, idea, are essentially heterogeneous objectives which cannot be reduced to a common denominator without falsifying the human significance of diplomatic strategic action. If the rivalry of States is comparable to a game, what is 'at stake' cannot be designated by one concept valid for all civilizations and for all eras."]

[12] It is true that the ultimate ends of economic action as well, whether for the individual or for the collective, are no more determined by the "immanent end" of this activity (the maximization of resources) than are the ultimate ends of diplomatic-strategic action, which cannot rely on a concept equivalent to that of value or utility in economic theory. But if the ultimate "indétermination d'activité économique" appears no different from the ultimate indeterminacy of political conduct, there is still a very considerable difference between the two types of activities, and the theories analyzing these activities, at the level below that of ultimate ends. Money not only provides a rigorous standard of measure in the case of economic activity; it also provides the possibility of substituting for the chaos of individual preferences a relatively clear objective, i.e., the maximization of monetary resources. To this extent, economic theory may dispense with ultimate ends and consider only the necessary means as the common objective of individuals. "Quand il s'agit de la conduite d'un individu, l'économiste n'a pas d'autre définition de l'*intérêt* que l'échelle des préférences, variable d'individu à individu, ou la maximisation de l'*ophélimité* mesurée par les quantités monétaires" (p. 98). ["When it is a question of individual conduct, the economist has no other definition of *interest* than the scale of preferences, varying from individual to individual, or the maximization of *satisfaction* as measured by monetary units."] The existence of a relatively determined objective, together with strictly defined rules and a high degree of interdependence of variables, permit the *homo oeconomicus* of theory to resemble rather closely the concrete economic actor. They also make possible a definition of rational conduct, though when one passes from the individual to the collective, and from a consideration of the individual's interest to that of the collective's interest, this possibility becomes much less clear.

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tional—means to the ends sought by policy, given the essential risks and uncertainty that characterize diplomatic-strategic conduct. Once again, therefore, we are forced to the conclusion that power cannot provide the unit of measure for a theory of international relations that money provides for economic theory. Aron concludes: "Si la conduite diplomatique n'est jamais déterminée par le seul rapport des forces, si la puissance n'est pas l'enjeu de la diplomatie comme l'utilité celle de l'économie, alors la conclusion est légitime qu'*il n'y a pas de théorie générale des relations internationales, comparable à la théorie générale de l'économie*" (p. 102).[13] Theory can analyze the "intelligible structure" of diplomatic-strategic action; it cannot legitimately propose an "eternal diplomacy" or pretend to the construction of a closed system. Nor can it construct a standard of rational behavior that will closely approximate the actual behavior of governments and in accordance with which the statesman should and does strive to conform. Diplomatic-strategic conduct is undertaken by actors who entertain multiple and equivocal ends. The rules which regulate this conduct are vague and frequently ineffective (there is no arbiter competent to interpret and enforce the rules). The space within which this conduct takes place is not closed and the actors whose conduct is the object of inquiry do not form a highly organized system. In consequence, diplomatic conduct is necessarily "indéterminée et aventureuse," a "prise de risques." The conduct of foreign policy may be more or less reasonable, but Aron stresses that *reasonable* and *rational* are not synonymous. The statesman would not act reasonably if he did not take the relationship of forces into his calculations. But the relationship of forces, even if it could be calculated with precision, does not determine the behavior of statesmen.[14]

[13] ["If diplomatic conduct is never determined by the relationship of forces alone, if power is not the stake of diplomacy, as utility is that of the economy, then the conclusion is legitimate that there is no general theory of international relations comparable to the general theory of economics."]

[14] In a final critical note, Aron considers the applicability of game theory to diplomatic-strategic conduct. The principal difficulties in applying game theory must be found, he writes, in the indeterminacy of the stakes and the limits of the game. "Pour qu'il y ait un jeu au sens rigoureux du terme, pour qu'une solution mathématique définissant la conduite rationnelle soit possible, il faut qu'il y ait un début et une fin, un nombre fini de démarches par chacun des joueurs, un résultat, susceptible d'une évaluation, cardinale ou ordinale, pour chacun des joueurs. Aucune de ces conditions n'est, à proprement parler, remplie dans le champ des relations internationales" (pp. 756-57). ["In order for there to be a game in the rigorous sense of the term, in order for a mathematical solution defining rational conduct to be possible, there must be a beginning and an end and, for each actor, a finite number of plays and a measurable result susceptible of evaluation. None of these conditions is, strictly speaking, fulfilled in the field of international relations."]

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III

These considerations on the nature and scope of the discipline of international relations, as well as the prospects for a general theory, are not novel. Nor does Aron lay claim to any novelty in making them. A more distinctive feature of *Paix et Guerre* is the method employed to comprehend the meaning—or rather the several meanings—of diplomatic-strategic action ("comprendre dans tous ses aspects la logique d'une conduite spécifique"). It is Aron's contention that in the analysis of any social action it is possible to distinguish four levels of conceptualization and that all four are necessary if one is to grasp "la texture intelligible d'un univers social." Aron terms these four levels of conceptualization: theory, sociology, history, praxiology. *Paix et Guerre* is accordingly divided into four roughly equal parts, each part analyzing the significance of diplomatic-strategic action from one of these conceptual levels. The scheme of the book, which follows this fourfold division, may be briefly described.

"Théorie" (subtitled: "Concepts et systèmes"), proceeding from the postulate of a competitive system in which each of the actors wishes to impose its will on the other actors and comprising the basic alternatives of war and peace, concentrates on defining, distinguishing, and elaborating fundamental concepts. Thus Aron deals with the unity and primacy of foreign policy ("la solidarité de la diplomatie et de la stratégie"), as well as with the means and objectives of foreign policy. From the analysis of foreign policy considered in isolation, theory proceeds to the consideration of international systems. The latter are analyzed in terms of certain general characteristics (homogeneity or heterogeneity, the relationship of forces, the degree of juridical regulation, etc.) and ideal types (multipolar and bipolar). Finally, types of war and peace, as well as intermediate forms, are set out.

"Sociologie" (subtitled: "Déterminants et régularités"), drawing upon the insights provided by theory, is devoted to an inquiry into the general causes, social and material, of diplomatic action as well as to a description of the regularities characterizing this action.[15] The

[15] The distinction between theory and sociology is, of course, a distinction between two types or conceptions of theory. They are, Aron observes, not contradictory but complementary: "le schématisme rationnel et les propositions sociologiques constituent les moments successifs dans l'élaboration conceptuelle d'un univers social" (p. 16). ["The rational schematization and the sociological propositions constitute successive moments in the conceptual elaboration of the social universe."] It must be emphasized, though, that Aron's "le schématisme rationnel" is not a rational scheme of diplomatic-strategic conduct in the sense that it is deduced in abstract manner from a given hypothesis or limited set of hypotheses. It is instead a rational schematization drawn from his-

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significance of space, numbers, and resources (geography, demography, and the economy) as determinants of diplomatic conduct is examined and the various theories that have sought to establish causal relationships between one of these factors and the behavior of states are critically reviewed. The inquiry then turns to the social determinants of foreign policy. Beginning with the influence that distinctive types of regimes may have on the conduct of diplomacy or of strategy, the inquiry goes on to examine the significance of the nation itself as a determinant, and the constancy through history of this determinant. Beyond the regime and the nation, the inquiry turns to civilizations. Is it possible to find in the history of a civilization a sequence of typical phases, each phase characterized by a distinctive type of foreign policy common to the units comprising the civilization, and each phase characterized by a determined frequency or type of war? Finally, to what extent is the most characteristic manifestation of diplomatic-strategic conduct, war, the result of human nature? The search for determinants and regularities therefore ends with the examination of theories that have variously found the origins of "l'institution belliqueuse" in the nature of man, the nature of society, or in a combination of the two.

"Histoire" (subtitled: "Le système planétaire à l'âge thermonucléaire"), which is devoted to an analysis of "la conjuncture actuelle," seeks to apply the "théorie rationalisante" and the "théorie sociologique" of the two preceding parts. But the present historical conjuncture is dominated by two major, and unique, developments: the technical revolution and the planetary extension of the diplomatic field. Whereas the first development has resulted in an unprecedented increase of man's capacity both to destroy and to produce, the second development has given rise for the first time to a universal diplomatic system—to a diplomatic system marked by "l'hétérogénéité réelle" and "l'homogénéité juridique." Hence, the study of international relations in the nuclear age has two principal objectives: ". . . à dégager les caractères inédits de la stratégie et de la diplomatie, à l'époque de la bombe thermonucléaire . . . à présenter une description, éclairée par l'étude antérieure des concepts et des déterminants, d'une conjoncture con-

tory, a rationalization or ordering of history. Thus Aron's concepts and types are drawn from a systematic and comparative study of concrete phenomena, as is clear, for example, in his analysis of the objectives of foreign policy. Whereas theory, in this latter sense, "suggère d'elle-même l'énumération des phénomènes-effets, des déterminés," the sociologist "est invité à rechercher les phénomènes-causes, les déterminants" (p. 184).

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crète" (p. 369).[16] Part III begins with an examination of the principal systemic characteristics of "le monde fini," then undertakes a detailed analysis of the strategy of deterrence, proceeds thence to an analysis of the diplomacy within and between the blocs as well as between the blocs and the non-engaged, and concludes by drawing a series of contrasts and comparisons between the Soviet Union and the United States ("les frères ennemis").

"Praxéologie" (subtitled: "Les antinomies de la conduite diplomatico-stratégique"), the final section of the book, is concerned with normative and philosophical issues and includes the re-examination of initial hypotheses. Following the analysis of diplomatic-strategic action from several viewpoints, each one of which is independent of moral judgment, the last part is addressed to the central question: what is the judgment we ought to pass, the moral evaluation we ought to make, on this conduct? The answer to this question will evidently depend upon the nature of the moral standards by which we judge diplomatic-strategic conduct. At the same time, are not the moral judgments we make also dependent on, or conditioned by, our appreciation of the limits within which statecraft must operate? Part IV begins with a review of the fundamental controversy engendered by the classic doctrine of *raison d'état*—the so-called realist-idealist controversy, as it is termed in the American literature. Given a world in which law does not reign in the relations of states and in which each state must ultimately look to its own devices if it is to preserve its vital interests, what are the limits that ought to be imposed on diplomatic-strategic conduct? Are there indeed *any* limits to the means states may legitimately employ in order to protect their security and independence? The examination then takes up the impact that the introduction of nuclear weapons has had on this perennial controversy and asks whether nuclear weapons must be considered to have invalidated the response that may have appeared acceptable in an earlier era. There follows a lengthy analysis of the strategy Aron considers to afford the most hopeful prospects of avoiding the twin evils of surrender and of thermonuclear war. Finally, the inquiry goes beyond the dilemmas attending the conduct of foreign policy ("au delà de la politique de puissance"), beyond a world in which each state claims the right to make justice for itself, and considers the prospects of universal peace, either by the voluntary submission of states to the

[16] [" . . . to disengage the original characteristics of strategy and diplomacy in the thermonuclear age . . . to present a description, illuminated by previous study of concepts and of determinants, of a concrete conjuncture."]

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rule of law ("la paix par la loi") or by their integration into a world state ("la paix par l'empire").

Aron places considerable emphasis, and understandably so, on the method he has employed to grasp the various meanings of a specific conduct—in this instance, diplomatic-strategic conduct. It is but a small criticism of this method that the abstract distinctions drawn between the various levels of conceptualization, particularly between "théorie" and "sociologie," are not always altogether clear in practice. Nor is it a serious drawback of the method that it results in a substantial degree of overlap and repetition. As a general approach to the study of international relations, as a method of ordering the disparate materials of a vast field and, above all, as a scheme for illuminating the different meanings of a specific conduct, it possesses considerable merit. If others have also suggested a similar method, none has articulated it as well as Aron or pursued it more imaginatively.

IV

A reviewer of *Paix et Guerre*, in turning from the general aspects of the work to the substantive analyses that comprise each part, is of necessity forced to concentrate on one set of problems. In the following pages I have chosen to comment on some of the major issues dealt with in part IV. Whether part IV may be regarded as the most important section of the book I do not pretend to answer. It does represent in a number of respects the consummation of the analyses, however, and not merely by virtue of its position.

In the introduction to part IV, Aron declares that: ". . . l'essence des relations interétatiques soulève deux problèmes praxéologiques que j'appellerai le *problème machiavélien* et le *problème kantien*: celui des moyens légitimes, celui de la paix universelle" (p. 565).[17] What are the means that may be legitimately employed in the conduct of foreign policy? Given the environment in which the statesman must act, is there any assurance that the observance of restraints will be reciprocated? On the other hand, if this environment does not permit the actors to place any clear limitations on the measures they must be ready to employ, if necessary, to preserve their interests ("la politique étrangère est-elle ou non en elle-même diabolique?"), how may we—if, indeed, we may—transform it and thus resolve the otherwise insoluble problem of means? A "state of nature" is never a satisfactory

[17] [" . . . the essence of interstate relations raises two praxiological problems that I will call the Machiavellian and the Kantian: that of legitimate means and that of universal peace."]

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condition. But, depending upon circumstances, it may still be more or less tolerable. The "Kantian problem" becomes urgent when the "Machiavellian problem" appears to afford little prospect of even a barely tolerable solution.

Aron's "le problème machiavélien" is, of course, the problem of reason of state. Reason of state is, presumably, that special form of "reason" which the statesman must employ in preserving the ends of the state—above all, the independence and survival of the state. "It tells the statesman," in the words of Meinecke, "what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the state."[18] The distinctive problem raised by reason of state is how such conduct as may be required to preserve the state's "health and strength" can be justified. The problem of justification need not arise. It does not arise where there is no awareness of an order imposing obligations on the individual and independent of, and in potential opposition to, the order of the collective. Where men identify themselves completely with the collective to which they belong, where they believe that the "health and strength" of the collective is not only the highest but the only moral imperative, the problem of reason of state does not and cannot arise. Even where this identification of the individual with the collective no longer obtains, the problem of justification need not arise if diplomatic-strategic conduct is given a consistently and exclusively naturalistic interpretation. If the conflicts of states are viewed as a necessity that men may perhaps decry but one from which they cannot escape, and if the means employed in these conflicts are considered as equally determined, the problem of justification does not arise. In threatening or in employing force—including nuclear force—the statesman merely acts as he is compelled to act. To insist, however, that this action raises moral dilemmas and forms the proper object of moral judgment is to misapprehend its nature and significance. It may of course be seen as tragic in much the same way that death is seen as tragic. Still, we do not ask whether death as such poses moral dilemmas for men, much less whether death is moral or immoral, just or unjust. It is as meaningless to pass moral judgment on death as it is to pass moral judgment on an earthquake or a flood or on any natural catastrophe. Very nearly the same has been claimed for the attempt to pass moral judgment on the catastrophes that have marked men's collective relations in the past and that may yet one day attend the failure of a strategy of nuclear deterrence.

[18] Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its History*, trans. by Douglas Scott (New Haven 1957), 1.

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This ancient view has had many versions, the latest, and in many respects the most persuasive, being the necessity imposed by technology. It has always been an attractive view. It relieves men of the burden of moral responsibility. Moreover, it does afford a justification of sorts for the actions men take. We do not normally attach moral opprobrium to those who have only acted as they were compelled to act and it would seem pointless and even perverse to do so. Nor is this all, given the ubiquity and the intensity of men's need for justification. When explanation takes the form of necessity, what is evidently a *non sequitur* from the point of view of logic becomes a truism from the point of view of psychology, and to explain is in effect to justify. It may be true that by placing men's behavior beyond meaningful choice, and presumably beyond moral or immoral, just or unjust, the appeal to necessity can provide only a negative justification of behavior; in terms of satisfying the obsession for justification it is no more than half a loaf. Even so, half a loaf is better than none; a negative justification is still preferable to no justification at all.

Aron rejects the temptation to avoid the moral problem of reason of state in the nuclear age by denying the presuppositions without which this problem is no longer meaningful. Despite the general limitations that always condition diplomatic-strategic conduct, and the particular conditions that restrict this conduct today, it is not necessity as such but a moral imperative that binds the statesman and directs his actions. At the same time, Aron rejects the current view that force has lost its utility as an instrument of foreign policy, as well as the view that even if force has not lost its utility its threat or initiation ought nevertheless to be condemned because of the expected consequences of its employment. Of course, if force has lost its utility, its condemnation on moral grounds appears superfluous. If in the pursuit of their interests states need no longer choose between peaceful methods of persuasion and force, what remains is evidently not a moral issue at all but a task of adjusting to an environment in which certain behavior is no longer a rational or expedient means for securing the ends men desire. But the experience of the past fifteen years has not invalidated the venerable rule that, in the relations of states, change rarely occurs save through the threat or use of force. Nor has this experience demonstrated that states need no longer rely on force in order to preserve interests deemed vital. Where change has occurred it has almost invariably been attended by the threat, if not the actual use, of force. Where force has been neither employed nor seriously threatened on behalf of interests challenged by others, such interests

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have been preserved, if at all, only with great difficulty. In the light of this experience it borders on the absurd to contend, though an increasing number of observers do so contend, that force has lost its utility as an instrument of statecraft. If anything, the erosion of conditions which in the nineteenth century often permitted force to play a modest and unobtrusive role has instead given rise to a world in which force has assumed a role and significance it seldom before possessed.[19]

It is another matter to insist that even if force has not lost its utility as an instrument of statecraft, its threat or initiation ought nevertheless to be condemned. But apart from the expectation of war's destructiveness the moral argument would remain—save for the pacifist—as inconclusive as ever. Force has always been subject to abuse, given the circumstances in which it is employed in international society. These circumstances ensure only the triumph of the stronger over the weaker; they do not ensure that force will be employed as an instrument of order, let alone of justice. Yet it is precisely these same circumstances that also provide the principal justification of force.[20] The general condemnation of force accordingly remains inconclusive in the absence of the further demonstration that the moral risks incurred by the employment of force must of necessity prove greater than the risks incurred by the abstention from force. A persuasive demonstration to this effect, Aron argues, has yet to be made. To condemn the resort to force, irrespective of purpose and of consequence, is not to express a compelling moral truth even in the nuclear age. Nor is this all. If Aron

[19] It is, of course, the besetting sin of those who argue that force has lost its utility that they insist upon evaluating the significance of military power largely in terms of its virtually uncontrolled use. The conclusion of the argument therefore appears foreordained. But alter the assumption on which the argument proceeds—consider the functions served by military power so long as it is not overtly employed or employed only with restraint—and precisely the opposite conclusion may be drawn.

[20] Thus: ". . . il est difficile de condamner, moralement ou historiquement, l'initiative du recours à la force pour deux raisons: cette initiative peut être le seul moyen de prévenir une attaque, à échéance mortelle; aucun tribunal, jugeant en équité, n'est en mesure de dire quels changements pacifiques s'imposent et d'imposer le respect de ces décisions" (p. 571). [" . . . it is difficult to condemn morally or historically the initial recourse to force for two reasons: this initiative may be the only means of preventing a possibly mortal attack; no tribunal, judging in equity, is in a position to say what peaceful changes are imperative and to guarantee the acceptance of these decisions."] There is, however, the other side of the coin. Those who argue for the increasing restriction on the recourse to force need not reject Aron's argument. They may simply maintain that the circumstances marking the use of force in international society imply that *on the whole* force is more apt to lead to injustice than to justice and for this reason the initiation of force ought to be generally condemned. If this argument is not compelling, it is not easily refuted. At any rate, Aron gives less than adequate attention to it.

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refuses to condemn the initiation of force, irrespective of purpose and consequence, he also refuses to condemn any particular means employed in war, irrespective of purpose and consequence. Thus, in considering the act of deliberately destroying a city in war, he writes: "Je ne me dissimule pas les risques de ce moyen, mais il n'y a pas de jugement éthique possible, abstraction faite des circonstances historiques. Toutes les actions de guerre étant à notre époque destructrices, une action brutale, qui amenerait la capitulation rapide d'un aggresseur, serait éventuellement justifiable" (p. 599).[21]

Aron's position with respect to "le problème machiavélien" is, in substance, Machiavelli's position. To say this is not to say that Aron is a Machiavellian. It is simply to say that Aron refuses to acknowledge any clear limitations on the means states may legitimately employ regardless of circumstance. Whether one accepts or rejects this position, there should be no doubt over its central implication. Its acceptance affords in principle a justification for any and all measures deemed essential to the preservation and continuity of the state. It is important that this conclusion not be obscured by general prescriptions which, though they do not essentially alter the argument, operate to soften its impact. Thus the motto of *Paix et Guerre*, to which Aron refers on several occasions, is the statement of Montesquieu: "Le droit des gens est naturellement fondé sur ce principe: que les diverses nations doivent se faire, dans la paix, le plus de bien, et, dans la guerre, le moins de mal qu'il est possible, sans nuire à leurs véritables intérêts."[22] It is difficult to take exception to this sentiment. Still, it does not tell us a great deal about what means states may legitimately employ and what means ought to be condemned. Very nearly the same must be said of Aron's insistence upon prudence as the supreme virtue of the statesman. To be prudent, he writes, "c'est agir en fonction de la conjoncture singulière et des données concrètes, non par esprit de système ou par obéissance passive à une norme ou à une pseudo-norme, c'est préférer la limitation de la violence au châtiment du prétendu coupable ou à

[21] ["I do not dissimulate the risks of this means, but there is no ethical judgment possible without taking into account historical circumstances. All acts of war today being destructive, a brutal action which would bring a quick capitulation of an aggressor might conceivably be justified."] Elsewhere, Aron declares: ". . . le jugement *éthique* sur les conduites diplomatico-stratégiques n'est pas séparable du jugement *historique* sur les buts des acteurs et les conséquences de leur succès ou de leur échec" (p. 592). [". . . *ethical* judgment on diplomatic strategic conduct is inseparable from *historical* judgment on the aims of the actors and the consequences of their success or failure."]

[22] ["The law of nations is naturally founded on this principle: that the several nations should try, in peace, to do each other the most good, and, in war, the least harm, without injuring their true interests."]

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une justice dite absolue, c'est se donner des objectifs concrets, accessibles, conformes à la loi séculaire des relations internationales et non des objectifs illimités et peut-être dépourvus de signification . . ." (p. 572).[23] If prudence is an indispensable virtue, one may still question the assertion that it is the supreme virtue of the statesman. But whether one questions the assertion or not, it is clear that the injunction to be prudent is of itself no real solution to "le problème machiavélien." Nor does Aron's "la morale de la sagesse" succeed in resolving what prudence fails to resolve. This morality of wisdom is little more than a restatement in somewhat different terms of the norm of prudence.[24]

Does the prospect of a war fought with thermonuclear weapons transform the nature of the moral problem by virtue of a transformation in the nature of war itself? "La guerre thermonucléaire pose-t-elle au moraliste un problème différent en nature de celui que posaient les guerres dites classiques" (p. 597)?[25] If the prospect of thermonuclear war does raise novel moral issues, it does so not because the arguments that may be employed to justify nuclear force differ essentially from the arguments that have been employed to justify force in the past, but because these traditional arguments can no longer be employed with any degree of assurance. And they can no longer be employed with any degree of assurance primarily because of the sheer destructiveness a thermonuclear war is expected to entail. The view, therefore, that the justification of nuclear force does not and cannot differ in

[23] ". . . is to act in accordance with the particular contingency and the concrete givens, not to be enslaved by logic or by passive obedience to a norm or pseudo-norm; it is to prefer the limitation of violence to the punishment of the allegedly guilty or to a supposedly absolute justice; it is to set for oneself concrete and accessible objectives which conform to the secular law of international relations rather than limitless goals which are apt to be devoid of all significance. . . ."

[24] Thus: "La seule morale qui dépasse la morale du combat et la morale de la loi est ce que j'appellerai la morale de la sagesse qui s'efforce non seulement de considérer chaque cas en ses particularités concrètes, mais aussi de ne méconnaître aucun des arguments de principe et d'opportunité, de n'oublier ni le rapport des forces ni les volontés des peuples" (p. 596). ["The only morality superior to the morality of combat and to the morality of law is what I should call the morality of wisdom, which attempts to consider each case on its concrete merits, without ignoring any of the arguments of principle and of opportunity, or forgetting either the relationship of forces or the desires of peoples."] Aron declares that if this morality does not resolve the antinomies of diplomatic-strategic action, it does require the statesman to find in each case the most acceptable compromise (". . . elle s'efforce de trouver en chaque cas le compromis le plus acceptable"). This contention amounts either to a rather empty truism—the most acceptable solution to a conflict is obviously that solution which best satisfies the aspirations of the contestants—or to the altogether problematic view that an acceptable compromise is always possible, if only by splitting differences down the middle. There is no reason to assume that Aron accepts the latter view.

[25] ["Does thermonuclear war pose for the moralist a problem different in nature from that posed by the so-called conventional wars?"]

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substance from the justification of conventional forms of violence, that the normative standards applied to judge the one must be equally applicable in judging the other, and that nuclear force simply represents a new quantitative dimension in the application of these perennial standards, is as true as it is irrelevant to the claim that nuclear conflict does raise novel moral issues. For the novelty of these issues, and the difficulty of justifying the use of nuclear weapons, is not to be found in the criteria which presumably continue to afford a basis for moral judgment. That novelty must instead be found in the disparity between these criteria and the consequences expected to attend the employment of nuclear weapons. Nor would this disparity even arise were it not for the fact that the criteria affording the basis for moral judgment are at some point vitally dependent upon, and made meaningful by, quantitative considerations. The essential novelty of the moral issues posed by nuclear weapons is as simple then as it is profound. In introducing a new quantitative dimension into the conduct of war, nuclear weapons take the issues that force has always raised and threaten to carry them to an extreme.

But if the prospect of thermonuclear war does raise novel moral issues, it does not follow that men's response to these issues will prove equally novel. The justifications that have been invoked when threatening force, including nuclear force, bear an essential similarity, when stripped of their purely verbal innovations, to the principal justifications men have invoked in the past in threatening force. It is the state's independence and survival that continue to provide the principal justification of force, that continue to provide the residual "necessity" justifying the use of any means.[26] This continuity with the past is largely obscured by the one response that does deserve the mark of novelty. The novelty of that response, however, must be found precisely in the degree to which the possibility of thermonuclear war is denied—if not explicitly, then at least by implication. If the idea of deterrence as such is as old as the history of human conflict, the functions that strategies of nuclear deterrence are expected to serve and

[26] Nor is there any novelty in the contention that it is not the state as such, or even an alliance of states, in the defense of which any and all means must be employed, but those values the state serves to protect. This contention has always formed part and parcel of the argument of necessity or reason of state. But what is its practical significance so long as the state remains the indispensable institution for the protection of these values? Might the state not just as well be the end of action? The insistent appeal to individual and to cultural values does not essentially alter the nature of the justification men invoke today in threatening force as compared with the past. Besides, the attempt to reduce the state to a mere means has always had, and continues to have, an ideological ring, even when employed by democratic statesmen.

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the consequent expectations these strategies have elicited are as novel as the weapons on which nuclear deterrence rests. If deterrence in the nuclear age is in truth something new under the sun, it is because of the scope and intensity of the expectations deterrent strategies have called forth. Given these expectations, what would otherwise appear as a series of almost inexplicably inconsistent convictions instead take on the appearance of a simple and compelling consistency. A willingness to endorse a deterrent strategy, but a profound reluctance even to consider—let alone to make serious preparation for—the possible consequences of a thermonuclear war; a readiness to employ the threat of thermonuclear violence to preserve interests deemed vital, but an insistence that there can be no victor in a thermonuclear war; a belief in the moral rectitude of a deterrent strategy, but a pervading skepticism that the use of thermonuclear weapons could ever be justified; these and still other convictions are resolved into a consistent pattern only if the expectations placed in a deterrent strategy are sufficiently strong. With sufficient faith in the efficacy of deterrence, there is no need for men to torture themselves over the possible justification for ever employing nuclear weapons; the issues arising from the use of nuclear weapons deal with a contingency that for all practical purposes has been excluded from their view of the future.

It is only if this faith in the effectiveness of deterrence is seriously questioned that issues men believed they had successfully exorcized reappear. It is only if thermonuclear war is once acknowledged as a not too finite possibility that we are compelled to ask those questions men have asked themselves in the past. Yet it is a measure of the intractability of the moral issues raised by this possibility that as forthright an observer as Aron is less than direct in discussing them. Aron observes that "la puissance des armes thermonucléaires est telle qu'en changeant l'échelle des destructions, elle change aussi, éventuellement, la nature morale de la guerre" (p. 601).[27] It suffices to eliminate the influence of this quantitative change by an appropriate strategy, he goes on to argue, in order for the novelty of the moral problem to disappear. It goes without saying that the less the likelihood that nuclear weapons will ever be employed, and the less the likelihood that if once

[27] ["The power of nuclear weapons is such that by changing the scale of destruction, it also possibly changes the moral nature of war."] Even in this statement, however, there is the qualifying word "possibly." Is this point reached only when thermonuclear war can result in the extermination of humanity, or at least in the extermination of the belligerents? Is a thermonuclear war which falls short of these extreme limits one the moral nature of which may retain a continuity with the past? Aron is less than clear in this respect, though the implication of his discussion is to insist on a continuity—however tenuous—with the past.

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employed they will be employed without restraint, the less intractable appear the moral issues attending deterrent strategies. But for those who do not share the above-mentioned faith in the effectiveness of deterrence—and Aron is no true believer—it borders on the misleading to speculate about the eventual disappearance of these issues by virtue of the adoption of an appropriate strategy. For the present, at least, such a strategy is non-existent. Certainly the strategy Aron urges does not preclude the possibility of thermonuclear war, including a thermonuclear war that is fought without substantial restraint. Similarly, while Aron's criticisms of the arguments put forth by Bertrand Russell are on the whole well taken, it is evasive to write that "la menace monstrueuse de ravager les villes ou de tuer des millions d'êtres humains innocents . . . n'est moralement justifiable qu'à la condition d'être une menace suprême, chacun s'efforçant de créer des conditions telles qu'elle n'aura jamais à être mise à exécution" (p. 610).[28] Unfortunately, the present state of the art does not permit the creation of such conditions. Nor do we have much reason for believing that the requisite conditions can be created in the foreseeable future.

It will not do, then, to respond to the moral issues that the prospect of employing thermonuclear weapons raises by urging the creation of conditions in which "la menace monstrueuse" will never have to be put into execution. For those who do not share an unbounded faith in the effectiveness of deterrent strategies, the justification of these strategies is not, and cannot be, simply a matter of justifying a threat of force. Nor is it solely a matter of comparing the certain evils of a thermonuclear monopoly held by the Soviets with the possible disasters resulting from the breakdown of mutual deterrence. At some point, the problem of justifying the use of thermonuclear weapons must be considered in its own terms. Aron appreciates this, though it is hardly surprising that he does not relish the task of justifying the possible use of thermonuclear weapons. Nevertheless, he declares that there are still circumstances in which nuclear war may remain the preferable choice. "Il n'est pas besoin d'évoquer la mise à mort industrielle de six millions de Juifs pour conclure que *le coût de l'asservissement, pour un peuple et une culture, peut être plus élevé que le coût de la guerre, même de la guerre atomique*" (p. 617).[29] Nuclear weapons have car-

[28] ["The monstrous threat of annihilating cities or of killing millions of innocent human beings . . . is not morally justified except when it constitutes a supreme threat, with everyone trying to create such conditions that it will never have to be carried out."]

[29] ["There is no need to recall the wholesale killing of six million Jews to conclude that, for a people and a culture, *the cost of subservience can be higher than the cost of war, even of an atomic war.*"]

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ried "le problème machiavélien" almost to its extreme expression. Even so, Aron will not concede that this extreme expression has transformed the nature of the moral problem traditionally posed by diplomatic-strategic action."[30]

No one can be very content with this conclusion. But what is the alternative? Once thermonuclear war is consciously acknowledged as a historical possibility we are compelled to ask those questions, political and moral, that force has always raised. If the questions themselves hardly seem relevant when applied to the prospect of thermonuclear war, it is not surprising that men's responses to those questions have also been found wanting. Nevertheless, the conviction persists that man's scientific and technical achievements will somehow be matched by his political and moral achievements, that a technical breakthrough in the means of destruction will call forth a political and moral breakthrough in the means of conflict resolution. This conviction ignores the rather obvious possibility that only a very limited number of responses can be made to the dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons and that none of these responses appears very satisfactory; at least, none holds out the promise of resolving these dilemmas while avoiding what most men would still regard as an intolerable sacrifice.[31]

If "le problème machiavélien" has been brought to its extreme expression, it does not follow that "le problème kantien" is any nearer solution today than it was in an earlier and more benign age. Indeed, Aron argues, and persuasively so, that in a number of respects we seem farther from a solution of the latter problem than were our nineteenth-century predecessors. The advent of nuclear technology, an increasing measure of economic and technical interdependence, the emergence of a universal diplomatic system, and the growth of the

[30] Must we conclude that technology has made men worse? The answer will evidently depend upon what we mean by "worse." If we mean a conscious and deliberate rejection of pity, it may be argued that men are no worse today than in an earlier era. Thus Aron declares: "La grande guerre serait plus terrible qu'à toute autre époque non parce que les hommes sont pires, mais parce qu'ils sont plus savants" (p. 767). ["The great war would be more terrible than any previous war, not because men are worse, but because they know more."] On the other hand, if moral judgment is based on the objective consequences of behavior rather than on the conscious rejection of pity, or a personal inclination to kill, we may conclude that men are worse—or may be worse—precisely because they do "know more."

[31] Nor, we must add, is the failure to resolve the political and moral issues posed by nuclear weapons necessarily a mark of their complexity, any more than the successful resolution of scientific problems is necessarily a mark of their simplicity. However congenial the assumption that equates the apparently insoluble with the complex, it rests at bottom on a confusion of understanding and will. The failure to resolve satisfactorily political and moral issues may only indicate that these issues, though they may be encompassed by man's reason, are nonetheless impossible to resolve by his will.

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belief that all men form a greater community superior to their particular communities, provide the commonplaces in support of the view that we stand today on the threshold of an era of universal peace. The nation-state has become, on this view, an obsolescent form of social organization; "sovereignty" and "independence" have been reduced to empty fictions. Against these "facts," however, must be set the marked heterogeneity of the present system, the intensity of the conflicts that mark state relations, the steady growth in the functions of the state, the nationalization of culture, and the impotence of the "human conscience" when set against the "national conscience."[32] We have some evidence for believing that man's present capacity for destruction will prompt him to exercise an increasing measure of prudence, but we have as yet almost no evidence to support the conclusion that this capacity will move him to abandon the threat or use of force. Nor do we have any substantive reason for believing that an era of universal history will give rise to "universal minds" capable of rising above partial interests and considering those of mankind as a whole. To the extent that this belief rests on the assumption that universal solutions are imposed by the present interdependence of peoples, it is simply unfounded. Prosperity, Aron remarks, is still no more indivisible than peace.[33] To the extent that this belief rests on the assumption that men ought to consider the interests of humanity before they consider the interests of their particular group, it runs athwart the fact that the overwhelming majority of men still do not do so and that the statesman cannot do so. Finally, in a world in which the nation-state is almost everywhere triumphant—if not as a reality, then as an aspiration—it is idle to tell us that this form of social order has become obsolescent.

The present prospects for transcending "la politique de puissance" and of inaugurating a period of universal peace are, Aron therefore

[32] Or, if not the "national conscience," the conscience of another group that remains less than universal. "La dévalorisation des unités nationales, sur laquelle quelques observateurs mettent l'accent, ne marque pas un affaiblissement de la conscience tribale au profit de la conscience humaine, mais un affaiblissement d'une sorte de conscience tribale au profit d'une autre sorte" (p. 739). ["The devaluation of national entities, which several observers emphasize, does not imply a weakening of the tribal conscience in favor of a human conscience, but a weakening of one kind of tribal conscience in favor of another."] Even so, the events of recent years indicate that it is still the "national conscience," rather than the conscience of a larger grouping, that remains predominant.

[33] "La misère des masses indiennes ne compromet pas le bien-être de l'Européen ou de l'Américain moyen. Le bien-être de l'un n'est pas la cause de la misère de l'autre" (p. 734). ["The misery of the Indian masses does not result from the well-being of the average European or American. The well-being of the one is not the cause of the misery of the other."]

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concludes, modest to the point of being negligible. Schemes for universal peace must be addressed primarily to the fundamental situation in which states find themselves rather than to the particular character or aims of the actors. It is the "state of nature," and the consequent claim of those who live in this condition to make justice for themselves, that must be overcome, whether through an effective system of international law, a world federation of states, or a world empire. In a somewhat labored examination of the theme of world peace through world law, Aron reviews the obvious defects of international law as a system of law and indicates the equally obvious changes that would have to be made in order that this system provide a degree of order and security comparable to the order and security characteristic of national legal orders. In the place of a system dominated by the institution of self-help, there would have to be substituted a system in which states were obliged to submit their disputes to third-party settlement and in which they no longer possessed either the right or the means to make justice for themselves.[34] Such a radical change from the present system, if it is to take place peacefully, presupposes conditions that have never existed in the past, do not exist today, and offer little, if any, prospect of materializing in the foreseeable future. Moreover, schemes that have been euphemistically described as dealing *only* with the "limited field of war prevention"[35] cannot stop short of prescribing institutional changes which, if such changes are to serve effectively the central purpose for which they are designed, are tantamount to the creation of a world federation. "La voie de la Fédération planétaire est la même que celle de la paix par le droit" (p. 738).[36] The effective displacement of the institution of self-help cannot meaningfully be considered as a modification of the present system. Even though it were to take place peacefully, it would represent a revolutionary transformation of this system. Aron concludes that the abandonment of the present system "sera vainement réclamé par les hommes de bonne volonté aussi longtemps que ne se seront pas développées, entre les membres de la société planétaire, des relations

[34] Whatever position one may take with respect to the "right" that states presently possess to make justice for themselves, it is at least essential to distinguish between their right in law to employ force and their retention of the means to employ force. If the Charter and antecedent instruments have restricted the former, they certainly have not restricted the latter. Aron believes, or rather he simply decrees, that the law has succeeded in doing neither. This position must be questioned, despite the admitted uncertainty that attends the Charter's provisions respecting the use of force.

[35] See, e.g., Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

[36] ["The way of a planetary federation is the same as that of peace through law."]

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comparables à celles qui lient entre eux les membres—individus ou groupes—de chaque société nationale: conscience de communauté, consentement à un *régime*, juridique et politique, monopole de la force armée" (p. 738).[37]

Ultimately, speculation on the prospects for universal peace through world federation must go beyond these considerations. In discussing the political conditions required for federation we are of necessity forced to rely on past experience. But is such experience as we possess relevant once we consider the problem of world federation? Aron points out that federation in the past, as well as in the present, has never signified more than a change of form of the "conscience tribale"; federation where successful has represented a "changement d'échelle, à l'intérieur d'une histoire dont la nature demeure la même" (p. 583).[38] A world federation, on the other hand, would signify the abandonment of the "conscience tribale"; it would therefore represent "une conversion *de* l'histoire." Is such a conversion possible, if only in principle, or is it contrary to the nature of man to conceive of a world without violence, of a society without enemies? A positive response would be "un pari sur une conversion de l'espèce humaine" (p. 741).[39] A negative response must condemn the world either to war without end or to an imposed world empire. Characteristically, the issue, once raised, is left in doubt. This final note of uncertainty is altogether in keeping with an outlook which "confirme l'imperfection de tous les ordres sociaux, avoue l'impossibilité de connaître l'avenir, condamne la vaine prétention de dessiner le schème d'une société idéale" (p. 742).[40]

[37] [". . . will remain a futile aspiration of men of good will as long as there is not developed, among the members of the world society, relations comparable to those which bind the members—individuals or groups—of each national society: consciousness of community, consent to a *form of government*, legal and political, monopoly of armed force."]

[38] [". . . a change of scale within history, the nature of which remains the same."]

[39] [". . . a wager on the conversion of mankind."]

[40] [". . . insists on the imperfection of all social orders, avows the impossibility of knowing the future, condemns the vain pretension of drafting the blueprint for an ideal society."]

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OLD REALITIES AND NEW MYTHS*

By MORTON A. KAPLAN

J. W. Fulbright, *Old Myths and New Realities, and Other Commentaries*, New York, Random House (A Vintage Book), 1964, 147 pp. $1.45.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S recent excursion into the analysis of foreign policy has been hailed as a breath of fresh air that sweeps away the cobwebs of cant and misunderstanding. The history of postwar foreign policy explains why such a study is needed. The inspiring successes and inventive genius of the first Truman Administration—an era unparalleled in American history for resourceful and courageous adaptation to changing circumstances—have been succeeded by disarray and confusion in American foreign policy. Both the early postwar stereotypes and the grand design of policy are breaking down. Thus the Senator's objective—an objective of unmasking old myths and clarifying new realities—is necessary and salutary.

But has the Senator reached his goal or has he rather obscured old realities and created new myths? Has he clarified the failings of our foreign policy since 1950 or is he preparing the way for the mistakes of the late 1960's? Has he analyzed the mistaken assumptions, the lost opportunities, and the changed contours of the problems or has he compounded the set of errors? Has he exorcised true myths or instead ghosts—pale reflections of positions that have been rejected for a decade? Has he correctly outlined the differences between the foreign policies of Stalin and Khrushchev or has his analysis falsified both positions? Has Senator Fulbright's use of social science produced deeper understanding of the problems of statecraft or has it produced misleading oversimplifications and erroneous generalizations?

Matters that are very important and also very complex, such as international politics, naturally produce passionate dispute. One therefore often wants to write circumspectly in order to lower the fever of the debaters. There is also a proper role for the deliberately controversial piece. This is sometimes an important means for forcing re-examination of beliefs that are very deeply held. Senator Fulbright's book essays such a role. So does this review article.

* An early draft of this review article was circulated as a discussion paper at the Hudson Institute. Discussion papers are written at the initiative of the author and are not subject to review. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Hudson Institute.

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I

All political structures require myths in order to operate. These myths provide unity and direction in a disorderly world. Thus the myth of the monolithic nature of the Soviet bloc and of the imminent danger of a premeditated and unprovoked Soviet attack in the West, although factually inaccurate even for the 1947-1950 period, did serve the purpose of mobilizing energies for the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO.

No doubt the myth structure had dysfunctional consequences, even during this early period. It fostered a premature effort to achieve German rearmament—an effort that probably delayed German rearmament and that would not in any event have produced German forces during the putative crucial period. It undoubtedly was responsible for other blunders of a more serious nature during the Korean War. Its functional aspects, however, outweighed the dysfunctional in the period up to Korea. The excessive rigidity of the myth and the requirement for policies not completely in harmony with it after this period called for a re-evaluation.

A number of students of international politics were alert to the problem. This reviewer included in his first professional paper in 1952 the caution that more than one interpretation of Soviet policy was possible and that Soviet policy might change in important ways after "an old and sick man dies."[1] But even John Foster Dulles, rigid as he was in his policies, had some understanding of the myth of monolithicity. By 1954 (and in some cases earlier) most officials of the United States government had learned that the Soviet bloc was not monolithic and that the threat of Soviet attack was quite hypothetical. They did not, however, respond appropriately to the recovery of Western Europe, to the growing strains (as opposed to mere lack of monolithicity) in the Soviet bloc and in NATO, and to the consequences of nuclear military weapons, particularly after the Soviet system also had such weapons. These developments produced alliance difficulties which Senator Fulbright apparently still does not understand and which he attributes to a greater extent than is reasonable to the real—and unfortunate—foibles of General de Gaulle. We will return to this subject, but first we must turn to the analysis which Senator Fulbright makes of the changed Soviet system and of other world problems and to the conclusions he draws.

[1] "An Introduction to the Strategy of Statecraft," *World Politics*, IV (July 1952), 570.

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II

Senator Fulbright states that the Soviet world is hostile to the United States but that the nature of its threat has changed radically: "It has shown a new willingness to enter mutually advantageous arrangements with the West and, thus far at least, to honor them. It has therefore become possible . . . to deal with the Soviet Union, for certain purposes, as a normal state with normal and traditional interests. . . . How the Soviet Union organizes its internal life, the gods and doctrines that it worships, are matters for the Soviet Union to determine. It is not Communist dogma as espoused within Russia but Communist imperialism that threatens us and other peoples of the non-Communist world" (pp. 9-10).

Senator Fulbright here certifies the myth of the contrast between Stalin and Khrushchev (as elsewhere he certifies Khrushchev's myth concerning China). It is true that Stalin had greater control over bloc affairs than Khrushchev had and that this permitted Stalin to follow some lines of policy that were not available to Khrushchev. But it is not true that Stalin's policy was one of utter and implacable hostility to the non-Soviet world or that Khrushchev's policy was one of wholehearted accommodation. Senator Fulbright noted in an earlier book that Stalin was not incautious, as was Hitler.[2] Indeed, one might argue that Stalin showed greater caution in foreign policy than Khrushchev. Stalin rejected the opportunity to support Yugoslavia over Trieste. He was far from enthusiastic about the Greek civil war, which was supported largely by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Until the Communists were thrown out of the French and Italian governments in 1947, they were under instructions to hold down strikes in order to facilitate economic recovery. The claims of Soviet support for a Communist takeover in China are apparently mythological. Stalin did support the Korean War and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. But these were proxy operations. Khrushchev put down the Hungarian revolution by the direct use of Soviet armed forces and he put Soviet nuclear missiles and Soviet crews into Cuba ninety miles off U.S. shores. Stalin, on the other hand, denounced Yugoslav and Bulgarian plans to recognize the Greek rebels as a Comsomolist preventive war policy. And, as for the keeping of treaties, were any treaties more abjectly kept than was the Nazi-Soviet Pact by Stalin? As for the support of national democratic revolutions, as opposed to Communist revolutions, had not

[2] J. William Fulbright, *Prospects for the West* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 8.

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both Lenin and Stalin supported such revolutions in Asia, particularly in China?

The myth of the contrast between Stalin and Khrushchev with respect to foreign policy is one of the most pervasive in American politics today. And it receives full support from Fulbright. On the other hand, none of the examples of Soviet moderation, either under Stalin or under Khrushchev, establishes the "normality" of the Soviet state. Undoubtedly real states have never conformed exactly to the concept of the normal state. There are too many economic, social, and political organizations or systems that cut across national boundaries. But in a world in which virtually all differences are differences of degree, the number of degrees can assume crucial importance. The difference between the Soviet Union and the "normal" state lies only partly in Communist ideology (which under Stalin, Khrushchev, and Mao did and still does involve the "burial" of democracy). To a greater extent, it lies in the nature of Soviet political organization which provides the means for the implementation of Communist doctrine and Communist state objectives. The Communist parties in other nations have in the past constituted organizations responsive to directives from Moscow in ways that impeded normal diplomatic processes. These organizations made more difficult concerted action against Soviet expansive actions, made easier Soviet pursuit of diplomatic objectives, and provided a cover for intervention in the internal affairs of other states. The existence of this type of apparatus created opportunities that would not otherwise have been present, and confronted "normal" states with weaknesses in their positions that otherwise it would not have been so important to guard against.

The existence of Communist China as an alternative center for communism undoubtedly complicates the picture of an organized bloc directed, if not ordered, from a single center. Even so, world politics today cannot be understood without an understanding of communism and Communist organization. For instance, it is just as wrong to regard the Viet Cong merely as a local uprising—a new myth perhaps—as it is to view the Viet Cong merely as the product of an international Communist conspiracy, whether spawned in North Vietnam, China, or Moscow. To assert that Russia can be treated as a normal state, for the reasons which Senator Fulbright gives, is to obscure important aspects of the nature of current world politics and to sponsor a countermyth.

It is worth remembering that the three great threats to the stability of world order in modern times—Napoleon, Hitler, and communism—

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have represented revolutionary rejections of the existing state structure and have utilized groups within other nations in support of their objectives. It was not mere expansionism—dangerous as that might have been—but expansionism combined with ideology and, in the case of nazism and communism, party organization that built the threat to its most serious dimensions. Of the three, the Communist threat possesses the best organization and the most attractive ideology. If the Soviet bloc continues to weaken and if communism is transformed, the threat may be mitigated. But it likely will not be eliminated. And present trends may be halted or even reversed.

Despite Senator Fulbright's endorsement, George Kennan's thesis concerning the possibility that United States policy can affect the liberalization of the Soviet bloc is dubious. According to Kennan, "It could well be argued . . . that if the major Western powers had full freedom of movement in devising their own policies, it would be within their power to determine whether the Chinese view, or the Soviet view, or perhaps a view more liberal than either, would ultimately prevail within the Communist camp."[3] This analysis raises more questions than it answers. The lion's share of American aid within the Soviet bloc since 1956—aid that has been justified as a support for liberalization and autonomy—has gone to Poland, which, of all the Russian satellites, has backslid most since 1956 in terms of internal freedoms and autonomy. Hungary and Rumania have been virtually ostracized by the United States until recently. Yet these two nations have made the greatest advances since 1956 in liberalization and autonomy. Perhaps American aid prevented even greater backsliding in Poland. But it seems more likely that the commitment of the United States to the Gomulka regime disarmed the internal opposition and stifled the incentives for changes which, in terms of American values and interests, would have been highly desirable. It is striking that the Senator quotes Mr. Kennan's comment when, to the extent that there is any evidence, it would appear to support the opposite point of view. Here the Senator supports one of the State Department's new myths—a myth that lacks the functional values which the old myths did support.

In principle it would be possible to find a path among the strains of the Communist bloc and to structure a policy that advanced American interests by discriminating among the Communist nations. It is difficult, however, for one who has watched the divagations of the

[3] George Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XLII (January 1964), 178; quoted in *Old Myths and New Realities*, 13.

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State Department to have any confidence in its attempts to do so. Nor do the leakings of incidental intelligence from the State Department concerning its image of the Communist world lessen the fears of the external observer.

The Department of State and Senator Fulbright have bought Khrushchev's myth of the great changes in Soviet foreign policy since Stalin. This myth invokes a picture of Khrushchev as more moderate and of Stalin as less moderate than either actually was. Khrushchev also sold to the United States his myth concerning the contrast between the peaceful Russians and the war-mongering Chinese. (Undoubtedly it was the boldness of Chinese attacks on Hong Kong, Macao, Quemoy, and Matsu that led us to accept this point of view.) Another aspect of this myth—one to which Senator Fulbright subscribes—is that the Chinese advocate the reckless use of nuclear weapons (p. 57). Yet, as the Chinese have pointed out, it was Mr. Khrushchev who was reckless. The Chinese have said: "We have always maintained that socialist countries must not use nuclear weapons to support the peoples' wars of national liberation and revolutionary civil wars. . . . A socialist country absolutely must not be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor should it in any circumstances play with them or engage in nuclear blackmail and nuclear gambling. . . ."[4]

At least Senator Fulbright does not seem to subscribe to the emanations from some sources in Foggy Bottom that the United States and the Soviet Union will reach an accommodation that will enable them jointly to stem the aggressive designs of the Communist Chinese. Could any myth be better designed than this one to undermine American interests and values? Russia fronts on an area that is of urgent value to the United States. The skills, resources, and industry of Europe are such that the loss of the area to the Soviet Union would be a disaster. China does not front on any areas of reasonably comparable interest. Moreover, China diverts Russia from Europe. In addition, an alignment of the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union against China would produce a racial confrontation that might undermine the values that characterize our institutions. Even though this notion is still not official policy, it is nonetheless deeply disturbing to hear talk of a U.S.-Russian alignment against China.

[4] From *Jenmin Jih Pao*, November 19, 1963, as translated and published by the BBC Monitoring Service in *Summary of World Broadcasts: Part III, The Far East*, 2nd Series (November 20, 1963), C9-C11.

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Even where Senator Fulbright speaks sensibly of the possibility that the United States and China might eventually cooperate on some issues, he builds into this position the myth that the problems between the two nations stem from China's "implacable hostility toward the United States" (p. 38). Undoubtedly the Kremlin would like us to believe this, but why should we play into its hand? And where is the evidence for this hostility? Korea? We threatened legitimate Chinese national interests when we marched to the Yalu. Our disclaimers that China should not have regarded this as a threat would have been worthless even had our action in marching to the Yalu not repudiated earlier statements by the Secretary of State that our only objective in Korea was to restore the *status quo ante*. There was no excuse for this action on our part unless we intended to have a showdown with one or both of the Communist powers. Taiwan? Undoubtedly we have a moral commitment to the inhabitants of Taiwan not to surrender them to Communist tyranny. But since we cannot expect the Communists to admit that their regime is immoral, our position is weak on the basis of the more traditional criteria. India? The border region is ill-defined. Even where the Indians have a treaty claim, they undermined it themselves by the rationale of their attack on Goa. The Indians consistently refused peaceful negotiations. They engaged in deep military probes and were preparing an attack when the Chinese beat them to it. The Senator is right that we have nothing to gain now from recognition and much to lose, but why cloak this conclusion in false moralisms? It only confuses the real issue of international politics—namely, that specific interests may be incompatible. And it reinforces the myth that our problems stem from misunderstandings. They may instead stem from proper understanding.

Senator Fulbright thus structures a world in which the Russians show great moderation and the Chinese are reckless. He therefore finds it possible and desirable to achieve a general detente with the Russians, even if he does not advocate an alliance with the Russians against the Chinese. But has he really built his case properly? We have already considered many aspects of that case. We may now consider the final ingredients—ingredients which this time do exist but whose combination in a stew may not produce an edible dish. I agree with the Senator that it is unlikely that we can win the cold war completely or end it immediately and that good and evil are not absolutes. But I do not understand what relevance these comments have. Hitler was good to his dogs. One could even argue for some of his social policies. Genghis Khan undoubtedly had some redeeming features. No doubt

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St. Francis of Assisi had some very undesirable characteristics. Evil will never be eliminated from the world nor will good ever reign supreme. But not even Barry Goldwater wanted to unleash SAC against Moscow. And if a new Hitler had a big nuclear force, we undoubtedly would think twice about unconditional surrender.

Occasionally one gets a student in the classroom—never one of the best, although rarely one of the worst—who discovers that all nations behave selfishly and who therefore thinks that no interesting or important differences in national behavior can be articulated. On the continuum of national behavior there are significant differences. It makes good sense to recognize the Soviet system as an evil system. This does not mean that we must attempt to suppress the system by force. Even apart from the existence of nuclear forces, such an attempt might only unleash still greater evils. Surely, however, we are and ought to be hostile to the Soviet system and to its existence, just as we should be hostile to the evils of racism within our own system. Would not our policies be better adapted to their proper ends if we did recognize that each agreement with the Soviet system is strictly limited to some specific objective and that no purpose is or could be served by a general spirit of detente?

In addition, there is no significant evidence that a spirit of detente will in fact increase the probability that specific agreements will be reached and maintained in those areas where joint interests outweigh the detestation which the leaders of each system feel for the other. Would not Senator Fulbright's own recognition that American strategic superiority was a necessary element in the partial victory we won in the Cuban missile crisis (p. 5) imply that the Soviets do respond to hard realities and not to expressions of good will? And, although I distrust facile generalizations from history, does not the history of postwar negotiations with the Soviet Union indicate the same?

When Senator Fulbright speaks of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union as developing into a rudimentary parliamentary body (p. 58), he reinforces the new myths in a particularly dangerous way. The development of which he speaks might occur in the Soviet Union. To assert its plausibility on the basis of existing evidence is indefensible. The rarity of genuinely parliamentary regimes in the world, even where conditions are less unfavorable than in the Soviet Union, militates against this hypothesis. The least one would expect is an analysis of the micro-structure of Soviet society and political organs to indicate the factors that give plausibility to this type of develop-

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ment.[5] One would not like to think that major political orientations were based on superficial and fleeting analogies. The Wilsonian myths have long been discredited, and for reasons that are substantial.

Senator Fulbright undoubtedly makes some pertinent specific comments about the nature of the Soviet system, the changes in it, and the implications of these for world politics and American policy. These remarks are surrounded by other less cogent remarks in such a way that in effect a new myth is created—one in which the Soviet system withers away, the bloc disintegrates, the appetite of the Soviet Union diminishes, and it becomes little different from Britain or France. Culturally different perhaps, and a little more boorish, but essentially a member of the club. Although wishful thoughts sometimes come true, wishful thinking is not an adequate guide for policy.

As this review article is going to press, word has just come through of the purging of Khrushchev from the Soviet Russian leadership. This event, which caught official Washington by surprise, underscores the inadvisability of basing American policy upon the supposed attributes of particular Soviet leaders or upon inspired guesses concerning the future transformations that Soviet society and foreign policy are likely to undergo. This is so for three reasons. In the first place, the matter of the particular persons in charge of the Soviet Union may not be critical; that is, Soviet policy may not change in major ways or for the worse under the new leadership. In the second place, our policies may be largely irrelevant in influencing either change or stability in the Russian leadership. In the third place, we may be—and are likely to be—poorly informed concerning the alternatives. Although I do not believe we are likely to be so naïve as to credit information fed to us from Soviet sources as to the nature of internal Soviet quarrels (obviously such accounts serve multiple functions), we may become overcommitted to our own Kremlinological hypotheses.

It is much too early to evaluate the present shift in the Soviet high command. The new leadership is not yet consolidated and the struggle for control is likely to continue. Although the new leadership may be more effective in implementing Soviet policy than was the bumbling Khrushchev, we are less likely to be confronted with the kind of impulsive gambling that he engaged in. In any event, pragmatic policies based on specific coincidences of American and Soviet inter-

[5] For a cogent analysis which indicates the implausibility of this hypothesis, see Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 558-75.

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ests are likely to serve American interests better than a general commitment either to detente or to inflexible hostility. During the succession crisis of 1953, we may have missed an opportunity to negotiate the German question advantageously because of our commitment to inflexible hostility. It would be a shame if this time a commitment to detente made us so unwilling to disturb the new situation that we again failed to explore the negotiation space available to us.

III

Senator Fulbright attacks several other "myths" of U.S. foreign policy. "We Americans," the Senator says, "would do well to divest ourselves of the silly notion that the issue with Panama is a test of our courage and resolve. . . . It takes stubbornness but not courage to reject the entreaties of the weak" (pp. 18-19). If the Senator were merely saying that the United States can afford to be magnanimous in its treatment of Panama, I would not disagree with him. I favor revision of the treaty, increased benefits for Panama, and even a different type of regime for the administration of the Canal. Our past policy has been governed at least by inattention and perhaps also by pettiness and stupidity.

President Johnson, however, exercised sound judgment when he refused to "negotiate" a change of the treaty under pressure. For once, in recent years, the United States refused to quail when subjected to "blackmail" by a smaller power. And, in this instance, particularly, given the history of our past attitudes toward the Canal and the irresponsible statements of the Panamanian representatives, the failure to conform to a "stubborn" line, to use the Senator's word, probably would have had extremely unfortunate consequences elsewhere in the world.

For years the United States has paid blackmail to petty and unpopular dictators who have threatened us with the alternative of communism. We have played with the simple-minded notion that we can "buy off" Nasser and Sukarno with our largesse, not merely with respect to temporary expediencies, but with respect to long-term goals. Part of this policy has rested on the liberal myth that the troubles of the world stem not from incompatible goals but from mutual suspicions. Another part of it rests on characterological weakness and the inability to take a stand. This weakness was demonstrated for all the world to see when the Secretary-General of the United Nations made the outrageously false charge that we discriminated against Japan in

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the use of nuclear weapons, as contrasted with Germany, because Japan was a colored nation. The *New York Times* did not record even the weakest kind of official rebuttal, even by a lesser official, let alone by our chief representative to the UN.

On the other hand, I do not understand why we demanded that Bolivia break relations with Castro. I thought that we approved of the present Bolivian government. Since the breaking of relations with Castro by Bolivia does not weaken Castro's regime in any way, but may weaken the Bolivian regime, it would seem to have little to commend it.

Senator Fulbright, however, is dealing with a straw man when he attacks administration policy on Cuba. Of course, it is ridiculous to try to enforce a boycott in ways that we cannot enforce, that only antagonize allies, and that do not do much to hurt Castro. The real alternative, however, is not to remove those measures that do strain his regime and that put an extra burden on the Russians, but to support the exiles in ways that would further harass and weaken the regime.

Since Castro could not have taken over without at least tacit official support from the United States, we do have a moral obligation to the Cuban people to remove his tyrannical regime. The effective arguments against this course lie not in its impossibility in terms of resources but in the demonstrated incompetence of the United States when it comes to implementing programs of this sort. The Bay of Pigs episode demonstrated not only military incompetence and failure of will but also political ineptitude of an egregious nature. We did not have any good idea of what to do with Cuba after Castro was gone or we could not possibly have supported the Cubans we did. We could, if necessary, bring down the Castro regime today, using direct American military force, without risking a nuclear confrontation or political disaster in Latin America, if we possessed the requisite political skills. This undoubtedly would not solve our problems elsewhere in Latin America, but it might give us a respite which we could then utilize. In any event, however, we seem capable only of a policy of pinpricks which seems to satisfy our national ego but which produces little in the way of practical results and at a price which is unnecessarily high. And the opposition party seems only to desire to use the Marines to nursemaid the water taps.

Much the same kind of paralysis affects our Vietnamese policy. It was apparent for years that the Diem regime lacked the political skills to win the war against the guerrillas. It was and is also clear that no other regime can win that war unless the war is extended

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against the North. Even though much of the Viet Cong support is genuinely indigenous, so that perhaps it could not be halted by simple orders from the North, Viet Cong morale is sustained by the immunity of the Northern bastion. And the morale of the South is depressed by that same immunity. The present position is completely one-sided.

The fear that extension would merely unleash the North and the Chinese overlooks the difficulty the Chinese would have in intervening, the immense logistic advantages possessed by the United States, and the great reluctance of the North Vietnamese to encourage Chinese intervention. Such intervention would undermine Viet Minh autonomy and create the conditions under which a vigorous guerrilla war against the Viet Minh, utilizing the traditional techniques of such ventures, could be launched. If the United States is unwilling or unable to adopt a winning strategy, which should include the negotiation of definite and moderate political objectives, it might instead cut its losses by withdrawing. This is a less desirable policy, but it is better than the inept policy that is being pursued.

Indeed, one wonders if the present course can be called a policy at all. Whom did the Department of State believe it was fooling by sending General Taylor to Vietnam? Surely the Chinese were not deceived into believing that the sending of General Taylor heralded a potentially tougher policy, when it was transparent that he was sent only because the United States intended nothing that went farther than its current line. One is inclined to believe that the American response in Tonkin Gulf reflected the President's gut reaction, not State Department policy. This is reinforced by the almost unbelievable report in the *New York Times* that some officials recommended that the response be made by the South Vietnamese.[6]

IV

Senator Fulbright fails to understand the legitimate European concern about the nature of the American nuclear commitment. "It is," he says, "clearly understood in the United States that a successful Soviet attack on Europe would almost certainly be followed by an attack on the United States, and that even if it were not, the loss of Europe to the free world would leave the United States so weakened and isolated as to put its security, its economy, and probably its survival as a free society in the gravest jeopardy. Nor is it possible to imagine that the Russians would take the incredible risk of leaving the United

[6] James Reston, *New York Times* (August 6, 1964), 8: "One view was that the retaliation should be done by the South Vietnamese to minimize the risk."

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States out of the conflict with its forces intact and able to intervene whenever it chose" (p. 99). This position is a ritual incantation in Washington. And among the greatest of myths are ritual incantations.

Possibly if the Soviet Union struck Western Europe in a massive onslaught out of the blue, the American response would approach the certainty of which Senator Fulbright talks. This is perhaps the least plausible way in which a European conflict is likely to begin. Most observers believe it would start slowly, as the consequence of an unplanned incident, in which the equities and objectives of the states involved would be less than clear. We probably would have lots of time to overevaluate the equities on the Russian side and to consider the potential casualties on our own.

The Europeans are most familiar with very interesting public statements by our highest officials. At the hearing to consider his nomination as Secretary of State, Christian Herter said, "I cannot conceive of any President involving us in an all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly we are in danger of all-out devastation ourselves, or that actual moves have been made toward devastating ourselves."[7]

European qualms are increased by comments on the horrors of nuclear war. On July 26, 1963, President Kennedy asserted: "A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors—as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese—'The survivors would envy the dead.' For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors."[8]

President Kennedy may have overemphasized the likelihood that a nuclear exchange would escalate into a full-scale nuclear war. But if the President makes such a statement, are not Europeans right to fear that Americans may fear nuclear war even more than the loss of Europe? After all, the dangers of nuclear war would be clear and immediate. Those that Senator Fulbright speaks of are indirect and remote. It seems likely that some Americans would be inclined to use the escape clause Senator Fulbright elsewhere invoked: "Our commitment to the defense of Europe is absolute and irrevocable—so long

[7] Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Hearings on the Nomination of Christian A. Herter to be Secretary of State*, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, 9-10.

[8] J. F. Kennedy, "The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Step Toward Peace," *Department of State Bulletin*, XLIX (August 12, 1963), 236.

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as the critical decisions that led to war or peace are not removed beyond our influence or responsibility."[9] Might we not soon find that that was the case? Moreover, Europeans fear that we might object to military action in a situation that appeared vital to them, and consequently fear that we would then disclaim responsibility for action taken by them.

I do not disagree with Senator Fulbright's analysis of the value of Europe to the United States, although I believe he greatly overestimates the probability that a Soviet attack on Europe would necessarily be part of a plan to attack the United States. The threat to us would likely be indirect and would require great sophistication on the part of the public and high policy-makers for its understanding. The Senator is correct when he asserts that that threat would be to our way of life.

Shortly after Sputnik the American guarantee seemed to lose its effectiveness—thus anticipating military developments that had not yet taken place—and the Russian threat also seemed less imminent. Thus the incentives for independence of foreign policy and the development of independent nuclear systems seemed to increase. Many Americans—some of them most influential—began to welcome the latter development in this period. Since this seemed to me to be the wrong policy, I began to circulate in 1958 what I believe to have been the first proposal for a joint NATO nuclear force.[10] The proposal was presented to a conference at Princeton University in 1959. A Bowie-Knorr study group later incisively recommended to the Eisenhower Administration a joint NATO nuclear force based on Polaris submarines. This was followed by a somewhat similar Eisenhower Administration proposal for a NATO Polaris nuclear force which, although inadequate, was nonetheless desirable.

When the Kennedy Administration came into office, it was so thoroughly committed against nuclear diffusion that it pigeonholed the proposal for a NATO force. Only after it became clear that diffusion could not be prevented did it consider an alternative to national diffusion. Unfortunately, when it did consider alternatives, its proposals were gimmicks that attempted more to persuade than to cope with the legitimate problems that the European nations faced. Since the proposals were ineffective in satisfying the needs of the Europeans and were advanced by an administration that had shown hostility

[9] *Prospects for the West*, 60-61.

[10] Subsequently published in revised form under the title, "Problems of Coalition and Deterrence," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security* (Princeton 1959), 127-50.

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

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to the idea of a real NATO force, most Europeans viewed them as frauds. It is probable that the Germans have backed MLF not because they like it, but because they need American support and hope that present support for the United States may later produce American support for a nuclear force that the Germans can use in their vital interests. In addition, the clearly appropriate technical decision on Skybolt was implemented with peculiar political ineptitude at Nassau. NATO is still paying the penalty for these mistakes. Perhaps even the most sincere, adequate, and judiciously presented proposals would have been scuttled by de Gaulle. But the United States gave de Gaulle every excuse to follow his current policy.

The French force will soon confront the United States with a dilemma. It does not do so yet only because the force does not yet exist. Inspired stories from Washington to the effect that the French force will not be able to penetrate Soviet airspace either are inaccurate or the Soviets have much better low-level radar and anti-aircraft capabilities than we have. The trouble with the French force is that it is a first-strike force highly vulnerable to attack on the ground and therefore provocative. It cannot be integrated into a strategy of limited nuclear strikes. It may deter in all situations except the most provocative. But our nuclear force would be equally deterring for these situations, since the Russians would not run even a small chance of our nuclear intervention unless the provocation were gross. In the most provocative situations, however, the Russians might have to decide whether an attack on the French of such scope that it would eliminate the French force—an attack that would therefore produce large civilian casualties—would trigger the American force. Although the probability that they would attack the United States as a consequence of such a calculation may not be very high, it nonetheless may be higher than we want to risk. After all, we are building a controlled force because we do not want to run the risks involved in an uncontrolled force—even one that is much better than the French *force de frappe*. It would largely negate this policy for the United States to remain in NATO while the French possess the *force de frappe*. Even those who may think the problem somewhat less drastic must still recognize that it is very serious. The incentive for the United States to remove itself from NATO is reinforced by the fact that even if NATO were dissolved, the existence of an American nuclear force likely would deter the Russians from an attack on Western Europe under all conditions except the most provocative.

We have been much too unwilling as a nation over the last twelve

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years to recognize that Western Europe has emerged from the period of American tutelage and that it has necessarily become restive about American dominance in the area of foreign policy. We have been unwilling to make concessions when those concessions would have been appreciated and perhaps effective. We have refused to admit that the Europeans have a legitimate problem with respect to our nuclear guarantee, or that those under threat of annihilation have some right to representation in the making of the decisions that might lead to it. We have been unwilling to admit that there are conditions under which it may be legitimate to surrender our nuclear veto or that conditions might develop which would make it desirable for us to leave NATO.

We have been caught within a system of rigid myths. Our paralysis of policy has permitted General de Gaulle to constrain our alternatives for us. We have neglected the opportunities to constrain his alternatives for him. This is demonstrated most clearly by the impotence of our policy with respect to the *force de frappe*. If we had told de Gaulle that if he went ahead with the French force we might leave NATO and drop the American nuclear guarantee, and if we had provided some reasonable alternative for the French, he might have found his alternatives constrained. And there would likely have been political opposition in France to the *force de frappe*, for many Frenchmen have been convinced that the *force de frappe* is a supplement, not an alternative, to American nuclear force—a supplement that increases French independence. If the French had to face the added prospect that the United States might sponsor a German nuclear force if the United States withdrew from NATO, the French might feel even more constrained. If we then suggested, as an alternative, that we would help the Europeans to develop a joint European force, considerable support for it might develop. Although this is less desirable than a joint NATO force, it is better than the likely consequences of the present situation. And this may perhaps be the period in which we have our last opportunity to encourage this development.

The creation of a controllable joint European nuclear force would remove the incentive for American withdrawal from NATO. Thus the United States could maintain its conventional forces in Europe and in this way NATO could retain the conventional superiority that is so important for stability. On the other hand, complete American withdrawal, perhaps coupled with the nuclear offer suggested above, may be the only way to shock Europe into unity—a unity that would have a powerful attractive force for the Soviet satellites. And

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the existence of such a Europe might clarify for the United States the advantages of a larger Atlantic Union. This plan, however, seems too much to hope for under likely circumstances.

Senator Fulbright, however, believes that NATO is a viable organization. The consultation on nuclear strategy which Senator Fulbright calls for is a requirement for viability, although it is probably too late. But it is not enough. If the reduction of NATO to impotence is to be averted and if we do not desire a joint European nuclear force, actual control of a NATO nuclear system must be devolved from American control under clearly stated conditions. In "Problems of Coalition and Deterrence," the conditions suggested were Russian first use or a massive Russian incursion in Western Europe, followed by a refusal to withdraw upon notice. Given the change in conventional force balances that has recently occurred in Europe, the latter condition may not be so important any more.

Of course, solving the military problem will not solve the real problem of NATO. It could at best provide time for a political solution. Since it may already be too late to form a joint NATO force, serious attention should be given to the alternative of a joint European nuclear force, lest we also be too late in sponsoring this plan.

V

Senator Fulbright is not a social scientist and it is not legitimate to hold him to the standards of social science. It is, however, saddening to see him discard the conventional wisdom of diplomacy, with its virtues as well as its vices, for social science generalizations that come from the bottom of the heap.

"There is," says Senator Fulbright, "perhaps some instruction for us in the experience of Europe before 1914. None of the great powers of that era actually planned a major war, but each of the two major groupings . . . was beset by fears of attack by the other. . . . Mutual fear generated the arms race, which in turn generated greater fear, until almost by accident Europe was plunged into general war" (p. 51). This assertion lacks any kind of historic depth. The system of mobilization of the great powers obtaining at the time may have played a role in the First World War, but not the arms race. The major factors were political; and the fears that existed, both warranted and unwarranted, were not generated by the arms race. The almost insoluble problem of the Austro-Hungarian Empire lay at the center of this problem. Accidents did play a role, but again not accidents

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closely connected with an arms race. Moreover, what evidence does the Senator have for his assertion that "a continuing arms race, accompanied by mounting fears and tensions, has frequently led to war in the past" (*ibid.*)?

If one thing is clear about the present, it is that some aspects of the arms race have improved the stability of peace in the world we live in, have diminished the probability that a nuclear accident or a provocative situation will produce war, and have made it possible to control nuclear war, if it occurs. Perhaps much of the "detente" which we perceive can be attributed to this greater military stability. Whether a continued arms race would have similar felicitous consequences or whether these would be overbalanced by unfavorable aspects of the arms race is a matter for sober and cautious analysis.

Matters get even worse when the Senator decides that psychologists have a big contribution to make toward understanding the problems of peace and war. The Senator quotes Gordon Allport to the effect that "The crux of the matter lies in the fact that while most people deplore war, they nonetheless *expect* it to continue. *And what people expect determines their behavior.* . . . the indispensable condition of war is that people must expect war, before, under war-minded leadership, they make war."[11] Fulbright says that war is a habit and that one must create the expectation of peace.

It is not possible in this review article to make a full analysis of the kind of muddle-headed thinking that underlies these propositions. The reference terms are completely undefined with respect to their boundary conditions and reflect an ideology rather than intellectual analysis. One might instead argue that if Chamberlain and his group had expected that war was possible, they might have avoided it. The fact is that there is a range of ways in which to settle conflicts; these extend through diplomacy, economic and political moves, armed reprisals, and war. Any intelligent diplomat knows they are all possible, and he attempts to resolve conflict in the least costly way consistent with the set of goals and values that he is trying to implement. The knowledge that a more costly way is possible—that is, that war is possible—reinforces the likelihood of peace. A statesman aware of this is more likely to avoid cornering his opponent or foreclosing all other alternatives than is one who does not believe in the possibility of war.

Some wars may have been started because the rulers of the nations

[11] Gordon W. Allport, "The Role of Expectancy," in Hadley Cantril, ed., *Tensions That Cause Wars* (Urbana, Ill., 1950), 43 and 48; quoted in *Old Myths and New Realities*, 144-45 (italics in original).

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involved believed in war as the most appropriate method of settlement of disputes. Bismarck's small wars in fact did follow this pattern, although, contrary to the expectations of Allport and Fulbright, these wars were expeditious, paid off, and did not produce large war cycles.[12] The generalization is an unsatisfactory explanation of the First World War, except in the tautological sense that it is impossible to fight a war without the expectation that war is possible. This is hardly a startling insight. Moreover, it is foolhardy and costly to believe that peace is probable if faced with a revolutionary opponent who believes in war. In this kind of situation, the expectation of war may improve the chances for peace; and the expectation of peace may increase the probability of war. In any event, the proposition that it is the expectation of war that produces war makes central what is at best peripheral and simple what is surely very complex. To borrow a psychological term, it denies the real problems that produce war and maintain peace and runs to a comforting womb in which all will be well when all think good thoughts.

Senator Fulbright quotes a statement in a letter from Dr. Jerome D. Frank to the effect that "Frightened, hostile individuals tend to behave in ways which aggravate their difficulties instead of resolving them, and frightened, hostile nations seem to behave similarly" (pp. 74-75). This generalization is not very helpful with respect to individual behavior, let alone with respect to state behavior. For instance, I have my students read the psychological literature on paranoia, which points out that trying to satisfy the demands of paranoidal individuals does not satisfy them, but may drive them into making even greater demands. According to much of the literature, the only way to handle such people is to keep paranoids closely controlled. The parallel with Hitler—and, some would think, with the Soviet Union—is obvious. My better students, however, recognize that such generalizations can do more harm than good, for they can divert attention from the concrete aspects of the case to abstract theoretical aspects which, even if they were better validated than psychological theory is, would still apply only statistically, and then only to individual behavior. And one would still need to know that the individual really belonged in the category.

Such psychological theories—and one could find a theory that would support any conceivable pattern of response—have value only when

[12] It could be argued that Bismarck's seizure of Alsace-Lorraine did indirectly have the last-named consequence. This does not affect the principle of the discussion, for the issue of the series is too remote to fall within the terms of the generalization.

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they reinforce analyses made on more relevant grounds. That is, an analysis in depth is made of behavior patterns and situational components. Then, if the theory of personality that seems to apply in the individual case supports the conclusion, it tends to reinforce and corroborate judgment. Even so, it probably has only marginal value. Many of the best analysts state privately that the Freudian categories can be used predictively or prescriptively only when the analyst is familiar with the life history and circumstances of the patient in great detail and in context. This is a kind of knowledge we will not have for the relevant political cases.

If prediction, or prescription, is so difficult for individuals, the problem is even worse when we deal with national entities. The individuals who represent these entities are constrained by colleagues, decision-making processes, and role expectations. They respond to regime pressures we know little about; and much of what we know is probably wrong or out of context. We do not understand either the insulating mechanisms or the triggering devices that operate in these circumstances. The psychological generalizations which have at best only minimal utility when dealing with individuals are worse than useless—indeed, are dangerous—when dealing with matters of high international politics.

Moreover, Dr. Frank's generalization would seem to conflict with well-known information about Russian Bolshevik leadership. The Russians—in the past at least—were concerned with concrete results as opposed to "pride." They found it easier to bargain with hostile enemies whose positions they "understood," and with whom they could make limited and temporary agreements that were mutually advantageous, than with opponents who exuded "good will" and whose motives they could neither understand nor trust. Even where the hostility was overwhelming, as in the case of Hitler, Stalin responded by backing down step by step, even to the extent of not mobilizing adequately at the frontier. If I were incautious, I could assert that the way to deal with the Russians is to keep confronting them with threats. This might be true in individual cases; as a generalization, it is dangerous.

It is better to trust the intuition of the experienced participant than vague psychological generalizations. It is, however, true that the intuition of the trained participant may break down when he operates in a different environment. Roosevelt, for instance, did not really recognize that the techniques of persuasion which worked so well in domestic politics were not very useful when dealing with Stalin and de

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Vol. VI **CONTENTS** **No. 3 (January, 1965)**

Articles

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Gaulle. As a consequence, where agreement seemed essential, he may have repressed the evidence that it did not exist—e.g., in the case of Stalin. Where agreement did not seem essential, he likely recognized disagreement and responded with pique, as in the case of de Gaulle. (Is a repetition of history possible?) The psychologist and anthropologist could help by alerting the practitioner to the range of possible variations and the conditions under which the variations are likely to occur. Dr. Frank, however, does not attempt to open the practitioner's mind to the range of variations but to persuade him of the accuracy of a set of dangerously oversimplified generalizations that have only limited applicability at best. This perverts the utility that a knowledge of psychology might have for the practitioner. Unfortunately, Dr. Frank is not merely a bad example. In general, the psychologists who have been talking loudly about international politics make ridiculous and misleading assertions that they attempt to cloak beneath a certificate of professional skill.

If one treated these generalizations with care, it would be apparent that no conclusions could be drawn from them. For instance, Senator Fulbright's quotation from Dr. Frank does not state that friendly behavior on our part would reduce Russian hostility or that Russian hostility would produce difficulties for us. Practitioners would do well to avoid the half-digested contributions of psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists to the problems of foreign policy. As bad as common sense and conventional wisdom may be, it is much better than what these men have to offer.

VI

There were a number of myths which Senator Fulbright might have dealt with but did not. Why foreign aid, for instance? Except for Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe and for aid to a few selected countries, such as Israel and Taiwan, there is little evidence that our aid has done any good and some that it has done harm. If aid is to be provided primarily as a gesture of sympathy—a not unworthy reason—perhaps we should understand this. If there are other reasons, it is time to discover what they are.

Why support for India? Successful development in democracies in Asia is taking place in Japan and Malaya, but not in India. If we are looking for a counterexample to China, India is the wrong place. Would it really hurt us if India drifted into the Russian orbit in some respects at least? Such a development might support rather than hinder

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American foreign policy requirements. It might worsen the strains between Russia and China and increase the drain upon Russian resources.

Our relations with Japan are much better now that Ambassador Reischauer has replaced Ambassador MacArthur, but why jeopardize these fine relations by maintaining bases which are an irritant and which probably could not be used in any serious crisis? If the Japanese government is not adding its voice to the attack against the bases, this probably stems more from its fears concerning Congress and trade than from lack of resentment. We conceivably may pay a high penalty for not anticipating this problem and resolving it on our own initiative.

We pay lip service to the problem of German unity. In fact, we do not want such unity any more than the French or the Russians. Yet the division of Germany is by far the most plausible cause of central war or of several other extremely uncomfortable developments. Russia's own interests, if she understood them, would lie in the resolution of the issue as long as the fake government of East Germany could be eliminated in a face-saving way. The failure to understand this and to press the issue may be the neatest ostrich trick of the century.

As for the UN, it undoubtedly is a valuable institution that we would do well to support. However, we overload and overvalue the institution in a whole series of ways that cannot be recounted here. There is more cant than wisdom in our attitudes toward the organization. (This is also true with respect to our position on Russian dues.) And this may in fact help more to undermine the UN than to support it. In the same way, the enormous amount of cant on the subject of disarmament may do more to undermine than to support peace, let alone other values.

Does the United States have the will and the skill to act resourcefully in various areas of the globe? Events in Vietnam, Cuba, Africa, Latin America, and Asia call this into question. We lack the will to act, the coldness to engage in counterterror, and the skill to discriminate among contenders for favor. The Congo is a prime instance of the last-named failing. Perhaps we would be much better advised to cut our commitments—not, as Senator Fulbright contends, because we lack the power, but rather because we lack the will and the skill.

I believed that the development of Atlantic Union was the hope of mankind. I would still believe so if it could be made to work. But is not the evidence now against it and even against smaller designs such as NATO? Perhaps we should still try palliatives like the parliamentary union suggested by Senator Fulbright, but perhaps we should also think seriously about more relevant and feasible objectives. What about

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union with Australia? The Australians like us; they are far enough away not to fear our embrace, but to fear its lack. If they joined the union as a State, the Canadians might follow suit. We would then unify much of the northern half of the hemisphere and also would have an outpost in Asia which we could use to protect the Philippines and other interests in that part of the world. If the British later joined, we might eventually link up with a Europe that had united in the meantime. This new American union should not be limited to those of white skin and English tongue, but English-speaking white nations are the more likely early entrants.

We can draw one further inference from the disarray of our alliance structure. Our alliances are no longer sufficiently functional for us to worry excessively about the reactions of our alliance partners to our policies. Our concern for Allied reactions serves more to inhibit policy than the existence of the alliance structure serves to support policy. Although we should not be entirely indifferent to the opinions of our allies, it is plausible that our present hobbled policy further undermines our external support and that a more active and determined policy might create new support when its effectiveness has been demonstrated. Perhaps we should allow support to coalesce, as we did at the time of the missile crisis in Cuba, and not worry even about those cases where it is lacking in the immediate event. Just as every case of Soviet economic aid and of revolution somewhere in the world tends to be feared by the United States, we tend to fear any disruption of the existing alliance structure. This may be far too negative a position. And it likely contributes to the existing paralysis of United States foreign policy.

More examples might be given, but they cannot be developed here. Our criticisms of Washington and of Senator Fulbright have been severe. Perhaps to some extent this has been a one-sided account. There are intelligent, dedicated, courageous, and hard-working individuals who have responsibilities for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and who carry out these responsibilities in the Department of State and in the Executive Office of the President. Still, these organizations do not function well, at least in the top echelons. The contrast with the intellect, sparkle, and skill of the Department of Defense is all too obvious. We have learned the art of war much better than the art of peace. By the most important operational tests, U.S. foreign policy is bankrupt.

At least some of the blame for this bankruptcy of policy can be attributed to the new dysfunctional myths that Senator Fulbright espouses. We do not need these myths. We do need a new analysis that will provide new directions for American foreign policy that are

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more in harmony with American possibilities, resources, ideals, and will than is present American policy. Undoubtedly it is unpleasant to admit the failures of one's hopes and expectations. But mere denial will not change any of the facts. To succeed in an adverse world, we require the courage to view the world as it is and to mold it, so far as lies within our powers and skills, as we would have it. Now is the time for a real great debate—the debate that Senator Fulbright did not provide for us.

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